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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MAURICE STYLES,
Appellant No. 2741 EDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order August 4, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at Nos.: CP-51-CR-0900261-1999
CP-51-CR-0900351-1999
CP-51-CR-1103661-1999
BEFORE: BOWES, J., MUNDY, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED May 11, 2016
Appellant, Maurice Styles, appeals pro se from the denial of his second
petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9541-9546, as untimely. We affirm.
We take the following factual and procedural background from the trial
court’s September 21, 2015 opinion and our independent review of the
certified record. On January 3, 2000, Appellant entered open guilty pleas to
rape and related charges arising from his sexual crimes against, and
stabbing of, two women in Philadelphia. On March 23, 2000, the court
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of not less than fifty-six nor more
than 112 years’ incarceration.
On appeal, this Court vacated the judgments of sentence and
remanded for resentencing because the trial court did not reference the
sentencing guidelines when explaining its reasons for the sentence imposed.
(See Commonwealth v. Styles, 812 A.2d 1277 (Pa. Super. 2002)). On
March 25, 2003, the trial court resentenced Appellant to the same aggregate
term of not less than fifty-six nor more than 112 years’ incarceration. On
June 29, 2006, this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence and, on
February 14, 2007, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for
allowance of appeal. (See Commonwealth v. Styles, 905 A.2d 1049 (Pa.
Super. 2006) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 917 A.2d 314
(Pa. 2007)).
On June 15, 2007, Appellant filed a first PCRA petition pro se.
Appointed counsel filed a Turner/Finley1 “no-merit” letter, and the PCRA
court provided notice of its intent to dismiss the petition on December 15,
2008 pursuant to Rule 907.2 The court dismissed the petition on January 9,
2009. Appellant did not appeal.
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1
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth
v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
2
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1).
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On May 15, 2012, Appellant filed his second pro se PCRA petition. On
July 15, 2012, the court sent Rule 907 notice to Appellant of its intent to
dismiss the petition. On August 4, 2015, the PCRA court dismissed the
petition as untimely. Appellant timely appealed.3
Appellant raises three issues for this Court’s review:
[1.] Did the [PCRA] court abuse its discretion by dismissing
[the] PCRA petition as untimely?
[2.] Whether the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Missouri v. Frye[, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012),] create[d] a new
constitutional right?
[3.] Also did this newly created right conceive a substantive
rule change in criminal procedure?
(Appellant’s Brief, at 2).
This Court examines PCRA appeals in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. Our review
is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of
record[.] Additionally, [w]e grant great deference to the factual
findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings
unless they have no support in the record. In this respect, we
will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is supported by
evidence of record and is free of legal error. However, we afford
no deference to its legal conclusions. [W]here the petitioner
raises questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and
our scope of review is plenary.
Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal
denied, 101 A.3d 785 (Pa. 2014) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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3
The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement;
the court filed an opinion on September 21, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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Here, the PCRA court found that Appellant’s petition was untimely and
that he failed to plead and prove any exception to the PCRA time-bar. (See
PCRA Court Opinion, 9/21/15, at 2). We agree.
It is well-settled that:
A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be
filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of
sentence became final, unless he pleads and proves one of the
three exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1). A
judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review by this
Court or the United States Supreme Court, or at the expiration
of the time for seeking such review. 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] §
9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are
jurisdictional; therefore, a court may not address the merits of
the issues raised if the petition was not timely filed. The
timeliness requirements apply to all PCRA petitions, regardless of
the nature of the individual claims raised therein. The PCRA
squarely places upon the petitioner the burden of proving an
untimely petition fits within one of the three exceptions.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16-17 (Pa. 2012) (case citations
and footnote omitted).
In the case sub judice, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final
on May 15, 2007, at the expiration of the time for him to file a writ of
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13;
see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Therefore, he had one year from that
date to file a petition for collateral relief unless he pleaded and proved that a
timeliness exception applied. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
Hence, Appellant’s current petition, filed on May 15, 2012, is untimely on its
face, and we lack jurisdiction to consider its merits, unless he pleads and
proves one of the statutory exceptions to the time-bar.
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Section 9545 of the PCRA provides only three exceptions that allow for
review of an untimely PCRA petition: (1) the petitioner’s inability to raise a
claim because of governmental interference; (2) the discovery of previously
unknown facts that would have supported a claim; and (3) a newly-
recognized constitutional right. See id. When a petition is filed outside the
one-year time limit, petitioners must plead and prove the applicability of one
of the three exceptions to the PCRA timing requirements. See
Commonwealth v. Johnston, 42 A.3d 1120, 1126 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“If
the petition is determined to be untimely, and no exception has been pled
and proven, the petition must be dismissed without a hearing because
Pennsylvania courts are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the
petition.”) (citation omitted). Also, a PCRA petition invoking one of these
statutory exceptions must “be filed within 60 days of the date the claim
could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
Here, Appellant is attempting to claim the applicability of the newly
recognized constitutional right exception. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 4-8);
see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). Specifically, he argues that plea
counsel was ineffective when he advised Appellant to enter an open guilty
plea rather than to take the Commonwealth’s negotiated plea offer, and that
the United States Supreme Court, in Frye, supra, created a new
constitutional right applicable to ineffective assistance of counsel claims that
should be applied to his case. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 5-8). However, this
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issue is unavailing because Appellant has failed to plead and prove the
applicability of Section 9545(b)(1)(iii).
It is well-settled that:
Subsection (iii) of Section 9545(b)(1) has two
requirements. First, it provides that the right asserted is a
constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of
the United States or th[e Pennsylvania Supreme C]ourt after the
time provided in this section. Second, it provides that the right
“has been held” by “that court” to apply retroactively. Thus, a
petitioner must prove that there is a “new” constitutional right
and that the right “has been held” by that court to apply
retroactively . . . to cases on collateral review.
Commonwealth v. Leggett, 16 A.3d 1144, 1147 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citation and emphasis omitted).
Appellant’s claim, that Frye created a new constitutional right that
satisfies the newly created constitutional right exception to the PCRA’s
timeliness requirement, has already been rejected by this Court. In
Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 69 A.3d 1270 (Pa. Super. 2013), we stated:
“The right to effective assistance of counsel during the plea
bargaining process has been recognized for decades.”
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 63 A.3d 1274, 1280 (Pa. Super.
2013) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88
L. Ed.2d 203 (1985) (holding that “the two-part Strickland, 466
U.S. 668 [104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.2d 674], test applies to
challenges to guilty pleas based on the ineffective assistance of
counsel”); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473,
176 L. Ed.2d 284 (2010) (“Before deciding whether to plead
guilty, a defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of
competent counsel.”)). In Frye, the United State Supreme
Court merely clarified that this well-established right “extends
to the negotiation and consideration of plea offers that lapse or
are rejected.” Frye, 132 S.Ct. at 1404 (emphasis added). In
other words, the Frye Court held “that, as a general rule,
defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from
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the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that
may be favorable to the accused.” Id. at 1408. In determining
whether counsel has satisfied this obligation, the two-part test
set forth in Strickland applies. See id. at 1409. . . .
* * *
It is apparent that . . . Frye [did not] create[] a new
constitutional right. Instead, the[] decision[] simply applied the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the Strickland test for
demonstrating counsel’s ineffectiveness, to the particular
circumstances at hand, i.e. where counsel’s conduct resulted in a
plea offer lapsing or being rejected to the defendant’s detriment.
Accordingly, Appellant’s reliance on Frye . . . in an attempt
to satisfy the timeliness exception of section
9545(b)(1)(iii) is unavailing.
Feliciano, supra at 1276-77 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Likewise, here, for the reasons enunciated by this Court in Feliciano,
Appellant’s reliance on Frye is fatal to his claim. See id. at 1277.
Accordingly, because Appellant failed to plead and prove the applicability of
a PCRA timeliness exception, we conclude that the PCRA court properly
found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s claims, and dismissed
his untimely petition without a hearing. See Henkel, supra at 20;
Johnston, supra at 1126.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/11/2016
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