In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: May 9, 2016
S16A0485. STOKES v. THE STATE.
NAHMIAS, Justice.
On September 5, 2013, Appellant Rebecca Ann Stokes was indicted in
Towns County for malice murder, felony murder, two counts of aggravated
assault, terroristic threats, tampering with evidence, and removal of body parts
from the scene of a death based on her participation in the shooting death of
Charlotte Diann Donaldson on June 17, 2013. On August 18, 2014, Appellant
entered a negotiated guilty plea to malice murder, and the State nol prossed the
remaining charges.
At the plea hearing, the State presented the following factual basis for the
guilty plea. Around June 17, 2013, Appellant discovered photographs
indicating that her husband was having a relationship with Donaldson, who was
living in a camper trailer on Appellant and her husband’s property. In
statements to the GBI, Appellant admitted that she took her husband’s gun and
shot it once at Donaldson. Her neighbor and accomplice, Brittany Ledford, then
used the gun to fire two more shots into Donaldson. Although Appellant told
the GBI that she thought she had not hit Donaldson, an autopsy showed that
Donaldson was struck by three bullets. After Donaldson stopped breathing,
Appellant and Ledford put her body in a bag, which they then dumped in a well.
As the State recommended, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve life
in prison with the possibility of parole. On December 31, 2014, she filed a
timely motion to withdraw her guilty plea, which she amended with new counsel
on March 30, 2015, raising the three claims discussed below. On June 1, 2015,
the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. Appellant, her plea
counsel, and his investigator testified, and the transcript from the plea hearing,
the plea form, the written plea offer, and Appellant’s medication logs from the
jail were admitted into evidence. Later that day, the trial court issued an order
denying Appellant’s motion. She now appeals, and we affirm.1
1. Appellant first contends that her plea counsel provided ineffective
assistance by misrepresenting when she would be eligible for parole. Appellant
testified at the evidentiary hearing that her plea counsel and his investigator told
1
Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals, which properly transferred the
appeal to this Court because this is a murder case. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III
(8); Neal v. State, 290 Ga. 563, 567-572 (722 SE2d 765) (2012) (Hunstein, C.J., concurring).
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her that she would be eligible for parole in 10 years with good behavior. Both
plea counsel and the investigator, however, testified that they did not give her
this incorrect information and in fact told her that she would have to serve 30
years before being eligible for parole.
In addition, the State’s written plea offer said that under OCGA § 17-10-
6.1 (c) (1), a person
shall not be eligible for any form of parole or early release
administered by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles until that
person has served a minimum of 30 years in prison. The minimum
term of imprisonment shall not be reduced by any earned time, early
release, work release, leave, or other sentence-reducing measures
under programs administered by the Department of Corrections.
The plea offer then reiterated, “Defendant must serve a sentence of Life to serve
no less than 30 Years in confinement before the possibility for parole.”
Appellant signed the offer to show her acceptance of its terms.
Furthermore, at the plea hearing, the trial court asked Appellant if she
understood how the possibility of parole worked; she answered yes. The court
then asked “What would it be under this plea?” and she answered, “30 years,
sir.” At the end of the plea hearing, the State recommended a life sentence and
wanted “specifically put on the record that [Appellant] in open court and by her
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counsel have been advised under current law that . . . the only consideration of
parole is after 30 years.” The court agreed, and after the State recommended
conditions to be imposed on Appellant if she is granted parole (including that
she be banished from the Enotah Judicial Circuit), the court asked, “You still
want to enter this plea?” and Appellant answered yes.
The trial court expressly found that Appellant’s testimony was not
credible. See Stinson v. State, 286 Ga. 499, 500 (689 SE2d 323) (2010) (“The
trial court ‘was authorized to reject [appellant’s] version of the facts and credit
instead the testimony of his counsel.’” (citation omitted)). The record clearly
shows that Appellant was not misled, but rather was correctly advised in
numerous ways, about her parole eligibility. Her plea counsel was not
ineffective as she alleges.
2. Appellant next contends that she was under the influence of several
prescription drugs that prevented her from “thinking straight” at the plea
hearing. Appellant was taking medications to treat her diagnosed bipolar
disorder. Although she testified at the evidentiary hearing that she was given
a double dose of these medications on the morning of the plea hearing, the
medication log from the jail shows that she was given her medications as
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prescribed on that day.
Furthermore, at the start of the plea hearing, Appellant’s counsel told the
trial court that Appellant was taking medications for her bipolar disorder but that
“she seemed to be oriented and understands what’s going on.” The court asked
Appellant if she was taking her medications the way they were prescribed, and
she answered yes. She also indicated on her signed plea form that she was not
under the influence of any drugs. And her plea counsel and his investigator
testified at the evidentiary hearing that she did not appear impaired by her
prescription medications, including on the day of the plea hearing.
Thus, on this contention too, the evidence contradicting Appellant’s
version of events fully supports the trial court’s finding that her testimony was
not credible and the court’s conclusion that she was not intoxicated when she
entered her guilty plea.
3. Finally, Appellant asserts that she was not informed of her right to
remain silent at trial. This assertion is flatly contradicted by the transcript of the
plea hearing, which shows that the court told Appellant that at trial, “You would
have the right to testify as you choose. You can’t be required to testify, and if
you decided not to testify at your trial, ma’am, after discussing the matter with
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your lawyer, the jury could not hold that as evidence against you.” The court
also told her as to the plea hearing, “You also have a constitutional right to
remain silent. If you want to exercise that constitutional right, we would just
have a jury trial.” Appellant said that she understood these rights. Appellant
also indicated on her signed plea form that she understood her “right to testify
or not testify at trial” and that she could not be required to testify at trial. This
evidence demonstrates that Appellant was in fact informed of her right to remain
silent at trial. See Rogers v. State, 286 Ga. 55, 56 (685 SE2d 281) (2009).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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