UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4512
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PURNELL WOOD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen,
Senior District Judge. (3:12-cr-00239-GCM-17)
Submitted: March 31, 2016 Decided: May 17, 2016
Before KING, SHEDD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Daniel Johnson, Drew Nelson, WILLIS JOHNSON & NELSON PLLC,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray,
Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Purnell Wood appeals the downward variant sentence of 21
months imposed following his guilty plea to conspiracy to
violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2012). On appeal, Wood’s
counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there are no meritorious
grounds for appeal but questioning the reasonableness of Wood’s
sentence and whether trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance. Wood has not filed a pro se supplemental brief,
despite being notified of his right to do so. We affirm.
We review a sentence’s procedural and substantive
reasonableness for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 527-28 (4th Cir. 2014). We first review
for procedural error, such as improper calculation of the
Sentencing Guidelines range, failure to consider the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012) sentencing factors, selection of a sentence
based on clearly erroneous facts, id. at 528, or failure to
adequately explain the sentence, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). Absent any procedural error, we examine the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence under “the totality
of the circumstances.” Id. Sentences within or below a
properly calculated Guidelines range are presumed reasonable,
and this “presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the
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sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295,
306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014).
Because Wood did not object to his Guidelines calculations
below, we review for plain error. United States v. Hamilton,
701 F.3d 404, 410 (4th Cir. 2012); see Henderson v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126-27 (2013) (discussing standard).
We conclude that Wood’s sentence is procedurally reasonable.
The district court properly calculated Wood’s offense level,
criminal history, and Guidelines range. The court afforded both
parties an adequate opportunity to make arguments about the
appropriate sentence and allowed Wood an opportunity to
allocute. Additionally, the court’s explanation for its
sentence, in which the court addressed several of the § 3553(a)
factors, was individualized and detailed. Moreover, Wood cannot
overcome the presumption of substantive reasonableness accorded
his below-Guidelines sentence.
Wood also summarily suggests that trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance. Unless an attorney’s ineffectiveness
conclusively appears on the face of the record, ineffective
assistance claims are not generally addressed on direct appeal.
United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008).
Instead, such claims should be raised in a motion brought
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012), in order to permit
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sufficient development of the record. United States v.
Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). Because the
record does not conclusively establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, we conclude that such claims should be raised, if at
all, in a § 2255 motion.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and find no meritorious ground for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Wood, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Wood requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Wood. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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