In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 15‐2079
JOSEPH S. ROBERTS,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants‐Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 12 C 828 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.
ARGUED JANUARY 12, 2016 — DECIDED MAY 6, 2016
Before BAUER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and PETERSON,*
District Judge.
BAUER, Circuit Judge. Defendant‐appellee, Columbia College
Chicago (“Columbia”), terminated plaintiff‐appellant, Profes‐
sor Joseph Roberts (“Roberts”), after it discovered that Roberts
plagiarized several chapters in a textbook that he composed in
*
Of the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin,
sitting by designation.
2 No. 15‐2079
2004. Roberts filed suit against Columbia and several Colum‐
bia faculty members. In his complaint, Roberts pleaded
multiple theories of recovery. All defendants moved for
summary judgment, which the district court granted. Roberts
appealed the grant of summary judgment in regards to his
claims for breach of contract and age discrimination in viola‐
tion of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”),
29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. For the following reasons, we affirm the
district court’s ruling.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Textbook
Columbia hired Roberts in 1999 as a tenure‐track professor
in the Arts, Entertainment and Media Management Depart‐
ment (“AEMM Department”). Roberts achieved tenured status
in 2003. His tenure rights were secured by a contract entitled
“Columbia College Chicago Statement of Policy on Academic
Freedom, Faculty Status, Tenure, and Due Process” (the
“Statement of Policy”).
In late 2003, Roberts believed there were no good, reason‐
ably priced textbooks on the subject of economics as applied to
the arts. So, he began creating a new custom textbook with the
help of his AEMM Department colleague Clark Greene and
several graduate students in the AEMM Department. This
process involved working with a publishing company to
compile materials from other textbooks into one new custom
textbook. Roberts worked with publisher McGraw‐Hill and
used materials from three current textbooks: Issues in Economics
Today by Robert Guell; Economics is Everywhere by Daniel
Hamermesh; and Basic Economic Concepts by Werner Sichel and
No. 15‐2079 3
Peter Eckstein. The final product, Economics for Arts Entrepre‐
neurs and Managers, consisted primarily of the copied material
from the three textbooks. Roberts and Clarke Greene also
prepared original material, such as the first chapter.
Roberts testified in his deposition that he sent McGraw‐Hill
photocopies of the three covers of the textbooks, reference
sections, and copyright sections. When his textbook was
published, however, the cover was titled: Economics for Arts
Entrepreneurs and Managers: with selected material from Issues in
Economics Today and Economics is Everywhere. The cover also
lists the following authors in order: Dr. Joseph S. Roberts,
Robert C. Guell, and Daniel S. Hamermesh. The textbook does
not reference or cite Basic Economic Concepts by Sichel and
Eckstein. Further, the inside cover page states, “Peer review,
class testing, and accuracy are primarily the responsibility of
the author(s).”
Roberts intended to use Economics for Arts Entrepreneurs and
Managers for his 2004 fall semester class. He requested a final
proof of the textbook from McGraw‐Hill prior to its publica‐
tion, but never received one. Instead, the first time Roberts saw
the completed textbook was when he purchased it at Colum‐
bia’s bookstore, after his students for the 2004 fall semester had
arrived in class with the textbook already purchased. Upon
reviewing it, Roberts noticed several errors, such as omitting
the reference to Basic Economic Concepts by Sichel and Eckstein,
as well as the lack of reference pages at the end of each chapter.
Roberts testified that after he identified the errors, he made
a phone call to McGraw‐Hill to inform the publisher of the
problem, but did not send a follow‐up letter or email detailing
4 No. 15‐2079
the issues. He also provided his students with a corrected
reference page. He understood at that time that not citing the
Sichel and Eckstein textbook was a “serious error” and created
a “big problem” for his book. Ultimately, Roberts and several
other colleagues decided to never use Economics for Arts
Entrepreneurs and Managers again due to the errors and its
price. Roberts made no further efforts to ensure McGraw‐Hill
corrected the omission.
Sometime around either December 2005 or January 2006,
Roberts approached graduate student Nissan Wasfie
(“Wasfie”), and asked for his assistance updating Economics for
Arts Entrepreneurs and Managers. Roberts intended to correct
the original textbook’s reference errors in the updated version.
Wasfie agreed to help, however, the updated version never
came to fruition because a dispute arose over money that
Roberts allegedly owed Wasfie. The original publication was
never corrected.
Roberts updated his curriculum vitae in 2009 and 2011.
Both times he listed Economics for Arts Entrepreneurs and
Managers under his list of publications.
B. Roberts’ Age Discrimination Evidence
In 2010, Roberts served on a search committee to name the
AEMM Department Chairperson. The committee identified
who they believed was the best candidate, but that individual
refused the position due to issues regarding the terms of
employment. Eliza Nichols, the Dean of the School of Fine and
Performing Arts at Columbia (“Nichols”), then called the
individual members of the search committee and asked them
to approve Philippe Ravanas (“Ravanas”) as the new chairper‐
No. 15‐2079 5
son, which each member did. Roberts testified that Ravanas
was the committee’s “reluctant second choice,” and that
Roberts wished the committee was able to convene as a whole
prior to making the decision.
Contention arose between Roberts and Ravanas sometime
after Ravanas was appointed the AEMM Department Chair‐
person. Ravanas commented that Roberts and other older
members of the faculty did not fit the “image” that Ravanas
desired to create, as he wanted to portray a “young and hip
look for the program.” At that time, Roberts was about fifty
years old. Ravanas also removed a photograph of Roberts from
the online directory because he believed it did not project the
look he wanted for the AEMM Department. In addition, two
other tenured professors of the AEMM Department submitted
sworn testimony that Ravanas was “hostile” towards older
members of the faculty.
Ravanas had other disputes with Roberts as well. On
February 23, 2011, Ravanas sent Roberts an email asking him
to explain why Roberts received a $250 per month cellphone
allowance from Columbia when no other professor did, why
Roberts submitted a request for $950 to cover a membership
fee for an organization when that organization’s website listed
the fee as $125, and why Roberts identified himself as associ‐
ated with the Coleman Foundation after the AEMM Depart‐
ment had cut ties with the group. On April 12, 2011, Ravanas
sent Roberts another email questioning why Roberts was listed
on the Coleman Foundation’s website, why the Self Employ‐
ment in the Arts Conference website listed Roberts as having
a PhD in Entrepreneurship when it was actually in Education,
and why Roberts’ biography on the AEMM Department
6 No. 15‐2079
website indicated he designed entrepreneurship programs for
inner‐city neighborhoods when he had not provided this
information to the Department before. Roberts responded that
he would contact the websites and ask them to correct the
information.
C. Plagiarism Investigation
At some point in 2004, before Roberts published Economics
for Arts Entrepreneurs and Managers, Wasfie noticed graduate
students in Roberts’ office had open textbooks on Roberts’ desk
and were typing from them. Wasfie became suspicious that
Roberts had committed plagiarism, but did not mention this to
anyone at that time.
Wasfie developed a brain tumor in the fall of 2010, and
went on leave from December 2010 through March 2011 to
recover from brain surgery. Wasfie testified that while on
leave, he reflected on “life in general,” “justice,” and “doing
what’s right.” He decided during this time to investigate
whether Roberts had plagiarized Economics for Arts Entrepre‐
neurs and Managers. He went to the library to research his
suspicions, and eventually compared Roberts’ textbook with
Basic Economic Concepts by Sichel and Eckstein.
In mid‐March 2011, Wasfie approached Ravanas with the
results of his investigation. He informed Ravanas that a
significant part of Economics for Arts Entrepreneurs and Managers
was unattributed. Wasfie also provided Ravanas with a copy
of Roberts’ textbook and information regarding the unattri‐
buted sections from Sichel and Eckstein’s Basic Economic
Concepts.
No. 15‐2079 7
In his deposition, Roberts testified that he had indicated the
reference error to Wasfie years earlier when Roberts sought
Wasfie’s assistance with updating the textbook. Roberts also
testified that he did not think Wasfie harbored any antagonism
towards him, and he believed that someone “put [Wasfie] up
to” informing the faculty of Roberts’ plagiarism. Roberts
acknowledged that he had no evidence other than his own
speculations as to whether Ravanas, or anyone else, coerced or
induced Wasfie to make the plagiarism allegation against him.
After Wasfie informed Ravanas of the plagiarism, Ravanas
compared Roberts’ Economics for Arts Entrepreneurs and Mana‐
gers with Sichel and Eckstein’s Basic Economic Concepts. He
concluded that eight chapters from Roberts’ textbook consisted
almost entirely of unattributed excerpts from the Sichel and
Eckstein textbook. This amounted to approximately 10,000
unattributed words total. He prepared a written memorandum
detailing his findings. Ravanas forwarded the memorandum
to Nichols in early April 2011, who then reviewed the memo‐
randum and compared the relevant textbooks. Nichols also
concluded that plagiarism had occurred and informed the vice
president for academic affairs, the provost, and the general
counsel’s office about her findings.
During this same time period, Roberts and other faculty
members were organizing their complaints against Ravanas’
leadership of the AEMM Department. On May 2, 2011, Roberts
and several of his colleagues issued a formal complaint against
Ravanas. On May 31, 2011, Roberts and the other faculty
members met with Louise Love, who was then‐Vice President
of Academic Affairs (“Love”), regarding the situation. Immedi‐
8 No. 15‐2079
ately afterwards, Roberts met with Nichols for a previously
scheduled meeting.
There are two conflicting accounts of how the May 31, 2011,
meeting between Nichols and Roberts transpired. According
to Roberts, Nichols accused him of committing plagiarism, told
him that he had five minutes to resign, and that if he refused
to resign the plagiarism would go on his record. Roberts also
testified that Nichols did not show him the memorandum from
Ravanas, did not give him an opportunity to present his side
of the story, and told him to go to his office and think about his
family and career. According to Nichols, she asked Roberts to
review Ravanas’ memorandum and address the charges
contained therein, but Roberts did not get through the first
line. She testified that Roberts claimed that the title of the book
was wrong, and thus he was not the author of the book. She
acknowledged giving him the option to resign and told him to
think about it, but denied saying that he only had five minutes
to decide. She also testified that Roberts was “very confusing”
throughout the meeting and “had absolutely no comprehensi‐
ble excuse for what he did.” Both agree that Roberts called
Nichols later that day and informed her that he would not
resign.
In June 2011, Love was appointed interim provost of
Columbia. As provost, she had the authority to terminate
tenured faculty members. Shortly after her appointment, she
was informed of the plagiarism charge against Roberts. She
investigated the matter by comparing Roberts’ Economics for
Arts Entrepreneurs and Managers with Sichel and Eckstein’s
Basic Economic Concepts. After reviewing the two sources, she
concluded that there was “substantial plagiarism” in Roberts’
No. 15‐2079 9
textbook. She also spoke with Nichols about the matter and
reviewed the memorandum prepared by Ravanas. Love did
not speak with Roberts as part of her investigation because she
believed “[t]he evidence spoke for itself.” She also testified that
it was irrelevant whether the mistake was Roberts’ fault or
McGraw‐Hill’s fault, because “[t]he author is responsible for
the material.”
After her investigation, Love decided to terminate Roberts’
employment. She testified that Columbia made no attempt to
address his conduct other than by termination because “[t]he
nature of his offense didn’t allow for that,” since “[h]is viola‐
tion of the standard of academic integrity was quite egre‐
gious.”
On June 9, 2011, Love sent Roberts a letter terminating his
employment with Columbia. The letter stated, “In accordance
with Section IX(A)(2) of the [Statement of Policy], your
termination is due to academic dishonesty related to plagia‐
rized passages within your book, Economics for Arts Entrepre‐
neurs and Managers.” It went on to state that “your continued
participation in the affairs of [Columbia] is likely to be detri‐
mental to [Columbia’s] reputation and will cause academic
harm to [Columbia].” The letter concluded that Roberts was
“hereby suspended without pay pending an internal review
you may wish to seek.”
Upon receiving the letter, Roberts sent an email to Love
with a list of clarifications. Love did not respond. Following
this, Roberts did not seek the internal review procedures
referenced in the termination letter. He stated in his deposition
that he “didn’t see any point in doing that” based on his
10 No. 15‐2079
previous experience serving as a member of the internal review
panel, known as the Elected Representatives of the College
(“ERC”). He further testified that “the ERC powers were
reduced, so it was no longer an oversight as intended to be.”
On February 6, 2012, Roberts filed a civil lawsuit against
Columbia, Nichols, and Ravanas. He made several claims
against Columbia, such as breach of contract, retaliatory
discharge, defamation, and discrimination under Title VII, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; the ADEA; and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. He
also brought other claims against all of the defendants, and
against Ravanas individually. All defendants filed motions for
summary judgment in regards to all counts, which the district
court granted on April 21, 2015. Roberts appealed the district
court’s ruling as to whether summary judgment was appropri‐
ate in favor of Columbia for Roberts’ breach of contract claim
and his ADEA discrimination claim.1 So, Columbia is the only
appellee in this matter.
1
Roberts also alleged that the district court improperly resolved disputed
issues of material fact in favor of Columbia, improperly rejected testimony
in favor of Roberts as “self‐serving,” and improperly construed facts, made
credibility determinations, and drew inferences in favor of Columbia. Since
we review grants of motions for summary judgment de novo, whether the
district court erred in this regard is not determinative of whether this court
should reverse and remand. Under de novo review, Roberts can rely upon
his brief to argue anew how the relevant facts and reasonable inferences
drawn from them, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, show
that Columbia was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law or that a
genuine dispute of material fact exists.
No. 15‐2079 11
II. DISCUSSION
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, while construing all facts and drawing all reasonable
inferences within the record in favor of Roberts. Harris v.
Warrick Cty. Sheriffʹs Depʹt, 666 F.3d 444, 447 (7th Cir. 2012)
(citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate if the
moving party shows that no genuine dispute of material fact
exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
In its brief, Columbia argues that this court cannot hear
Roberts’ claims because the Statement of Policy precludes
judicial review by limiting Roberts’ relief to the college’s
internal ERC review process. So, before we can address the
merits of Roberts’ appeal, we must determine whether the
claims were properly brought before the court.
A. Statement of Policy’s Preclusion of Judicial Review
Columbia argues that the Statement of Policy provides that
the ERC process was Roberts’ sole recourse for reviewing the
merits of Columbia’s decision to terminate his employment. In
support, it cites the following provision from the Statement of
Policy:
A faculty member who wishes to challenge or
seek review of the Provost/Senior Vice Presi‐
dent’s decision to sanction or dismiss him or her
may do so solely in accordance with the follow‐
ing provisions of this Section IX.D.2.b., allowing
for a review by the [ERC].
12 No. 15‐2079
Columbia relies on the word “solely,” as well as the
extensive ERC review procedures set forth within Section
IX.D.2.b. of the Statement of Policy, to argue that the contract
prevented judicial review of the merits of Love’s decision to
terminate Roberts’ employment.
Initially, we note that Columbia never presented this
argument to the district court. Rather, Columbia argued that
Roberts had to seek ERC review as a prerequisite for obtaining
judicial review. Thus, it made an exhaustion of remedies
argument, not the argument that the Statement of Policy
summarily prevented Roberts from bringing his claim to the
court. As a result, Columbia has waived any argument that the
Statement of Policy precludes judicial review. See Domka v.
Portage Cty., Wis., 523 F.3d 776, 783 (7th Cir. 2008).2
Further, even if the argument were preserved, we find that
the Statement of Policy does not prevent judicial review of
Roberts’ claims. Neither party provided any binding authority
regarding whether a private university could preclude judicial
review of the merits of a decision to dismiss a tenured profes‐
sor. While we generally avoid reviewing the merits of deci‐
2
At oral argument, Columbia claimed that seeking ERC review was a
prerequisite for seeking judicial review of whether the termination
procedures were properly followed, but that a court could never review the
substantive merits of the decision to terminate a tenured professor. Since
Columbia never argued this in its brief, it is waived and we need not
address it. See Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150, AFL‐CIO v. Rabine,
161 F.3d 427, 432 (7th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted) (although party presented
argument before district court and at oral argument, the argument was not
in the appellate brief, and “arguments not raised in a brief are waived”).
No. 15‐2079 13
sions to grant tenure, see, e.g., Blasdel v. Northwestern Univ., 687
F.3d 813, 816 (7th Cir. 2012), it is unclear whether private
universities can contractually prevent the court from reviewing
the substantive merits of a university’s decision to dismiss a
tenured faculty member.
In examining this issue, we find that McConnell v. Howard
University, 818 F.2d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1987), provides persuasive
authority. In McConnell, a tenured professor sued Howard
University for breach of contract after his employment was
terminated. Id. at 59. The district court applied a deferential
standard of review because the faculty handbook stated that in
reviewing faculty grievances, “[t]he decision of the Board of
Trustees shall be final.” Id. at 67. The District of Columbia
Circuit reversed, finding the contract did not limit judicial
review of university decisions to terminate tenured faculty
members. Id. at 67–68. “Such a reading of the contract renders
tenure a virtual nullity. Faculty members like Dr. McConnell
would have no real substantive right to continued employment,
but only certain procedural rights that must be followed before
their appointment may be terminated.” Id. at 67 (emphasis in
original). Although the contract language stated that the Board
of Trustees’ decision was final, the court found that this only
clarified that there were no “further avenues of review within
the University.” Id. at 68 (emphasis in original). The court
reasoned, “If we were to adopt a view limiting judicial review
over the substance of the Board of Trustees’ decision, we
would be allowing one of the parties to the contract to deter‐
mine whether the contract had been breached. This would
make a sham of the parties’ contractual tenure arrangement.”
Id.
14 No. 15‐2079
This case parallels McConnell. The Statement of Policy’s
language states that terminated tenured professors wishing to
seek review of the decision “may do so solely in accordance
with the following provisions of this Section IX.D.2.b., allowing
for a review by the [ERC].” This does not mandate ERC review
as the sole recourse available, and that terminated tenured
professors cannot seek judicial review. Rather, it states that
terminated professors who “wish” to challenge the provost’s
decision “may do so solely in accordance with” the procedures
specified within the contract. As in McConnell, the provision
here merely clarifies the internal review procedures for
professors seeking to challenge the termination decision within
Columbia itself. It does not prevent terminated tenured profes‐
sors from bringing their claims to court. Further, tenure would
be an illusory benefit if we interpreted the Statement of Policy
as preventing Roberts from filing suit to challenge the merits
of Columbia’s decision to terminate his employment.
Therefore, since Columbia waived its argument that the
Statement of Policy precluded judicial review, and the State‐
ment of Policy does not prevent judicial review, we find that
Roberts properly brought his breach of contract complaint
before the court. So, we turn to the merits of his claim.
B. Breach of Contract
Both parties agree that Illinois law governs Roberts’ breach
of contract claim. Under Illinois law, to sustain a breach of
contract claim a plaintiff must prove: “(1) the existence of a
valid and enforceable contract; (2) substantial performance by
the plaintiff; (3) a breach by the defendant; and (4) resultant
damages.” W.W. Vincent & Co. v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 351
No. 15‐2079 15
Ill. App. 3d 752, 286 Ill. Dec. 734, 814 N.E.2d 960, 967 (2004). In
this case, Roberts’ tenure rights were secured by the Statement
of Policy, which both parties agree constitutes a contract
between Roberts and Columbia.
Roberts argues that Columbia breached two separate
provisions of the Statement of Policy. He first claims that Love
did not conduct an “appropriate” investigation into the
plagiarism charge. He also argues that Columbia breached the
contract by not imposing less severe sanctions to remedy his
conduct. We address each issue separately.
1. Whether Love Conducted an Appropriate Inves‐
tigation
The pertinent language from the Statement of Policy
regarding Roberts’ first claim is as follows: “the Provost/Senior
Vice President will undertake such investigation and comply
with such procedures as he or she believes appropriate.”
Roberts acknowledges that the Statement of Policy granted
Love discretion in determining how to investigate the plagia‐
rism charge. But he argues that she still had to exercise her
discretion in good faith. Roberts alleges that Love did not
exercise her discretion in good faith because plagiarism
contains an intent element, yet Love never attempted to
discern whether Roberts intentionally plagiarized. Instead, her
investigation consisted of comparing the relevant chapters
from Roberts’ Economics for Arts Entrepreneurs and Managers
with the corresponding text from Sichel and Eckstein’s Basic
Economic Concepts, consulting with Nichols (who had previ‐
ously met with Roberts regarding the matter), and reviewing
the memorandum prepared by Ravanas.
16 No. 15‐2079
We disagree that as a matter of law plagiarism necessarily
contains an intent element. In Seitz‐Partridge v. Loyola University
Chicago, the Illinois appellate court examined an almost
identical issue in a case involving a graduate student who was
accused of plagiarism. 2013 Ill. App. (1st) 113409, 369 Ill. Dec.
692, 987 N.E.2d 34, 42 (2013). The graduate student argued that
she did not commit plagiarism because any plagiarism that
occurred was unintentional. Id. In its analysis, the court
examined the student handbook and found that it did not
contain an intent element for its definition of plagiarism. Id.
The court also examined the two university committees’
investigations against her, and found that neither made a
finding that the plaintiff intentionally plagiarized. Id. As a
result, the student could not create a genuine dispute of
material fact by arguing that she did not intend to plagiarize.
Id. at 42–43. In this case, Roberts similarly cannot point to
anything in the Statement of Policy defining plagiarism, nor
did Provost Love make a finding that he acted intentionally.
Thus, whether he intentionally plagiarized is irrelevant.
Roberts also argues that Love’s investigation was not
undertaken in good faith because she did not examine whether
he took efforts to remedy his plagiarism. Specifically, he claims
that he called McGuire‐Hill to report the problem, did not use
the textbook for future classes, and distributed corrected
reference pages to his students. We note, however, that he
failed to remove the plagiarized textbook from his curriculum
vitae for several years. Regardless, the fact that Roberts took
some efforts to remedy his plagiarism is not relevant in this
matter. The question before us is not whether Love’s
investigation was maximally thorough; it is only whether she
No. 15‐2079 17
acted in good faith when she exercised her discretion under the
Statement of Policy to determine an “appropriate” investiga‐
tion into whether Roberts plagiarized. Love had a documented
case of serious plagiarism. She made a reasonable decision that
she had the evidence she needed, and Roberts has not adduced
evidence to show her bad faith. We conclude that Columbia
did not breach the Statement of Policy.
2. Whether Lesser Sanctions Were Required
Roberts also claims that Columbia breached the Statement
of Policy by not imposing less severe sanctions against him to
remedy his conduct. The pertinent language reads:
The College is authorized … to dismiss a
faculty member with a Tenured Appointment
for Cause. Prior to dismissing such a faculty
member, the College will, in ordinary circum‐
stances, attempt to correct the conduct giving
rise to Cause by other less severe action. Dis‐
missal is appropriate if such action has failed to
end such conduct within a specified period of
time or other less severe action is inappropriate
and contrary to the best interests of the College
because of the nature or seriousness of the con‐
duct. (Emphasis added.)
Plagiarism is not an “ordinary circumstance” in the
academic community. As Columbia cited in its brief,
“[p]lagiarism is considered by most writers, teachers, journal‐
ists, scholars, and even members of the general public to be the
capital intellectual crime.” Richard A. Posner, The Little Book
of Plagiarism 107 (2007). Roberts himself admitted that “[i]n
18 No. 15‐2079
academia, plagiarism is considered an egregious and serious
offense.”
Roberts argues that, based on the broad Statement of Policy
language, it is necessarily a jury question whether his conduct
constituted “ordinary circumstances” in which less severe
action was required.3 We acknowledge that it may be difficult
in some instances to distinguish between an “ordinary circum‐
stance” and a case in which the “nature or seriousness of the
conduct” justifies termination. It is clear, though, that in the
academic realm few charges are more serious than plagiarism.
Therefore, it was perfectly reasonable for Love to find that the
“nature or seriousness” of Roberts’ plagiarism within Econom‐
ics for Arts Entrepreneurs and Managers was such that it was
improper to attempt to correct his conduct through less severe
action. See Korf v. Ball State Univ., 726 F.2d 1222, 1228 (7th Cir.
1984) (finding that the university reasonably interpreted the
faculty ethics provision prohibiting “exploitation of students
for … private advantage” to include the professor’s sexual
exploitation of his students). As a result, her decision to
terminate Roberts’ employment, rather than impose less severe
sanctions, did not breach the Statement of Policy.
3
Roberts relies on a district court case, Lerman v. Turner, 2013 WL 4495245
(N.D. Ill. 2013), to support this argument. Lerman is an unpublished district
court opinion that has no binding precedential authority over this court.
Wirtz v. City of South Bend, 669 F.3d 860, 863 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations
omitted) (“A district court decision does not have precedential effect … that
is, it is not an authority, having force independent of its reasoning, and to
which therefore a court with a similar case must defer even if it disagrees,
unless the circumstances that justify overruling a precedent are present.”).
No. 15‐2079 19
C. ADEA Claim
Roberts also claims that Columbia’s termination of his
employment constituted unlawful discrimination on account
of his age. “The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to
refuse to hire or otherwise discriminate against an individual
‘because of such individual’s age.’” Ripberger v. Corizon, Inc.,
773 F.3d 871, 880 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)).
ADEA protection extends to individuals who are 40 years of
age or older. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). A plaintiff asserting an ADEA
claim may proceed under the direct or indirect method of
proof. Fleishman v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 698 F.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir.
2012). In this case, Roberts has proceeded under the direct
method of proof, which requires him to either present a direct
admission from Columbia that he was fired for age discrimina‐
tory reasons, or show a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial
evidence that “points directly to a discriminatory reason for
[Columbia’s] action.” Id. (citations omitted). Further, Roberts
must “show evidence that could support a jury verdict that age
was a but‐for cause of the employment action.” Id. at 604
(citations omitted).
In this case, Love made the decision to terminate Roberts.
Roberts has not produced any evidence indicating that she had
any animus against him on account of his age. Instead, Roberts
argues that under a “cat’s paw” theory of liability, Ravanas’
hostility against Roberts on account of his age could be
imputed to Love due to Ravanas’ involvement in the termina‐
tion process.
“In employment discrimination law the ‘cat’s paw’ meta‐
phor refers to a situation in which an employee is fired or
20 No. 15‐2079
subjected to some other adverse employment action by a
supervisor who himself has no discriminatory motive, but
who has been manipulated by a subordinate who does have
such a motive and intended to bring about the adverse
employment action.” Cook v. IPC Int’l Corp., 673 F.3d 625, 628
(7th Cir. 2012). To prevail on his cat’s paw theory, Roberts has
to show that Love’s decision was “decisively influenced by
someone who was prejudiced.” Blasdel, 687 F.3d at 817 (empha‐
sis in original) (citations omitted). Even if we assume that
Ravanas’ comments to Roberts and the affidavits from Roberts’
colleagues were sufficient to show that Ravanas was preju‐
diced against Roberts on account of his age, there is no
evidence that Ravanas “manipulated” or “decisively influ‐
enced” Love’s decision to terminate Roberts’ employment.
In Woods v. City of Berwyn, we found that the Supreme
Court’s holding in Staub v. Proctor Hospital changed cat’s paw
liability in this circuit such that we no longer require the
subordinate with the discriminatory animus to be the “singular
influence” on the decision‐maker. 803 F.3d 865, 869 (7th Cir.
2015). But we noted that the Supreme Court still left open the
possibility for cases in which a subordinate’s discriminatory
animus is too remote to the decision‐maker to sustain a cat’s
paw theory of liability. Id. at 870. Specifically, in instances
where the final decision‐maker conducted his or her own
investigation into the matter, we stated:
If the ultimate decision‐maker does determine
whether the adverse action is entirely justified
apart from the [subordinate’s] recommendation,
then the subordinate’s purported bias might not
subject the employer to liability. This is consis‐
No. 15‐2079 21
tent with our previous holdings that “the chain
of causation can be broken if the unbiased
decision‐maker conducts a meaningful and
independent investigation of the information
being supplied by the biased employee.”
Schandelmeier–Bartels v. Chi. Park Dist., 634 F.3d
372, 383 (7th Cir. 2011). To hold otherwise would
be to rule that whenever a discriminatory subor‐
dinate makes an allegation or institutes a charge
and the plaintiff‐employee is fired, there are no
steps the ultimate decision‐maker could ever
take to break that chain of proximate causation.
That cannot be so.
Id.
In this case, Love conducted her own investigation into
whether to terminate Roberts’ employment. She read Roberts’
Economics for Arts Entrepreneurs and Managers and compared
the controversial chapters with the specific un‐credited
sections from Sichel and Eckstein’s Basic Economic Concepts. By
examining the primary sources, she determined for herself that
Roberts had committed plagiarism. In addition, Love consulted
with Nichols after Nichols had previously met with Roberts
regarding the situation. Although Love also reviewed Ravanas’
memorandum, it is clear that she conducted a “meaningful and
independent investigation” into the matter apart from relying
on Ravanas’ recommendations. Further, Roberts does not
contest the accuracy of Ravanas’ memorandum, and in fact
admitted the accuracy of substantially all of the allegations
contained therein. Also, there is no evidence that any other
tenured professor, of any age, had engaged in similar plagia‐
22 No. 15‐2079
rism and had not been fired. Thus, there is no reasonable
inference that Ravanas’ age hostility against Roberts manipu‐
lated Love’s decision to terminate Roberts’ employment.
Roberts attempts to save his cat’s paw theory by arguing
that Ravanas’ memorandum “set in motion the eventual
termination.” That is incorrect; Wasfie originated the plagia‐
rism charge against Roberts, not Ravanas. Further, once Wasfie
accused Roberts of plagiarism, Ravanas undertook his own
independent investigation into the matter, rather than blindly
rely on Wasfie’s accusations. As discussed above, Roberts does
not contest the accuracy of Ravanas’ memorandum’s findings
and has not presented any evidence that Ravanas only investi‐
gated the plagiarism charge because of Roberts’ age. Therefore,
his ADEA claims cannot withstand summary judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.