Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC14-842
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JERMAINE C. JACKSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[May 5, 2016]
QUINCE, J.
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in Jackson v. State, 137 So. 3d 470 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). Because
the district court expressly declared a state statute valid, this Court has jurisdiction
to review the decision. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
Appellant, Jermaine Jackson, was convicted of one count of robbery with a
firearm while wearing a mask and sentenced to the statutory maximum of life in
prison. Jackson, 137 So. 3d at 472. Jackson was 20 years old when he committed
the crime, but 21 years old when he was tried and sentenced. If he had been
sentenced under the youthful offender statute, he faced a six-year cap as to his
sentence. Jackson filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, pursuant to Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2), alleging in part that his life sentence was
more severe than other defendants in similar situations. Id. In addition, he argued
that he had a right to be informed of the ability to dispute the court’s imposition of
investigative costs and public defender costs. Id. The trial court did not rule on
the motion within sixty days, and the motion was deemed denied. Id.
Jackson appealed, arguing that: (1) the sentencing court considered
impermissible factors when imposing his sentence; (2) the court erred in denying
his rule 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct illegal sentence on the basis that it was
disparate compared to other similarly situated defendants; (3) the court erred in
denying his rule 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct certain costs imposed against him;
(4) section 958.04 (1)(b), Florida Statutes (2008), Florida’s Youthful Offender Act,
violates equal protection and due process. Id. The Fourth District held that the
sentencing court did not consider any impermissible factors when it sentenced
Jackson and did not err when it denied Jackson’s rule 3.800(b)(2) motion without
an evidentiary hearing. Moreover, the Fourth District held that section
958.04(1)(b) did not violate equal protection or due process. However, the court
did reverse the costs imposed against Jackson. Id.
Before this Court, Jackson raises a facial challenge to the constitutionality of
section 958.04(1)(b). Jackson argues that section 958.04(1)(b) violates equal
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protection because the age-at-sentencing classification creates arbitrary and
irrational distinctions between otherwise eligible defendants. He claims that no
other Florida statute distinguishes between defendants based solely on their age at
sentencing and therefore this classification triggers strict scrutiny. Furthermore,
Jackson argues that section 958.04(1)(b) violates due process because eligibility
implicates liberty interests, and in attempting to be eligible for youthful offender
sentencing, a defendant may forgo certain constitutional rights. For the reasons
that follow, we hold that section 958.04(1)(b) is constitutional as amended and
does not violate equal protection or due process.
In 2008, the Legislature changed the requirements for youthful offender
sentencing from someone who committed a crime before their twenty-first
birthday, to someone who is younger than 21 at the time of sentencing. The
statute, in relevant part, states that
The court may sentence as a youthful offender any person . . . [w]ho is
found guilty of or who has tendered, and the court has accepted, a plea
of nolo contendere or guilty to a crime that is, under the laws of this
state, a felony if the offender is younger than 21 years of age at the
time sentence is imposed.
§ 958.04(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008).
Constitutional challenges to statutes are pure questions of law, subject to de
novo review. Crist v. Ervin, 56 So. 3d 745, 747 (Fla. 2010). Generally, statutes
are presumed constitutional, and the challenging party has the burden to establish
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the statute’s invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Lick, 390 So. 2d
52, 53 (Fla. 1980). It is the Court’s duty to “construe challenged legislation to
effect a constitutional outcome whenever possible.” Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v.
Howard, 916 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. 2005).
A statutory classification will be deemed to violate equal protection only if it
causes “different treatments so disparate as relates to the difference in
classification so as to be wholly arbitrary.” In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d
40, 42 (Fla. 1980), abrogated by Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children v. Zrillic,
563 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1990). Where no suspect classification is involved, “the statute
need only bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state interest.” Id. Some
inequality or imprecision will not “render a statute invalid.” Acton v. Fort
Lauderdale Hosp., 440 So. 2d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 1983).
In analyzing whether or not section 958.04(1)(b) violates equal protection,
the first question is whether or not the statute affects a fundamental right or a
suspect class. Neither this Court nor any other Florida court has determined
whether youthful offender status is a fundamental right. However, courts in other
states have held that youthful offender status is not a fundamental right for eligible
defendants. See People v. Robert Z., 511 N.Y.S.2d 473 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1986)
(“There is no constitutional right to youthful offender treatment. Such treatment is
entirely a gratuitous creature of the Legislature, subject to such conditions as the
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Legislature may impose without violating constitutional guarantees.” (citations
and emphasis omitted)); State v. Johnson, 279 S.E.2d 606, 447 (S.C. 1981) (“The
statutory right to youthful offender treatment is simply not a fundamental right.”);
Hilber v. State, 277 N.W.2d 839, 842 (Wis. 1979) (“Hilber and Mayes argue that
the statutory right to youthful offender treatment is ‘fundamental,’ but their
arguments are not convincing and are not supported by any authority. Indeed,
differences in the treatment of criminal defendants have been viewed as being
subject to the rational basis test.” (citations omitted)). We agree with our sister
courts.
The discretionary nature of youthful offender sentencing provides further
support that it is not a fundamental right for defendants. A “lower court is under
no obligation to sentence [a defendant] under the Youthful Offender Act unless the
lower court believes such a sentence would be appropriate.” Holmes v. State, 638
So. 2d 986, 987 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also Ellis v. State, 475 So. 2d 1021, 1023
(Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (“[A]pplication of the Youthful Offender Act to any particular
defendant is discretionary with the trial judge who is in the best position to
determine whether sentencing under the act is the most desirable treatment for that
defendant.”).
Moreover, the youthful offender statute does not involve a suspect class.
Under a constitutional analysis, a suspect class is one where strict scrutiny is
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required when questions of equal protection arise. Generally, classifications such
as race, national origin, or alienage have been held to be suspect classifications.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 61 (1973). Youth,
however, is not a suspect classification. See art. I, § 2, Fla. Const. (defining the
protected classes as “race, religion, national origin, or physical disability”); see
also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (holding that age is not a
suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause).
Because section 958.04(1)(b) does not affect a fundamental right or suspect
class, the rational basis test applies. Miller v. State, 971 So. 2d 951, 952 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2007). Under rational basis analysis, a statute must be upheld if the
classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government objective. Id.
The statute must be upheld if there is any conceivable state of facts or plausible
reason to justify it, regardless of whether the Legislature actually relied on such
facts or reason. McElrath v. Burley, 707 So. 2d 836, 839 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
The Legislature did not provide guidance when it amended section
958.04(1)(b). However, as the Fourth District noted, an examination of the
statute’s legislative intent gives possible insight into the amendment. The
legislative intent of Chapter 958 states, in relevant part,
The purpose of this chapter is to improve the chances of correction
and successful return to the community of youthful offenders
sentenced to imprisonment by providing them with enhanced
vocational, educational, counseling, or public service opportunities
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and by preventing their association with older and more experienced
criminals during the terms of their confinement.
§ 958.021, Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added).
Section 958.04(1)(b) bears a rational relationship to the legitimate
government objective of preventing the association between young offenders and
older criminals. By requiring that a defendant be sentenced before the age of 21 in
order to be eligible for youthful offender sentencing, section 958.04(1)(b) ensures
that defendants entering the program are truly youthful. It also ensures that
defendants eligible for the program will complete their sentence without being
exposed to more experienced and sophisticated criminals during their
incarceration. Because the statute bears a rational relationship to this legitimate
government objective, it does not violate equal protection.
Substantive due process protects fundamental rights that are so “implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty” that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
were sacrificed.” Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937). Analyzing a
substantive due process claim begins with a “careful description of the asserted
right.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). As discussed above, eligibility
for youthful offender sentencing is not a fundamental right; instead, eligibility is at
the discretion of the trial court. Therefore, section 958.04(1)(b) need only satisfy
the rational basis test. Under substantive due process, the test “is whether the
statute bears a rational relation to a permissible legislative objective that is not
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discriminatory, arbitrary, capricious, or oppressive.” Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
296 So. 2d 9, 15 (Fla. 1974). Courts will not be concerned with whether the
particular legislation in question is the most prudent choice, or is a perfect panacea,
to cure the ill or achieve the interest intended. If there is a legitimate state interest
that the legislation aims to effect, and if the legislation is a reasonably related
means to achieve the intended end, it will be upheld. State v. Walker, 444 So. 2d
1137, 1138-39 (Fla. 2d DCA), aff’d, 461 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1984).
The Youthful Offender statutes are the means to achieve the State’s goal of
providing rehabilitation to young offenders and preventing association between
young offenders and older criminals. Section 958.04(1)(b) as amended serves a
legitimate state interest by ensuring that only those who are truly youthful are
eligible for youthful offender sentencing. By restricting eligibility to those who are
younger than 21 at the time of sentencing, the legislation guarantees that young
offenders will not associate with older, more experienced offenders. For this
reason, section 958.04(1)(b) does not violate due process.
Jackson has failed to demonstrate that section 958.04(1)(b), as amended,
violates equal protection or due process. Accordingly, we affirm the Fourth
District.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion.
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., dissenting.
I dissent because the 2008 legislative change to section 958.04, Florida
Statutes, as to what determines a defendant’s eligibility for youthful offender
sentencing—from the defendant’s age at the time of the offense to the defendant’s
age at the time of sentencing—arbitrarily infringes on the defendant’s fundamental
right to a trial. See ch. 2008-250, § 7, Laws of Fla. A defendant who pleads not
guilty and chooses to go to trial, thereby exercising this fundamental right, is
penalized if the delay inherent in the discovery and trial process causes the
sentencing to occur after the defendant has reached the age of twenty-one—
eliminating his or her eligibility to be sentenced as a youthful offender. A
defendant who commits a crime close to his or her twenty-first birthday may feel
pressured to plead guilty and forego his or her constitutional right to trial solely
because the clock on youthful offender eligibility is ticking.
Prior to the legislative change, the same defendant would be eligible for
youthful offender classification, even if the defendant, in exercising the
fundamental right to trial, turned twenty-one before the trial began. A defendant
should not be forced to relinquish his or her right to a trial in order to obtain the
benefit of a specific sentencing statute that seeks to “improve the chances of
correction and successful return to the community,” by “providing . . . enhanced
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vocational, educational, counseling, or public service opportunities and by
preventing [the] association with older and more experienced criminals during the
terms of [] confinement.” § 958.021, Fla. Stat.
The Legislature provided no reason for the change in what determines
eligibility for youthful offender sentencing. If the legislative justification for the
change is to ensure that young offenders will not associate with older, more
experienced offenders, as the majority speculates, the change does not bear a
reasonable relationship to that objective because the trial court could have
accounted for that factor under the previous statute. Indeed, the legislative intent
of the Youthful Offender Act, even before the 2008 amendment, was in part to
prevent the association of youthful offenders “with older and more experienced
criminals during the terms of their confinement.” § 958.021, Fla. Stat. (2007). For
example, a trial court would have been able to classify a defendant as a Youthful
Offender on the basis of the crime occurring before the defendant turned twenty-
one, but could have considered the defendant’s age at sentencing in determining
the precise Youthful Offender sentence to impose to avoid the defendant’s
association with hardened criminals. See, e.g., § 958.04(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2007)
(providing the court with discretion to impose a split sentence, including a period
of incarceration between one and four years).
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Tying eligibility for youthful offender sentencing to the defendant’s age at
sentencing—the timing of which may be delayed by several factors outside of the
defendant’s control—rather than at the time of the offense, means that two
defendants who commit a crime at the exact same age will be treated differently
solely based on when they are ultimately sentenced. To me, that arbitrariness,
which has an effect on the defendant’s fundamental right to trial, results in a
substantive due process violation. For that reason I dissent.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Statutory
Validity
Fourth District - Case No. 4D11-3174
(St. Lucie County)
Carol Stafford Haughwout, Public Defender, and Nan Ellen Foley, Assistant Public
Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Consiglia Terenzio,
Bureau Chief, and Allen R. Geesey, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach,
Florida,
for Respondent
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