FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY 06 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YUSHI ZHANG, No. 13-72359
Petitioner, Agency No. A087-886-758
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 4, 2016**
Pasadena, California
Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Yushi Zhang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming an
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of Zhang’s application for asylum, withholding
of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review factual findings for
substantial evidence. Al Jun Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014).
Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s and IJ’s adverse credibility
determinations, we deny the petition for review.
Our analysis is governed by the REAL ID Act. Under the REAL ID Act,
“[i]nconsistencies no longer need to ‘go to the heart’ of the petitioner’s claim to
form the basis of an adverse credibility determination.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590
F.3d 1034, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). “Major
inconsistencies on issues material to the alien’s claim of persecution constitute
substantial evidence supporting an adverse credibility determination,” while
“minor inconsistencies regarding non-material and trivial details . . . cannot form
the exclusive basis for an adverse credibility determination.” Rizk v. Holder, 629
F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2011). “[W]e must uphold the IJ’s adverse credibility
determination so long as even one basis is supported by substantial evidence . . . .”
Id.
Zhang contends that the Chinese government persecuted him for practicing
Christianity by arresting him at a home church meeting and detaining him at a
police station. In affirming the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, the BIA relied on
an inconsistency between the written statement accompanying Zhang’s asylum
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application and his oral testimony as to whether Zhang was beaten by Chinese
police at the police station. Zhang’s asylum application stated multiple times that
the police beat him, but his oral testimony revealed that this did not occur. When
questioned about this inconsistency, Zhang stated that he believed the rough
treatment that he received during his detention, which included being dragged and
handcuffed to a radiator in an uncomfortable, half-squatting position for
approximately half an hour, amounted to being beaten. The IJ was not convinced
by this explanation, noting that to be “beaten” plainly means to be physically
struck. Zhang was never struck by a police officer.
This inconsistency constitutes substantial evidence supporting the BIA’s and
IJ’s adverse credibility determinations.1 Whether Zhang was beaten by police
bears on the central events underlying Zhang’s claim of persecution and is not
trivial. The record does not compel us to reach a contrary result. See 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(4)(B).
Because the BIA’s and IJ’s adverse credibility findings are supported by
substantial evidence, we cannot overturn the denial of Zhang’s application for
1
The BIA also relied on two other lack-of-credibility findings by the IJ
in denying Zhang’s application. We need not discuss those findings because we
must uphold the adverse credibility finding based solely on the ground discussed
above. See Rizk, 629 F.3d at 1088.
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asylum and withholding removal. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th
Cir. 2003). Further, the IJ permissibly denied Zhang’s CAT application, which
rested on the same evidence as his asylum application. Id. at 1157.
The IJ also found that a letter from Zhang’s church in the United States was
not particularly probative of his practice of Christianity in the U.S. because the
letterhead looked unofficial and the author was not present to testify. Zhang
contends that he should have been provided notice that corroboration of his
religious practice was required, and an opportunity to provide such evidence. We
have held that “[a]n applicant must be given notice of the corroboration required,
and an opportunity to either provide that corroboration or explain why he cannot
do so.” Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2011). Such notice-and-
opportunity protection, however, extends only to applicants who are “otherwise
credible.” Lai v. Holder, 773 F.3d 966, 976 (9th Cir. 2014). Because, as explained
above, Zhang is not an “otherwise credible” applicant, he was not entitled to such
protection.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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