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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-12329
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:15-cv-00394-TJC-JRK
NYKA TASSIANT O'CONNOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SUWANNEE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,
CHRIS LANDRUM,
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
JULIA JONES,
NORTH, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(May 9, 2016)
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Before TJOFLAT, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Nyka O’Connor is a Florida prison inmate incarcerated at Union
Correctional Institution (“UCI”). He brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 to recover damages on the theory that the named defendants infringed his
rights under the Fourth Amendment for excessive force and the Eighth
Amendment for inadequate medical treatment. The district court, acting sua
sponte, dismissed his complaint without prejudice pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), on the grounds that he had
sustained the dismissal of three or more qualifying lawsuits and was not imminent
danger of serious physical injury. He appeals the dismissal, arguing that he
qualified for the imminent danger exception. He also argues that the court
incorrectly denied him the ability to amend his complaint. We are not persuaded
and affirm.
I.
We review a district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) de novo.
Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008). We liberally construe pro
se pleadings. See Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2000).
The purpose of the PLRA is to conserve judicial resources by preventing
meritless cases initiated by prisoners. Vanderberg v. Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321,
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1324 (11th Cir. 2001). Under the PLRA, prisoners are only permitted to file three
meritless suits in in forma pauperis status. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The “three
strikes” provision of the PLRA provides:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment
in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on
3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any
facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that
was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is
under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
Id.
In Medberry v. Butler, we rejected the notion that imminent danger of
serious physical injury under § 1915(g) is measured at the time of the alleged
incident, not at the time the complaint is filed. 185 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir.
1999). We noted that the Eighth Circuit requires that the prisoner be in imminent
danger at the time of the filing, meaning that a past threat of imminent danger is
insufficient, while the Fifth Circuit requires “imminent danger at the time that he
seeks to file his suit in district court or seeks to proceed with his appeal or files a
motion to proceed IFP.” Id. at 1192-93. However, we declined to decide which
approach to adopt. Id. at 1193. We held, though, that “Congress’ use of the
present tense in § 1915(g) confirms that a prisoner’s allegation that he faced
imminent danger sometime in the past is an insufficient basis to allow him to
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proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to the imminent danger exception to the
statute.” Id. at 1193.
In Brown v. Johnson, we held that a prisoner with HIV and hepatitis faced
imminent danger when he alleged that the total withdrawal of treatment for his
conditions left him susceptible to other illnesses that could cause his condition to
quickly deteriorate. 387 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004). Although some of the
physical conditions that Brown alleged did not constitute serious injury, his
complaint as a whole successfully alleged that he faced an imminent danger of
serious physical injury because his HIV and hepatitis would lead to serious
afflictions if left untreated. Id. Furthermore, the fact that Brown’s illnesses were
already serious did not preclude him from claiming that his condition was
“worsening more rapidly as a result of the complete withdrawal of treatment.” Id.
The district court did not err by dismissing O’Connor’s complaint pursuant
to § 1915(g), because O’Connor failed to successfully plead that he was in
imminent danger. He is currently at UCI, but all of his allegations of harm
occurred months before at Suwannee Correctional Institution (“SCI”). He did not
allege that any abuse occurred at UCI. Furthermore, unlike Brown, O’Connor did
not experience a “complete withdrawal of treatment.” Brown, 387 F.3d at 1350.
Instead, shortly before his complaint was filed, O’Connor was seen by medical
personnel at UCI multiple times and was informed that he would need surgery.
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Therefore, O’Connor’s allegations do not sufficiently plead imminent danger of
serious physical injury because a past threat of imminent danger is insufficient.
His fears that his surgery might be delayed or his symptoms would lead to cancer
were speculative and not factually supported. Additionally, O’Connor’s assertion
that the SCI staff had threatened to continue to abuse him is not an imminent
threat, because at the time of his filing, O’Connor had been transferred to UCI and
he only speculated, without alleged facts in support, that he would be transferred
back to SCI. Thus, O’Connor failed to show that he faced imminent danger due to
inadequate medical treatment or staff misconduct.
II.
We review the denial of a motion to amend a complaint for abuse of
discretion. Williams v. Bds. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1291
(11th Cir. 2007). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) allows that “[a] party may
amend the party’s pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). We held that “the PLRA
does not preclude the district court from granting a motion to amend.” Brown, 387
F.3d at 1349. In Brown, because Brown filed his motion to amend before his
complaint was dismissed and before any responsive pleadings were filed, it was an
abuse of discretion when the district court denied Brown’s motion. Id.
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The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend,
because, unlike Brown, O’Connor did not make an attempt to amend his complaint
before it was dismissed. Furthermore, his complaint was dismissed without
prejudice, which means he is free to refile, and without a filing fee, assuming he
adequately alleges imminent danger in the future. Additionally, because, as he
acknowledges, he filed a prior complaint that was dismissed without prejudice with
instructions to either allege imminent danger or pay the filing fee, this complaint
was in essence an amended complaint, and he still did not make sufficient factual
allegations to show imminent danger of serious physical injury.
AFFIRMED.
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