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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
NIKHIL S. GOKLANEY
Appellant No. 743 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered March 23, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0006369-2014
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., STABILE, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED MAY 03, 2016
Appellant, Nikhil S. Goklaney, appeals pro se from the order entered
March 23, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County. Because
we conclude that the order is not final and/or appealable, we quash.
A detailed description of the facts and procedural history of this case is
unnecessary to our disposition of Appellant’s appeal. Appellant was charged
with one count of harassment, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(7). Appellant’s court-
appointed counsel, Valarie Potell, Esquire, filed a petition to withdraw as
counsel for Appellant. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that
Appellant was not financially eligible for legal representation from the
Dauphin County Public Defender’s Office and granted counsel permission to
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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withdraw. The court’s order, entered March 23, 2015, further barred
Appellant from contacting the Dauphin County Public Defender’s office and
directed that he be excluded from entering the Dauphin County Clerk of
Court’s Office. The court directed that all future discovery requests were to
be directed to the District Attorney’s Office. Appellant filed a timely appeal.
For the reasons that follow, we sua sponte conclude that this order is
not final and/or appealable. See Commonwealth v. Baio, 898 A.2d 1095,
1098 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that the appealability of an order implicates
the jurisdiction of this Court and may be addressed sua sponte). Our
Supreme Court has explained that this Court only has jurisdiction over
appeals taken from final orders. See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 43 A.3d
470, 477 (Pa. 2012). Rule 341(b) of our Rules of Appellate Procedure
defines a final order as any order that:
(1) disposes of all claims and of all parties; or
(2) is expressly defined as a final order by statute; or
(3) is entered as a final order pursuant to subdivision (c) of
this rule.
Here, the trial court’s March 23, 2015 order did not dispose of all
claims because Appellant’s harassment charge has yet to be adjudicated.
Therefore, that order is decidedly interlocutory. We acknowledge, however,
that we may consider interlocutory appeals in certain circumstances.
Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313, an “appeal may be taken as of right from a
collateral order of an administrative agency or lower court.” Pa.R.A.P.
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313(a). Rule 313 defines a collateral order as an order “separable from and
collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too
important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if
review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be
irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). “We construe the collateral order
doctrine narrowly so as to avoid ‘piecemeal determinations' and protracted
litigation.” Commonwealth v. Blystone, 119 A.3d 306, 312 (Pa. 2015)
(some internal quotes and citation omitted).
As previously noted, the March 23, 2015 order accomplished three
things. First, it granted Appellant’s court-appointed counsel permission to
withdraw her representation. Second, it prohibited Appellant from contacting
the Dauphin County Public Defender’s Office. Third, the order barred
Appellant from entry to the Dauphin County Clerk of Court’s Office.
Assuming, arguendo, that the first two elements of the collateral order
doctrine are met, Appellant’s claim cannot satisfy the third element that the
claim will be irreparably lost if review is postponed until final judgment. With
respect to the third element, this Court has explained that
[t]o satisfy this element, an issue must actually be lost if review
is postponed. Orders that make a trial inconvenient for one party
or introduce potential inefficiencies, including post-trial appeals
of orders and subsequent retrials, are not considered as
irreparably lost. An interest or issue must actually disappear due
to the processes of trial.
Commonwealth v. Sabula, 46 A.3d 1287, 1293 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation
omitted).
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Our Supreme Court has held that an order denying defense counsel’s
request to withdraw in a collateral proceeding is not immediately appealable
under the collateral order doctrine. See Commonwealth v. Wells, 719
A.2d 729 (Pa. 1998). The Court reasoned that the third prong of the
collateral order test was not satisfied “since Appellant’s claimed right [to
conflict-free counsel] would not be irreparably lost if review of the order
were postponed until final judgment[.]” Id., at 731.
We find this rational applies equally to the present case. Appellant’s
claim that he has a right to court-appointed counsel will not be irretrievably
lost if he waits until a final judgment is rendered on the harassment charge
to file an appeal of the court’s decision to grant counsel’s petition to
withdraw. Likewise, Appellant can wait until after a final judgment is
rendered to challenge the court’s decision to bar him from entering the clerk
of court’s office and from contacting the office of the public defender.
Alternatively, should Appellant be acquitted of the harassment charge, his
claims would be rendered moot. Since Appellant’s claims would not be
irretrievably lost if review of the order is postponed until final judgment, the
March 23, 2015 order is not appealable under the collateral order doctrine.
Therefore, Appellant’s appeal is interlocutory and we lack jurisdiction.
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Appeal quashed. Motion for appointment of counsel is denied. Motion
for remand is denied. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/3/2016
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