DLD-204 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-3080
___________
CHARLES WHITNEY,
Appellant
v.
JOHN E. WETZEL;
BRIAN V. COLEMAN; RHONDA HOUSE;
DEPUTY GATES; MAJOR S. NICKELSON;
CARL E. WALKER; CPT.TREPPET,;
CHUCK BYERS; BUZAS; B. PARSONS;
CPT. T. BERIER; MICHAEL OPPMAN;
MS. LINDERMAN; LT. CLARK;
C/O VORPAL; JOHN DOE, 1;
JOHN DOE, 2; JOHN DOE, 3;
JOHN DOE, 4; JOHN DOE, 5;
LT. SWITZER
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-12-cv-01632)
District Judge: Honorable Joy Flowers Conti
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
April 7, 2016
Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR. and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 9, 2016)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
Charles Whitney appeals from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to
Appellees, and the District Court’s partial grant of Appellees’ motion to dismiss. We
conclude that the District Court correctly found Whitney’s claims meritless, and will
affirm.
Whitney brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Appellees
violated his Eighth Amendment, First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights
during his incarceration at SCI-Benner. He alleges that Appellees retaliated against him
for filing grievances about his treatment at the facility by placing him in the Special
Management Unit (“SMU”), in violation of his First Amendment right to free speech.1
He also alleges that, while in he was housed in the SMU, Appellees violated his Eighth
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment by permitting him to reside in
inhumane conditions of confinement. Finally, he alleges that Appellees violated his right
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
SMU is “a special unit within designated Department facilities designed to safely and
humanely handle an inmate whose behavior presents a serious threat to the safety and
security of the facility, staff, other inmates or himself/herself.” See Concise Statement of
Material Facts, D.C. dkt # 75 at 2. 0
2
to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because they treated him differently
from white and “European” inmates by placing and keeping him in the SMU.
Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, which the District Court granted as to
Whitney’s First Amendment claim that Appellees improperly opened his privileged mail.
The Court also dismissed three Defendants from the suit, concluding that Whitney failed
to demonstrate their personal involvement in the constitutional violations he complained
of.2
Following discovery, Appellees moved for summary judgment. The Magistrate
Judge issued a Report and Recommendation recommending summary judgment in favor
of Appellees. The Magistrate Judge concluded that the record evidence did not establish
that Whitney’s complaints were a substantial motivating factor in Appellees’ decision to
place him in the SMU because Whitney had received so many misconduct citations over
the time he was incarcerated; therefore, Whitney could not meet his burden to
demonstrate that he had a First Amendment retaliation claim. The Magistrate Judge also
concluded that Whitney’s allegations did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation. Although Whitney alleged that inmates had been smearing feces on cell walls,
Whitney provided no evidence that he was housed anywhere near the cells with smeared
feces, that his own cell was smeared with feces, or that he was in any way exposed to the
feces. Therefore, there was no genuine dispute of material fact regarding this claim.
2
We agree with the District Court’s reasoning on these issues and will not discuss them
further.
3
Finally, Whitney’s Equal Protection claim failed because he did not demonstrate that he
was treated differently from similarly situated prisoners. Even if he had demonstrated
that he was treated differently from other prisoners, the Magistrate Judge concluded,
Appellees were entitled to summary judgment because an equal protection claim alleging
differential treatment compared to other prisoners is subject to rational basis scrutiny, and
Appellees had legitimate penological reasons for housing Whitney in the SMU.
Whitney filed objections to the Report and Recommendation, in which he argued
that the Magistrate Judge failed to address his claim that he had been forced to breathe in
deadly second-hand smoke while housed in the SMU in violation of his Eight
Amendment rights. He also argued that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly determined that
he did not raise a conspiracy claim or a theft of property complaint in his initial
complaint, and that the Judge incorrectly failed to consider his state law claims.
The District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation. The Court found
that Whitney’s claim of being exposed to deadly second-hand smoke was baseless, as he
had filed a grievance complaining of the smoke, and after an investigation it was revealed
that Whitney had not offered any proof to substantiate his claim. The District Court also
found that the Magistrate Judge did, in fact, address Whitney’s conspiracy claim and
correctly determined that it was baseless. The District Court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Whitney’s state law claims because it granted summary
judgment to Appellees on all of his federal constitutional claims.
4
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of an
order granting a motion for summary judgment is plenary. See McGreevy v. Stroup, 413
F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005). We will summarily affirm the District Court’s order where
there is no substantial question presented by the appeal. Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and
I.O.P. 10.6.
Summary judgment is proper where the movant “shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. We view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Blunt v. Lower Merion
School District, 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). “However, where a non-moving party
fails sufficiently to establish the existence of an essential element of its case on which it
bears the burden of proof at trial, there is not a genuine dispute with respect to a material
fact and thus the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. The
nonmoving party “cannot establish a genuine dispute as to a material fact by pointing to
unsupported allegations in the pleadings.” Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 175 (3d
Cir. 2011). The non-moving party must “present more than just bare assertions,
conclusory allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue.” Podobnik
v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005).
To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
(1) he engaged in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) he suffered, at the hands of a
state actor, adverse action “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from
5
exercising his [constitutional] rights;” and (3) that the protected activity was a substantial
motivating factor in the state actor’s decision to take adverse action. See Rauser v. Horn,
241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). A prisoner’s ability to file grievances and lawsuits
against prison officials is a constitutionally protected activity for purposes of a retaliation
claim. See Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373-74 (3d Cir. 1981). To establish a
causal connection between the exercise of the protected activity and the adverse action, a
plaintiff usually must prove either (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity
between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of
antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal link. See Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W.
v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007). A defendant may defeat a retaliation
claim by showing that he or she would have taken the same action even if the plaintiff
had not engaged in the protected activity. Id. at 267.
Whitney claims that he was placed in the SMU as retaliation for filing grievances
against prison staff and for agreeing to serve as a witness in other inmates’ lawsuits, but
he fails to provide any evidence that establishes a causal link between the two. The
record indicates that Whitney filed multiple grievances against prison staff for several
years, prior to and during the time he spent in the SMU. He was transferred into the
SMU program at SCI-Fayette because he received a misconduct report while housed at
SCI-Smithfield, and he had not yet completed the SMU program when he was
transferred. Whitney also has an extensive documented misconduct history for which he
has been sanctioned on multiple occasions. These include the use of obscene language,
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refusing to obey orders, breaking restrictions and being in unauthorized areas of the
facilities in which he has been housed. Whitney has offered no evidence to dispute the
validity of these misconduct reports, other than to make the unsupported contention that
one of them was fabricated. Appellees have therefore demonstrated that they had
legitimate penological reasons for placing Whitney in the SMU, and the District Court
correctly granted summary judgment to Appellees on this claim.
The District Court also correctly granted summary judgment to Appellees on
Whitney’s Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim. In order to succeed on
such a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate both that (1) he has been denied “the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities,” and (2) that prison officials acted with deliberate
indifference to those conditions. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1994).
Whitney contends that he was forced to live with mentally ill inmates at the SMU, where
inmates banging on toilets and sinks created intolerable noise, the air stank of urine and
feces, and he was exposed to inmates throwing urine and feces. He further alleges that
the stench made him lose his appetite and the noise deprived him of sleep. Whitney also
contends that he was denied heat in the winter months, and, as a result, his cell was
intolerably cold. Finally, he argues that he was exposed to deadly second-hand smoke
while housed in the SMU.
Whitney’s allegation of being housed with mentally ill inmates is baseless. The
record reveals that mentally ill inmates are not housed in the SMU at SCI-Smithfield, and
Whitney offers no evidence to indicate that prison officials were violating this policy.
7
Whitney’s allegation that his prison cell was too cold is also unfounded. The summary
judgment record reveals that after Whitney complained to prison officials that his cell
was too cold, the temperature of his cell was checked and determined to be 72 degrees.
Nor does the record support the allegation that Whitney was exposed to second-hand
smoke in the SMU.
Whitney’s allegation that the other inmates in the SMU caused intolerable noise
levels does not survive summary judgment. To meet the objective criteria of an Eighth
Amendment claim, a plaintiff must show that the risk of injury from the conditions to
which he was exposed was “so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency
to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36
(1993). Whitney has failed to provide any evidence that the noise in the SMU was so
excessive and pervasive that it posed a serious risk of injury to him. See Lunsford v.
Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574, 1580 (7th Cir. 1994). At most, Whitney has shown that the noise
in the SMU is “irritating,” which “cannot fairly be said to inflict cruel and unusual
punishment.” Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1027 (3d Cir. 1988).
Whitney’s allegations that the other inmates smeared feces on the walls also lacks
record support. The record evidence indicates that Whitney was the only inmate making
this complaint in the SMU, and he has not provided any evidence of the proximity of his
cell to the cells containing feces or to the inmates who threw feces, and the length of time
he was exposed to such conditions. He has therefore failed to demonstrate that there is a
genuine issue of material fact on this claim.
8
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects prisoners
from invidious discrimination based on race. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
556 (1974). In order to state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first show that he
has been treated differently from similarly situated individuals. See City of Cleburne,
Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Where an inmate
demonstrates that he was subjected to a prison’s policy of differential treatment based on
race, that policy is subject to strict scrutiny. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 507
(2005). Under strict scrutiny, Appellees have the burden of proving that their racial
classification is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. Id. at
505. In his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, Whitney alleges that he was
treated differently from the white inmates at SCI-Smithfield because of his race.
Specifically, he argues that while the white inmates were released from the SMU in only
90 days, black and latino inmates were kept in the SMU for much longer. Whitney has
not supported his allegations. In his deposition testimony, Whitney admits that he did not
keep track of which SMU prisoners were released, when they were released, and their
race. The District Court was therefore correct to grant summary judgment to Appellees
on this claim.
Because this appeal presents no substantial question, we will affirm. The motion
for appointment of counsel is denied.
9