15-692
Williams v. Correctional Officers
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 6th day of May, two thousand sixteen.
PRESENT:
JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
GUIDO CALABRESI,
PETER W. HALL,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
Randy Williams,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 15-692
John/Jane Does, Correctional Officers
Responsible for Delivery of Ramadan
Trays, Upstate Correctional Facility, Gerard
Jones, Upstate Correctional Facility,
Defendants-Appellees.
_____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Randy Williams, pro se, Malone, NY
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Zainab Chaudhry, Assistant Solicitor General,
New York State Office of the Attorney General,
Albany, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York (Suddaby, C.J.; Peebles, M.J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and
REMANDED for further proceedings.
Appellant Randy Williams, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court
also dismissed Williams’s claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”). Williams does not challenge this latter dismissal on appeal. We assume the
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on
appeal.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the
complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Chambers v.
Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which protects the free exercise of
religion, extends to prisoners and includes their right to meals that comport with religious
requirements. Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588, 597 (2d Cir. 2003); see also McEachin v.
McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 203-04 (2d Cir. 2004). We have not yet decided whether a prisoner
asserting a free-exercise claim must, as a threshold requirement, show that the disputed conduct
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substantially burdened his sincerely held religious beliefs. Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215,
220-21 (2d Cir. 2014). It is not necessary to resolve this issue here, however, because Williams
does not argue that the substantial burden threshold requirement is inapplicable and instead argues
that he met the requirement. See Ford, 352 F.3d at 592 (declining to address whether a prisoner
must meet the substantial burden threshold requirement in a free exercise case because he did not
raise the issue on appeal).
Assuming that the substantial burden requirement applies, this Court’s precedent leads us
to conclude that Williams plausibly alleged that his religious exercise was unconstitutionally
burdened. See Holland, 758 F.3d at 221 (declining to address the continued viability of the
substantial burden requirement where this Court’s precedent reveals that inmate’s religious
exercise was unconstitutionally burdened); McEachin, 357 F.3d at 203 (noting that “courts have
generally found that to deny prison inmates the provision of food that satisfies the dictates of their
faith does unconstitutionally burden their free exercise rights,” and determining that prisoner, a
practicing Muslim, stated a free exercise claim by alleging that the restrictive diet of “loaf” was not
properly blessed as required by Islam); Ford, 352 F.3d at 593-94 (holding that defendants were not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on question whether prisoner’s religious exercise was
unconstitutionally burdened when he was denied an Eid ul Fitr feast, which he characterized as
religiously significant to his practice of Islam). To satisfy the substantial burden requirement, a
prisoner claiming a violation of his free exercise rights must show “that the disputed conduct
substantially burden[ed] his sincerely held religious beliefs.” Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263,
274-75 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 477 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[A] substantial
burden exists where the state puts substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to
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violate his beliefs.” (quotation and alterations omitted)). We have reasoned that when
determining whether a prisoner’s religious beliefs have been substantially burdened, the relevant
question is whether the infringed-upon religious activity is considered central or important to the
prisoner’s practice of his religion. McEachin, 357 F.3d at 203; Ford, 352 F.3d at 593-94. Here,
Williams’s complaint alleged that the premature sunset meals forced him to either forego his meal
or break his fast; he characterized fasting for Ramadan as important to his practice of Islam and
stated that eating before sunset was a “grave spiritual sin” that canceled the “validity” of fasting.
Consequently, Williams successfully alleged a plausible free exercise claim. See Ford, 352 F.3d
at 593-94. The district court relied on non-binding case law when it determined that Williams’s
burden was de minimis because only a few of his meals were delivered prematurely; its reasoning
is inconsistent with this Court’s case law, which cautions against “the danger that courts will make
conclusory judgments about the unimportance of the religious practice to the adherent . . . .” Id. at
593.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED as to its
dismissal of Williams’s RLUIPA claim, VACATED as to its dismissal of Williams’s § 1983
claim, and REMANDED for further proceedings.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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