UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4542
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROBERT CRENSHAW, a/k/a Pops,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley,
District Judge. (1:14-cr-00098-IMK-JSK-1)
Submitted: April 29, 2016 Decided: May 16, 2016
Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Barry P. Beck, POWER, BECK & MATZUREFF, Martinsburg, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Zelda Elizabeth Wesley, Assistant
United States Attorney, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Crenshaw appeals his conviction and the sentence
imposed after he pled guilty to distributing heroin within 1000
feet of a protected location, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 860 (2012). Counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating
that he has found no meritorious grounds for appeal but
questioning whether Crenshaw’s plea was voluntary, whether
Crenshaw’s sentence is reasonable, and whether Crenshaw’s first
attorney was effective. Crenshaw was advised of his right to
file a pro se supplemental brief, but has not done so.
Having reviewed the transcript of Crenshaw’s plea colloquy,
we conclude that the district court substantially complied with
the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and that any errors in
the colloquy did not affect his substantial rights. See United
States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2009)
(providing standard). Although counsel questions whether
Crenshaw misapprehended the terms of his plea agreement,
Crenshaw’s testimony at the plea hearing indicates that he fully
understood the extent of his bargain with the Government. See
Walton v. Angelone, 321 F.3d 442, 462 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Absent
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, [a defendant] is
bound by the representations he made during the plea
colloquy.”). Moreover, Crenshaw has not shown that any such
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error would have affected his substantial rights, as there is no
indication that he would not have pled guilty absent the alleged
misunderstanding. See Massenburg, 564 F.3d at 343.
We review Crenshaw’s sentence for procedural and
substantive reasonableness, applying an abuse-of-discretion
standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
Having found no significant procedural error, we examine the
substantive reasonableness of a sentence under the totality of
the circumstances. Id. We presume on appeal that a within-
Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable. United
States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 421 (2014). The defendant can rebut that presumption
only “by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured
against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id. Having reviewed
the record, we conclude that Crenshaw has failed to rebut the
presumption that his within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable.
Finally, to the extent counsel questions the effectiveness
of Crenshaw’s first attorney, we conclude that Crenshaw has not
made the requisite showing to assert an ineffective assistance
claim on direct appeal and that this claim should be raised, if
at all, in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012). United
States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008)
(“Ineffective assistance claims are generally not cognizable on
direct appeal . . . unless it conclusively appears from the
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record that defense counsel did not provide effective
representation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record for any meritorious grounds for appeal and have found
none. Accordingly, we affirm Crenshaw’s conviction and
sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Crenshaw, in
writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Crenshaw requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Crenshaw. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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