William Morva v. David Zook

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1

WILLIAM CHARLES MORVA,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

DAVID ZOOK, Warden, Sussex I State Prison,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Michael F. Urbanski, District
Judge. (7:13−cv−00283−MFU−RSB)

Argued: March 22, 2016 Decided: May 5, 2016

Before WYNN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Wynn and Senior Judge Davis joined.

ARGUED: Jonathan P. Sheldon, SHELDON, FLOOD & HAYWOOD, PLC,
Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Alice Theresa Armstrong,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Teresa L. Norris, BLUME NORRIS &
FRANKLIN-BEST, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of Virginia, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
DIAZ, Circuit Judge:

William Charles Morva appeals the district court’s

dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and

challenges several aspects of his capital convictions and death

sentence. First, Morva argues that the Virginia circuit court’s

refusal to appoint a prison-risk-assessment expert compels

relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). But because Morva has

identified no clearly established federal law requiring the

appointment of a nonpsychiatric expert, we reject this claim.

Next, Morva asserts three related ineffective-assistance-

of-counsel claims regarding his counsel’s investigation and

presentation of mitigating evidence in his capital sentencing

hearing. Reviewing these claims through the deferential lens of

§ 2254(d), we find neither deficient performance nor resulting

prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Last, we determine whether Morva has shown cause to excuse his

procedurally defaulted claim that counsel was ineffective for

stipulating at the guilt phase of trial that Morva was a

prisoner in lawful custody at the time of the alleged capital

murder. Finding the underlying claim insubstantial under

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), we hold that he has

not.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

2
 I.

A.

In the summer of 2006, Morva was in jail awaiting trial in

Montgomery County, Virginia, on burglary-, robbery-, and

firearm-related charges. He had been in jail for approximately

one year when he escaped and committed the crimes we address in

this appeal. We set out the relevant facts of Morva’s crimes,

as recited by the Supreme Court of Virginia:

Morva was scheduled to go to trial on August 23,
2006. In the evening on August 19, 2006, he informed
the jail personnel that he required medical attention
due to an injury to his leg and forearm. During the
early morning hours of August 20, 2006, Sheriff’s
Deputy Russell Quesenberry, who was in uniform and
armed with a Glock .40 caliber semi-automatic pistol,
transported Morva to the Montgomery Regional Hospital
located in Montgomery County. Morva was wearing waist
chains, but Deputy Quesenberry did not secure Morva’s
allegedly injured arm.

Upon arrival at the hospital, Morva “kept trying” to
walk on Deputy Quesenberry’s right side even though he
was ordered to walk on Deputy Quesenberry’s left side.
Quesenberry was required to have Morva walk on his
left because Quesenberry wore his gun on his right
side. Quesenberry observed that Morva’s limping was
sporadic and “sort of went away.” Also, Nurse Melissa
Epperly observed Morva walking as if he were not
injured.

After the hospital treated Morva, Morva requested to
use the bathroom. Deputy Quesenberry inspected the
bathroom and allowed Morva access. While in the
bathroom, Morva removed a metal toilet paper holder
that was screwed to the wall. As Deputy Quesenberry
entered the bathroom, Morva attacked him with the
metal toilet paper holder, breaking Quesenberry’s
nose, fracturing his face, and knocking him
unconscious. Morva then took Quesenberry’s gun.

3
 Prior to leaving the bathroom, Morva confirmed that
Quesenberry’s gun was ready to fire, ejecting a live
round from the chamber.

After escaping from the bathroom, Morva encountered
Derrick McFarland, an unarmed hospital security guard.
Morva pointed Quesenberry’s gun at McFarland’s face.
McFarland stood with his hands out by his side and
palms facing Morva. Despite McFarland’s apparent
surrender, Morva shot McFarland in the face from a
distance of two feet and ran out of the hospital,
firing five gunshots into the electronic emergency
room doors when they would not open. McFarland died
from the gunshot to his face.

In the morning of August 21, 2006, Morva was seen in
Montgomery County near “Huckleberry Trail,” a paved
path for walking and bicycling. Corporal Eric
Sutphin, who was in uniform and armed, responded to
that information by proceeding to “Huckleberry Trail.”

Andrew J. Duncan observed Morva and then later
observed Corporal Sutphin on “Huckleberry Trail.”
Four minutes later, Duncan heard two gunshots, less
than a second apart. David Carter, who lived nearby,
heard shouting, followed by two gunshots, and saw
Corporal Sutphin fall to the ground.

Shortly thereafter, Officer Brian Roe discovered
Corporal Sutphin, who was dead from a gunshot to the
back of his head. Corporal Sutphin’s gun was still in
its holster with the safety strap engaged. Officer
Roe confiscated Corporal Sutphin’s gun to secure it
and continued to search for Morva.

Later that day, Officer Ryan Hite found Morva lying
in a ditch in thick grass. Even though Morva claimed
to be unarmed, officers discovered Quesenberry’s gun
on the ground where Morva had been lying. Morva’s DNA
was found on the trigger and handle of Quesenberry’s
gun.

Morva v. Commonwealth (Morva I), 683 S.E.2d 553, 557 (Va. 2009).

After a six-day trial, the jury found Morva guilty of assault

and battery of a law-enforcement officer, escape of a prisoner

4
by force or violence, three counts of capital murder, 1 and two

counts of using a firearm in the commission of a murder.

B.

1.

We begin with a brief discussion of Virginia’s capital

sentencing scheme.

Under Virginia law, a capital sentencing hearing proceeds

in two stages. See Tuggle v. Netherland, 516 U.S. 10, 12 n.1

(1995) (per curiam). First, the jury decides whether the

Commonwealth has proved at least one of two statutory

aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt: the defendant’s

future dangerousness and the vileness of his capital offense

conduct. Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-264.2, 19.2-264.4(C). In

evaluating the aggravating factor of future dangerousness, the

jury is limited to considering the defendant’s criminal record,

his prior history, and the circumstances surrounding the

commission of the capital offense. §§ 19.2-264.2, 19.2-

264.4(C). If the jury fails to find an aggravating factor, it

must impose a sentence of life imprisonment; if, however, the

jury finds one or both of the statutory aggravating factors, it

has full discretion to impose either the death sentence or life

1Morva was charged with the capital murder of Derrick
McFarland, the capital murder of Eric Sutphin, and the capital
offense of premeditated murder of more than one person within a
three-year period.

5
imprisonment. See §§ 19.2-264.2, 19.2-264.4(C)–(D); Tuggle, 516

U.S. at 12 n.1.

Although Virginia juries are not instructed to give special

weight to aggravating factors or to balance aggravating and

mitigating evidence, Swann v. Commonwealth, 441 S.E.2d 195, 205

(Va. 1994), juries are constitutionally required to consider

relevant mitigating evidence in determining a sentence in a

capital case, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113–14 (1982).

2.

Prior to trial, Morva moved for the appointment of Dr. Mark

D. Cunningham, a prison-risk-assessment expert, to “rebut the

Commonwealth’s claim that Morva was a future danger to society

and to provide the jury with an assessment of the likelihood

that Morva would commit violence if he were sentenced to life in

prison.” Morva I, 683 S.E.2d at 557. The circuit court denied

the motion, stating that Virginia law barred as irrelevant Dr.

Cunningham’s testimony regarding the environment and structure

of a maximum-security facility as well as testimony regarding

rates of violence among individuals similarly situated to the

defendant. Morva later moved for reconsideration, supported by

a letter from Dr. Cunningham, but the motion was denied.

Morva also sought the appointment of a mental-health expert

and a mitigation specialist, which the circuit court granted.

The court appointed Dr. Bruce Cohen, a forensic psychiatrist;

6
Dr. Scott Bender, a neuropsychologist; and Dr. Leigh Hagan, a

psychologist. All three experts prepared capital-sentencing

evaluations. Dr. Cohen and Dr. Bender diagnosed Morva with

schizotypal personality disorder. 2 Dr. Cohen and Dr. Hagan,

however, noted that there was no evidence indicating that Morva

was experiencing “an extreme mental or emotional disturbance” at

the time of the capital offenses, or that he was “unable to

appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his

conduct to the requirements of the law.” J.A. 2013; see also

J.A. 2025–26 (showing in Dr. Bender’s evaluation that he did not

find to the contrary; rather, he did not consider the issue).

At the sentencing phase, the Commonwealth tendered evidence

of both statutory aggravating factors. Morva called thirteen

witnesses, including Dr. Bender and Dr. Cohen. While Dr. Cohen

testified to Morva’s absence of extreme mental or emotional

disturbance and his ability to appreciate the criminality of his

conduct, the doctor also testified that Morva’s schizotypal

personality disorder mitigated against imposing the death

sentence. The jury ultimately found both aggravating factors

beyond a reasonable doubt and imposed the death sentence on each

of the three capital murder convictions.

2 The disorder “shares some of the biologic, emotional, and
cognitive features of schizophrenia, but the symptoms are of
lesser severity.” J.A. 2015.

7
 On direct appeal (and as relevant here), Morva challenged

the circuit court’s denial of his motion to appoint Dr.

Cunningham as a prison-risk-assessment expert. The Supreme

Court of Virginia found no abuse of discretion, affirmed Morva’s

convictions and sentences, and subsequently denied rehearing.

Two justices dissented from the majority’s decision on the

prison-risk-assessment issue, finding that the circuit court’s

denial of Morva’s motion “result[ed] in a fundamentally unfair

trial in the sentencing phase” because absent Dr. Cunningham’s

testimony and assessment, Morva “was not permitted the means to

effectively respond to the Commonwealth’s assertions” of future

dangerousness. Morva I, 683 S.E.2d at 568–69 (Koontz, J.,

dissenting).

The U.S. Supreme Court denied further review.

C.

Morva then sought post-conviction relief in the Supreme

Court of Virginia. His petition raised, in relevant part, three

of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims before us now.

The Warden filed a motion to dismiss, supported with exhibits

and affidavits, including Dr. Bender’s, Dr. Cohen’s, and Dr.

Hagan’s capital-sentencing evaluations. Morva moved repeatedly

to supplement the record and for discovery, the appointment of

mental-health experts, and an evidentiary hearing. The court

8
denied Morva’s motions and dismissed the habeas petition,

finding no ineffective assistance.

Morva subsequently filed a federal habeas petition under 28

U.S.C. § 2254, raising the claims on appeal here. The district

court held two hearings, permitted supplemental briefing, and

later issued a memorandum opinion dismissing the petition. The

court found that Morva was not entitled to relief under AEDPA’s

deferential standard. It also held that Morva failed to show

cause for his defaulted ineffective-assistance claim.

This appeal followed.

II.

Morva presents five claims. First, he contends that the

Virginia circuit court’s denial of his motion to appoint a

prison-risk-assessment expert violated his Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. Next, Morva raises three related ineffective-

assistance-of-counsel claims regarding counsel’s investigation

into his childhood, family background, and mental-illness

history; counsel’s presentation of mitigating evidence; and

counsel’s assistance to the state-funded mental-health experts.

Finally, Morva appeals the denial of relief on a separate

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, raised for the first

time in the district court, regarding his counsel’s decision

during the guilt phase of trial to stipulate to Morva’s status

9
as a “prisoner in a state or local correctional facility,” who

was “imprisoned, but not yet had gone to trial,” and who was “in

lawful custody” at the time of the charged offenses. J.A. 282–

83.

We consider each argument in turn, “reviewing de novo the

district court’s denial of [Morva’s] petition for a writ of

habeas corpus.” Gray v. Zook, 806 F.3d 783, 790 (4th Cir.

2015).

A.

We turn first to Morva’s prison-risk-assessment claim.

Because the Supreme Court of Virginia adjudicated this claim on

the merits, we may not grant Morva habeas relief unless the

court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” Gordon v. Braxton,

780 F.3d 196, 202 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting § 2254(d)).

Our evaluation of a state’s application of clearly

established federal Supreme Court precedent depends on the

specificity of the clearly established law. “[W]here the

‘precise contours’ of [a] right remain ‘unclear,’ state courts

enjoy ‘broad discretion’ in their adjudication of a prisoner’s

claims.” Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1377 (2015) (per

10
curiam) (second alteration in original) (quoting White v.

Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1705 (2014)). Similarly, when the

Supreme Court has not yet “confront[ed] ‘the specific question

presented by [a particular] case,’ the state court’s decision

[cannot] be ‘contrary to’ any holding” of the Supreme Court.

Id. (quoting Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2014) (per

curiam)).

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit

precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists

could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s

decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)

(quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

Thus, “[t]he question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court

believes the state court’s determination was incorrect but

whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially

higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473

(2007).

The Supreme Court of Virginia did not unreasonably reject

Morva’s claim that he was constitutionally entitled to a state-

funded prison-risk-assessment expert. Morva improperly frames

the court’s alleged error as an unconstitutional prohibition on

his right to present mitigating evidence. But this presents the

issue “at too high a level of generality.” Woods, 135 S. Ct. at

1377. Rather, Morva challenges the Supreme Court of Virginia’s

11
decision that due process did not require the appointment of a

state-funded nonpsychiatric expert—particularly where other

state-funded experts had been provided—because he did not make

the required showing under Virginia law.

We conclude that the Supreme Court of Virginia reasonably

applied clearly established federal law in rejecting Morva’s

challenge. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed

a capital defendant’s right to a state-funded nonpsychiatric

expert. The Court has only ruled on an indigent defendant’s due

process right to a state-funded psychiatrist when he makes “a

preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense

is likely to be a significant factor at trial.” Ake v.

Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74, 79 (1985). Since Ake, “the Supreme

Court ha[s] flatly declined to resolve the question of what, if

any, showing would entitle an indigent defendant to [state-

funded] non-psychiatric assistance as a matter of federal

constitutional law.” Weeks v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 249, 265–66

(4th Cir. 1999).

Absent federal precedent on the issue, the Supreme Court of

Virginia has crafted a rule to determine when due process

requires a state-funded nonpsychiatric expert. In Husske v.

Commonwealth, the court announced the “particularized need”

standard: “an indigent defendant who seeks the appointment of an

expert witness, at the Commonwealth’s expense, must demonstrate

12
that the subject which necessitates the assistance of the expert

is ‘likely to be a significant factor in his defense,’ and that

he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance.” 476

S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va. 1996) (citation omitted) (quoting Ake, 470

U.S. at 82–83). To satisfy this burden, the defendant must

demonstrate that the “expert would materially assist him in the

preparation of his defense” and that the expert’s absence “would

result in a fundamentally unfair trial.” Id.

We have said that the Husske standard is “congruent with

the requirements of the federal Constitution.” Bramblett v.

True, 59 F. App’x 1, 9 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Page v. Lee,

337 F.3d 411, 415–16 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that North

Carolina’s particularized-need test, which mirrors Virginia’s,

“is surely a reasonable interpretation of Ake”). Thus, the

Supreme Court of Virginia did not unreasonably apply clearly

established federal law in requiring Morva to show a

particularized need for his requested expert.

Turning to the Supreme Court of Virginia’s application of

the Husske test to Morva’s case, we find no constitutional

violation warranting habeas relief under § 2254(d). The court

first addressed the three cases on which Morva relied in support

of his claim—Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), Skipper v.

South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), and Simmons v. South

Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994)—and found they did not dictate the

13
result he urged. Morva I, 683 S.E.2d at 564–66. The court then

discussed Virginia precedent on the relevance of prison-

environment evidence to a future-dangerousness assessment and,

finding irrelevant and therefore inadmissible an “essential”

part of Dr. Cunningham’s proffered testimony (i.e., his

testimony regarding prison life, prison security, and statistics

on similarly situated defendants’ instances of violence in

prison), concluded that “the circuit court did not err or abuse

its discretion in denying [Morva’s] motion” because Morva did

not satisfy the particularized-need test. Id. at 565–66.

The Supreme Court of Virginia’s conclusion that Gardner,

Skipper, and Simmons do not support the constitutional rule

Morva asserts is neither contrary to, nor involves an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

Gardner concerned a court’s imposition of the death penalty on

the basis of a confidential presentence report that was never

disclosed to the defense. 430 U.S. at 353 (plurality opinion).

Vacating and remanding the case for resentencing, the U.S.

Supreme Court announced that the imposition of a death sentence

“on the basis of information which [the defendant] had no

opportunity to deny or explain” is unconstitutional. Id. at 362

(plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (finding a due process

violation); id. at 364 (White, J., concurring in the judgment)

(finding an Eighth Amendment violation); id. (Brennan, J.,

14
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joining the

plurality’s due process reasoning).

The Court relied on this general principle years later in

Skipper, when it considered a capital defendant’s right to

present mitigating evidence regarding future dangerousness when

the prosecution asserts that aggravating factor, lest the

defendant be sentenced to death on information he was never

allowed to challenge. 476 U.S. at 5 n.1. The Court’s holding,

however, was narrow:

[T]he only question before us is whether the exclusion
from the sentencing hearing of the testimony
petitioner proffered regarding his good behavior
during the over seven months he spent in jail awaiting
trial deprived [him] of his right to place before the
sentencer relevant evidence in mitigation of
punishment. It can hardly be disputed that it did.

Id. at 4 (emphasis added).

Finally, Simmons announced yet another narrow expansion of

a capital defendant’s right to introduce mitigating evidence.

The Court there held that when “the defendant’s future

dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits the

defendant’s release on parole, due process requires that the

sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole

ineligible.” Simmons, 512 U.S. at 156 (plurality opinion); id.

at 177–78 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Where the

State puts the defendant’s future dangerousness in issue, and

the only available alternative sentence to death is life

15
imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles

the defendant to inform the capital sentencing jury—by either

argument or instruction—that he is parole ineligible.”). 3

These cases do not clearly establish a capital defendant’s

right to a state-funded nonpsychiatric expert. See White, 134

S. Ct. at 1702 (“‘[C]learly established Federal law’ for

purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only ‘the holdings, as opposed

to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions.’” (alteration in

original) (quoting Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1187

(2012))). Confined as we are under AEDPA, we conclude that the

Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision regarding a right whose

“‘precise contours’ . . . remain ‘unclear,’” is neither contrary

to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. Woods, 135

S. Ct. at 1377 (quoting White, 134 S. Ct. at 1705).

The Supreme Court of Virginia’s separate determination that

Morva failed to show a particularized need for the expert also

does not run afoul of clearly established law. The court’s

classification of prison-environment evidence as irrelevant and

therefore inadmissible is not unreasonable under U.S. Supreme

Court precedent. Nor is the court’s similar determination

3 Together, the three-justice plurality and Justice
O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy,
“provid[ed] the dispositive votes necessary to sustain [the
judgment].” O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 158 (1997).

16
regarding statistical evidence of similarly situated inmates and

instances of prison violence.

A defendant’s constitutional right to present mitigating

evidence related to his character, criminal history, and the

circumstances of his offense does not upset a state court’s

broad discretion in determining the admissibility of other,

nonindividualized evidence. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,

604 & n.12 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“Nothing in this opinion

limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as

irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant’s character,

prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.”); see also

Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 362 (1993) (“[Lockett and its

progeny] do not bar a State from guiding the sentencer’s

consideration of mitigating evidence. Indeed, we have held that

‘there is no . . . constitutional requirement of unfettered

sentencing discretion in the jury, and States are free to

structure and shape consideration of mitigating

evidence . . . .’” (second alteration in original)). Thus, the

Supreme Court of Virginia did not unreasonably apply U.S.

Supreme Court precedent by deeming irrelevant evidence that did

not relate specifically to Morva’s character, background,

criminal record, or the circumstances of his offense—i.e.,

evidence regarding general prison life and security offered to

show that Morva’s “opportunities to commit criminal acts of

17
violence in the future would be severely limited in a maximum

security prison.” Burns v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d 872, 893

(Va. 2001).

Finally, the Supreme Court of Virginia did not unreasonably

decide the facts. Morva contends otherwise, but he does not

identify the alleged factual error. We assume he takes issue

with the court’s finding that the inadmissible evidence of

general prison life and security was “essential” to Dr.

Cunningham’s proffered testimony. Morva I, 683 S.E.2d at 566.

But Dr. Cunningham’s own statements to the circuit court compel

this finding. In his letter, he wrote that an individualized

prison-risk assessment “is only meaningful if it takes into

account the person’s future setting, if known, and the frequency

of serious violence by people with similar characteristics in

similar settings.” J.A. 176. His declaration also noted that

the proffered group-statistical data and prison-environment

evidence are “necessary” and “critically important” to a

“reliable violence risk assessment.” J.A. 145–46. Accordingly,

we hold that Morva’s prison-risk-assessment claim does not

warrant federal habeas relief.

B.

Next we consider Morva’s nondefaulted ineffective-

assistance-of-counsel claims. First we determine the

appropriate standard of review. Then we turn to the merits.

18
 1.

The district court applied § 2254(d) to Morva’s

nondefaulted claims, and we review that decision de novo.

Gordon, 780 F.3d at 202. For AEDPA’s deferential standard to

apply to the state post-conviction-relief court’s dismissal of

these claims, the court’s decision must qualify as an

“adjudicat[ion] on the merits” under § 2254(d); otherwise, de

novo review is proper. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting

§ 2254(d)). “Whether a claim has been adjudicated on the merits

is a case-specific inquiry,” Winston v. Pearson (Winston II),

683 F.3d 489, 496 (4th Cir. 2012), but “[a] claim is not

‘adjudicated on the merits’ when the state court makes its

decision ‘on a materially incomplete record,’” Gordon, 780 F.3d

at 202 (quoting Winston v. Kelly (Winston I), 592 F.3d 535, 555

(4th Cir. 2010)). “A record may be materially incomplete ‘when

a state court unreasonably refuses to permit “further

development of the facts” of a claim.’” Id. (quoting Winston

II, 683 F.3d at 496). Morva argues that the state court’s

denial of the appointment of experts and an evidentiary hearing

resulted in a decision on a materially incomplete record. We

disagree.

Although the Supreme Court of Virginia precluded some

factual development as to counsel’s investigative

decisionmaking, the court did not act unreasonably. The record

19
was substantial and contained sufficient evidence to answer the

Strickland inquiry. Moreover, the record provided reasons for

counsel’s decisions not to interview or call certain witnesses

at the sentencing phase, and included cumulative information

about Morva’s background that counsel received through witness

interviews. And trial transcripts show the extent of mitigating

evidence presented to the jury.

Moreover, there is no doubt that the Supreme Court of

Virginia considered this substantial record in ruling on Morva’s

ineffective-assistance claims. See Morva v. Warden of Sussex I

State Prison (Morva II), 741 S.E.2d 781, 789–90 (Va. 2013)

(discussing the “double-edged” nature of submitted affidavits

regarding Morva’s background and character, and evaluating the

quality and implications of Morva’s mental-health evidence).

We therefore review Morva’s remaining nondefaulted claims

under AEDPA’s highly deferential standard. Under AEDPA, we

defer to the state court’s judgment, and under clearly

established Supreme Court precedent, the state court defers to

counsel’s presumptive “sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 689 (“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be

highly deferential.”). It was Morva’s burden before the state

court to show both that counsel’s performance was deficient—that

“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness”—and that he suffered prejudice as a result—by

20
showing “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Id. at 688, 694. “The likelihood of a

different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.”

Richter, 562 U.S. at 112.

“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task,”

id. at 105 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371

(2010)), and “[e]stablishing that a state court’s application of

Strickland was unreasonable [or contrary to clearly established

federal law] under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult,” id.

This double-deference standard effectively cabins our review to

a determination of “whether there is any reasonable argument

that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id.

2.

Morva asserts that counsel was ineffective in failing to

(1) adequately investigate his background, history, character,

and mental illness; (2) provide all available information to the

mental-health experts to ensure accurate evaluations; and

(3) adequately present the available mitigating evidence to the

jury. Although Morva identifies these as three distinct claims,

his briefs address them together, and we will resolve them as

such. The post-conviction-relief court found that Morva failed

to satisfy both Strickland prongs. We first review the court’s

21
decision on deficient performance, before considering whether

Morva met his burden as to prejudice.

a.

Regarding deficient performance, the Supreme Court of

Virginia held that counsel’s investigation and presentation of

mitigating evidence did not fall below an objective standard of

reasonableness. See Morva II, 741 S.E.2d at 789 (calling

counsel’s investigation “exhaustive,” finding that counsel spoke

with the affiants on whom Morva’s claim relies, and

characterizing the affiants’ would-be testimony as “double-

edged” (quoting Lewis v. Warden of Fluvanna Corr. Ctr., 645

S.E.2d 492, 505 (Va. 2007))). Similarly, the court found that

counsel adequately assisted the mental-health experts. Id. at

790 (finding that Morva failed to show an indication of “true

mental illness” to alert counsel).

The Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision on deficient

performance does not warrant federal habeas relief. As to the

investigation, Morva challenges trial counsel’s alleged failure

to investigate Morva’s multigenerational family history by

conducting “little or no investigation of [Morva’s] immediate

family” and only “cursory interviews with [Morva’s mothers’]

family members.” Appellant’s Br. at 50, 57. The record shows,

however, that counsel hired a mitigation expert and interviewed

many of the family-member affiants who did not testify at trial

22
and on whom Morva relies to show ineffective assistance,

including Morva’s mother, sister, paternal half-sister, one of

his brothers, and two of his aunts. Notably, Morva’s mother’s

affidavit provides a thorough account of Morva’s father’s

Hungarian background and American immigration and of her own

family history, J.A. 1071–1082, and it also states that she

“shared a good deal of information contained in th[e] affidavit

with [Morva’s capital defense team]” through “several

conversations with [them] over a period of more than a year,”

id. at 1115.

While Morva complains that counsel could have interviewed

other family members and spent more time gathering information

from those family members that were interviewed, he points to no

U.S. Supreme Court case establishing that counsel’s effort

constitutes deficient performance or that counsel’s decision not

to pursue this line of mitigating evidence was constitutionally

unreasonable. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“[A] court must

indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is,

the defendant must overcome the presumption that . . . the

challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”

(quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955))).

Indeed, clearly established federal law supports the

Supreme Court of Virginia’s deference to counsel’s performance

23
in this instance. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533

(2003) (“Strickland does not require counsel to investigate

every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how

unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant at

sentencing.”); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (finding that when

counsel has “reason to believe that pursuing certain

investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel’s

failure to pursue those investigations may not later be

challenged as unreasonable”). Given the doubly deferential

standard of AEDPA, we cannot conclude that the Supreme Court of

Virginia unreasonably applied Strickland when it held that

counsel’s investigation into Morva’s family history was not

“outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.”

466 U.S. at 690.

Regarding the presentation of mitigating evidence, Morva

has not shown that counsel performed deficiently. The jury

heard from thirteen witnesses, including the mental-health

experts who evaluated Morva. Witnesses testified to Morva’s

absent parents and his tumultuous relationship with them,

including that his mother was at times homeless and unable to

care for him; Morva’s own nomadic lifestyle and homelessness as

a young adult; his ongoing health problems; his nonviolent and

compassionate nature; and his odd, somewhat fantastical beliefs

and behavior.

24
 These sympathetic and humanizing facts compose the bulk of

the affidavits Morva presented to the Supreme Court of Virginia

to show inadequate investigation and presentation of mitigating

evidence. That the mitigating evidence Morva insists should

have been presented at trial is merely cumulative to the

evidence actually heard by the jury further undercuts Morva’s

claim for deficient performance. See Wong v. Belmontes, 558

U.S. 15, 22–23 (2009) (per curiam) (rejecting the view that

counsel should have presented additional “humanizing evidence”

about the defendant’s “difficult childhood” and “positive

attributes,” and stating that “[a]dditional evidence on these

points would have offered an insignificant benefit, if any at

all”).

The same can be said about the additional evidence that

Morva says counsel should have provided to the mental-health

experts. Dr. Bender and Dr. Cohen found that Morva suffered

from schizotypal personality disorder. In reaching this

diagnosis, they conducted interviews with Morva, his mother, and

his sister; performed diagnostic tests and evaluations of Morva;

and considered a plethora of documents from counsel, including

reports of interviews with Morva’s acquaintances. Morva

presents no evidence that counsel should have believed these

sources were insufficient for the experts to conduct a reliable

and accurate mental-health evaluation, or that providing the

25
cumulative evidence that Morva identifies would have materially

altered their assessments of his mental condition.

Morva contends that it was objectively unreasonable for

counsel to fail to provide the experts certain family medical

records and the names of three acquaintances who he claims had

“invaluable insight into [his] mental state.” Appellant’s Br.

at 66. But Dr. Bender and Dr. Cohen learned, through their

evaluations and interviews, of Morva’s maternal family history

of schizophrenia. And Morva did not show the Supreme Court of

Virginia how his three acquaintances’ relationships with him

gave them “invaluable insight” into his mental health at the

time of the capital offenses, or that counsel should have known

of their value to the defense. Thus, the court did not

unreasonably apply Strickland or its progeny when it held that

Morva failed to substantiate his claim that counsel performed

deficiently.

b.

As to prejudice, the Supreme Court of Virginia found that

“Morva has not demonstrated what impact, if any,” the new

family-background evidence “had on his actions,” and concluded

that the information “does not mitigate Morva’s actions.” Morva

II, 741 S.E.2d at 789. The court also found that Morva failed

to show that “the mental health experts who examined Morva in

preparation for trial and sentencing would have changed the[ir]

26
expert[] conclusions” if they had received the additional

information from counsel. Id. at 790. These decisions are not

unreasonable.

On appeal, Morva presents a cumulative prejudice argument.

He contends that the “inadequate investigation of [his] multi-

generational history deprived [the] jurors of a complex,

multifaceted description of [him] as a human being.”

Appellant’s Br. at 69. Additionally, he claims that had counsel

given the mental-health experts all known Morva-family history

and the contact information of Morva’s close acquaintances,

“there is a reasonable probability [that] the court-appointed

mental health experts would have diagnosed Morva with” a more

serious mental illness. Id. at 76. In turn, counsel “could

have had an explanation for the jury that Morva’s mental illness

was a but-for cause of the violence, reducing his moral

culpability and providing a strong argument for life in prison

rather than a death sentence.” Id. at 79.

This claim fails. First, Morva’s arguments relate to the

jury’s finding that his conduct was vile, but it does nothing to

combat the future dangerousness aggravating factor. And the

jury imposed the death penalty not only on the basis of what

Morva had done, but also on the probability that he might commit

violent crimes in the future.

27
 Second, Morva fails to show a reasonable likelihood that

the evidence of his family history and the anecdotal evidence of

his mental state—had it been presented—would have resulted in a

life sentence. His argument regarding the probability of a

different diagnosis is too speculative given the record and the

lack of any support from the mental-health experts. See Pooler

v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 702 F.3d 1252, 1268, 1279 (11th

Cir. 2012) (finding no § 2254(d) error with the state post-

conviction-relief court’s determination that the defendant did

not show prejudice because he “failed to demonstrate that [the

mental-health experts] would have changed their opinions had

they conducted more in-depth psychological evaluations or been

provided with his records” (quoting Pooler v. State, 980 So. 2d

460, 469 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam))); Roberts v. Dretke, 381 F.3d

491, 500 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that the prisoner failed to

establish Strickland prejudice in part because “there is no

evidence in the record suggesting that [the mental-health

expert] would change the psychiatric diagnosis in his report

based on a review of Roberts’s [undisclosed] medical records”). 4

4
Morva unsuccessfully sought to supplement the record with
an affidavit and unsworn preliminary report from two clinical
psychologists who, years after the capital offenses and Morva’s
schizotypal-personality-disorder diagnosis, reviewed the
documents produced throughout the litigation. The affidavit and
report, which the Supreme Court of Virginia declined to
consider, push for additional mental-health evaluations to
(Continued)
28
 Further, the record lacks the alleged “red flags” that

would have “‘point[ed]’ [the experts] to a more serious mental

illness.” Appellant’s Br. at 58 (quoting Rompilla v. Beard, 545

U.S. 374, 392 (2005)). Dr. Cohen thoroughly explained the eight

(out of nine) symptoms indicative of schizotypal personality

disorder that Morva displayed. Dr. Cohen discussed each symptom

individually and also distinguished the personality disorder

from an acute disease state with examples of how symptoms

manifest in both conditions. Morva’s three acquaintances’

accounts of his mental state are consistent with Dr. Cohen’s

account of the schizotypal symptoms Morva manifested after the

capital offenses. It is therefore unlikely the experts would

have changed their minds on the basis of the acquaintances’

anecdotes. And there is no reasonable probability that at least

one juror would have changed his sentencing vote on the basis of

additional lay-witness testimony regarding Morva’s “complex,

multifaceted” humanity.

determine whether Morva had a more serious mental illness at the
time of the capital offenses. Morva also attached to his
federal habeas petition a declaration from a psychiatrist, who
did not evaluate him directly but reviewed some litigation
documents and the trial mental-health experts’ evaluations, and
opined that Morva suffers from schizophrenic symptoms. However,
these submissions do nothing to show that Dr. Cohen, Dr. Bender,
and Dr. Hagan would have come to a different medical conclusion
at the time of Morva’s sentencing—the prejudice question before
us now.

29
 Last, when we “reweigh the evidence in aggravation against

the totality of available mitigating evidence,” it is clear that

Morva fails to show prejudice. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534. Even

the most sympathetic evidence in the record about Morva’s

troubled childhood and mental health 5 does not outweigh the

aggravating evidence presented at trial. “While we have no

doubt that the conditions in the home and the treatment of

[Morva and his] siblings made for an unpleasant living

environment, they do not tip the aggravation-mitigation scale in

favor of mitigation.” Phillips v. Bradshaw, 607 F.3d 199, 219

(6th Cir. 2010). Because the Supreme Court of Virginia’s no-

prejudice determination was neither contrary to nor involved an

unreasonable application of clearly established law, we reject

Morva’s ineffective-assistance claims.

C.

Finally, we turn to Morva’s claim of ineffective assistance

arising from counsel’s stipulation at the guilt phase of trial.

To convict Morva of prisoner escape, the jury was required to

5The affidavit of Constance “Connie” Beth Dye, one of
Morva’s aunts, relates the most revealing and troubling
information about Morva’s childhood. Ms. Dye characterizes
Morva’s father as a moody and controlling “monster” and his
mother as absent and mentally troubled. See J.A. 1030–43. She
also details the squalor of Morva’s early childhood: the house,
including the children’s room, smelled bad and was littered with
trash and food remnants, and the children were malnourished and
dirty. See J.A. at 1032–38.

30
find that Morva was, prior to escaping, lawfully imprisoned and

not yet tried or sentenced, or lawfully in the custody of law

enforcement. See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-478. Recall that, when

he escaped and committed the capital offenses, Morva was in jail

awaiting trial on pending charges for, inter alia, armed

robbery. After the trial court ruled, in Morva’s favor, to

prohibit the introduction into evidence of the substance of

Morva’s pending charges, defense counsel and the Commonwealth

stipulated to the following:

[O]n the dates in question for the crimes charged,
that is August 20th and August 21st of 2006, . . . the
Defendant was a prisoner in a state or local
correctional facility. . . . [T]he Defendant was
imprisoned, but not yet had gone to trial on the
criminal offenses, and . . . the Defendant was in
lawful custody. That is the extent of the
stipulation.

J.A. 282–83.

Morva contends that this stipulation improperly admitted an

essential element of the capital-murder charge involving the

shooting of Derrick McFarland, the hospital security guard. To

satisfy its burden as to capital murder, the Commonwealth was

required to prove that Morva shot and killed McFarland when he

was “confined in” jail or otherwise “in the custody of” a jail

employee. See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(3). Morva argues that

when he killed McFarland, he had escaped from Deputy

Quesenberry’s custody and was not physically confined in jail,

31
so the stipulation precluded either a successful motion to

strike or an acquittal on that charge.

Morva concedes that the claim, raised for the first time to

the district court, is procedurally defaulted. He argues,

however, that his state post-conviction counsel’s failure to

raise the claim in the Supreme Court of Virginia, serves as

cause to excuse his procedural default. We do not agree.

A habeas petitioner is generally barred from obtaining

federal habeas review of a claim if he failed to exhaust the

claim in state court. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

750 (1991). In Martinez, the Supreme Court carved out a “narrow

exception” to the Coleman rule. 132 S. Ct. at 1315.

Specifically, Martinez held:

[W]hen a State requires a prisoner to raise an
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in a
collateral proceeding, a prisoner may establish cause
for a default of an ineffective-assistance
claim . . . . where appointed counsel in the initial-
review collateral proceeding, where the claim should
have been raised, was ineffective under the standards
of Strickland v. Washington. To overcome the default,
a prisoner must also demonstrate that the underlying
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a
substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner
must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.

Id. at 1318 (citation omitted). Because state prisoners in

Virginia cannot raise ineffective-assistance claims on direct

appeal, and because state post-conviction counsel failed to

challenge counsel’s stipulation, the claim is squarely in

32
Martinez territory. See Fowler v. Joyner, 753 F.3d 446, 462

(4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1530 (2015).

The district court, however, properly found that this was

“no[t] [a] substantial claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel” and dismissed it for procedural default. Morva v.

Davis (Morva III), No. 7:13-cv-00283, 2015 WL 1710603, at *28

(W.D. Va. Apr. 15, 2015).

Even if the stipulation, which mirrors the elements of the

prisoner escape offense, conceded an element of the capital-

murder charge under section 18.2-31(3), it does not constitute

ineffective assistance. It is not objectively unreasonable for

counsel to stipulate to a fact that the government can prove.

See United States v. Toms, 396 F.3d 427, 433–34 (D.C. Cir. 2005)

(finding no deficient performance when counsel stipulated to a

fact the government was prepared to show through witness

testimony).

The Commonwealth could easily have shown that Morva was a

“prisoner confined” despite the fact that he was physically

outside of the jail and had escaped law enforcement’s custody.

In Mu’Min v. Commonwealth, the defendant was charged and

convicted of capital murder under section 18.2-31(3) 6 for killing

someone after escaping from an off-site prison work detail. See

6 At the time, section 18.2-31(3) was codified as 18.2-
31(c). See Mu’Min, 389 S.E.2d at 889.

33
389 S.E.2d 886, 889–90 (Va. 1990) (describing the facts

underlying the conviction), aff’d on other grounds sub nom.

Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991). On appeal to the

Supreme Court of Virginia, the defendant challenged as overly

prejudicial the admission into evidence of a copy of his

previous conviction, which was offered to prove the “prisoner

confined in a state or local correctional facility” element of

the capital murder charge. Id. at 894. The court found no

reversible error and noted that a jury instruction, which was

expressly charged to define the “prisoner confined” element on

the basis of the defendant’s legal status as an inmate and not

on his physical location or whether he escaped, was “a correct

statement of the law.” Id. at 894 & n.7.

Mu’Min makes clear that the Commonwealth could have shown,

through evidence of Morva’s pending charges, that he was a

“prisoner confined” when he killed McFarland. Cf. Simmons v.

Commonwealth, 431 S.E.2d 335, 335–36 (Va. Ct. App. 1993)

(explaining that, in the context of escape under Virginia law,

the defendant remained a “prisoner in a state, local or

community correctional facility” even while released on furlough

because the term refers to the prisoner’s legal status, which

“is not dependent upon actual physical presence in such facility

or otherwise restricted by a prisoner’s location”). Thus,

counsel’s strategic choice was not deficient performance.

34
 Moreover, the stipulation did not prejudice Morva for

substantially the same reason. Jury Instruction No. 9, which

was charged without objection, provides that “[a] prisoner of a

state or local correctional facility remains a prisoner at all

times until he is released from that status by the proper state

authority. A prisoner who escapes from custody retains the

status of prisoner during the entire course of such an

unauthorized absence.” J.A. 492. This instruction is almost

identical to the one charged in Mu’Min. See 389 S.E.2d at 894

n.7. So even without the stipulation, the Commonwealth could

have proven that Morva’s killing of McFarland satisfied the

elements of capital murder under section 18.2-31(3). As a

result, Morva’s claim that his counsel was ineffective is not

substantial and was properly dismissed for procedural default.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

judgment.

AFFIRMED

35