IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
KAMARCCUS JALEEL NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
WEBSTER, FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
Appellant,
CASE NO. 1D15-3211
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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Opinion filed May 10, 2016.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.
Edward P. Nickinson, III, Judge.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Susan S. Lerner, Assistant Public
Defender, Miami, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Michael Schaub, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant was convicted of one count of battery, one count of aggravated
battery with great bodily harm by discharging a firearm, and two counts of
aggravated assault by threat with a firearm. We affirm these convictions without
further comment but reverse and remand for resentencing pursuant to the Florida
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Williams v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S73 (Fla.
Mar. 3, 2016). Below, the trial court imposed consecutive mandatory-minimum
sentences for the aggravated battery and aggravated assault offenses pursuant to this
Court’s case law interpreting the 10-20-Life statute. The court noted that such
sentences were “required by law.” Appellant’s counsel acknowledged consecutive
sentencing was required but nonetheless objected. Although the trial court was
correct at the time, the supreme court subsequently held that consecutive sentences
are permissible but not mandatory. See Williams, 41 Fla. L. Weekly at S74 (“If . . .
multiple firearm offenses are committed contemporaneously, during which time
multiple victims are shot at, then consecutive sentencing is permissible but not
mandatory. In other words, a trial judge has discretion to order the mandatory
minimum sentences to run consecutively, but may impose the sentences
concurrently.”) (citations omitted). The State concedes that resentencing is proper
in this case. As such, we affirm Appellant’s convictions but remand for
resentencing, at which time the trial court may determine whether to impose the
mandatory-minimum portions of Appellant’s sentences consecutively or
concurrently.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and REMANDED in part.
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RAY, BILBREY, and JAY, JJ., CONCUR.
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