UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4236
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KAMRAN REZAPOUR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
Chief District Judge. (3:13-cr-00215-FDW-1)
Submitted: April 28, 2016 Decided: May 11, 2016
Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
George J.F. Werner, Ybor City, Florida, for Appellant. Jill
Westmoreland Rose, United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant
United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kamran Rezapour waived indictment and pled guilty to one
count of wire fraud and two counts of selling misbranded drugs.
The district court sentenced Rezapour to 108 months’
imprisonment. On appeal, Rezapour argues the district court
erred in accepting his plea because the factual basis was
insufficient to support his wire fraud conviction, and that
counsel was ineffective. We affirm.
Because Rezapour did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea,
we review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the plea for
plain error. See United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th
Cir. 2014). “Thus, we may reverse only on a finding that (1)
there was error, (2) that was plain, (3) that affected
substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Moore, 810 F.3d 932, 939 (4th
Cir. 2016) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The requirement that a plea be supported by a factual basis
“ensures that the court make clear exactly what a defendant
admits to, and whether those admissions are factually sufficient
to constitute the alleged crime.” United States v. Moussaoui,
591 F.3d 263, 299-300 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.
DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991)). “The trial court
has wide discretion when determining whether a factual basis
2
exists” and “need only be subjectively satisfied that there is a
sufficient factual basis for a conclusion that the defendant
committed all of the elements of the offense.” Id. at 300
(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
“[T]o convict a person of . . . wire fraud, the government
must show that the defendant (1) devised or intended to devise a
scheme to defraud and (2) used . . . wire communications in
furtherance of the scheme.” United States v. Wynn, 684 F.3d
473, 477 (4th Cir. 2012). The first element of this offense
requires that the defendant possess “the specific intent to
deprive one of something of value through a misrepresentation or
other similar dishonest method.” Id. at 478. The
misrepresentation must also be material, that is, it must
“ha[ve] a natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of
influencing its target.” Id. at 479 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
At the plea hearing, the Government explained the elements
of wire fraud, and Rezapour testified that he understood them
and that he was guilty of this offense. Rezapour also
stipulated to a factual basis that contained facts indicating
that he used the internet to induce potential customers to
purchase his products by misrepresenting those products as “all
natural” and free from the side effects of prescription
medication. Although Rezapour now argues that these
3
misrepresentations were not material, this claim is belied by
the factual stipulation accompanying his plea, which indicates
that his advertising touted the supposed “all natural” nature of
his products as a major reason to purchase them rather than
their prescription counterparts. The factual basis also
described the deceptive means by which Rezapour and his supplier
smuggled these ingredients into the United States, indicating
that Rezapour was aware of their nature. Accordingly, we
conclude that the district court did not err, plainly or
otherwise, in finding that the factual basis adequately
supported Rezapour’s plea. *
Rezapour also argues that counsel was ineffective for
failing to conduct an adequate investigation and by giving him
erroneous advice regarding his guilty plea. Unless an
attorney’s ineffectiveness conclusively appears on the face of
the record, ineffective assistance claims are not generally
addressed on direct appeal. Instead, such claims should be
*
To the extent Rezapour argues that the district court was
required to weigh the underlying evidence rather than accept his
admissions as true, this argument is meritless. See United
States v. Carr, 271 F.3d 172, 178-79 n.6 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The
court need not satisfy itself that a jury would find the
defendant guilty, or even that defendant is guilty by a
preponderance of the evidence. The district court must assure
itself simply that the conduct to which the defendant admits is
in fact an offense under the statutory provision under which he
is pleading guilty.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
4
raised in a motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012),
in order to permit sufficient development of the record. United
States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). The
present record does not indicate that counsel was ineffective.
Accordingly, we conclude that Rezapour’s ineffective assistance
claims should be raised, if at all, in a § 2255 motion.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5