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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JOHN E. MINNICK
Appellant No. 2516 EDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order July 30, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009788-2008
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OTT, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED MAY 19, 2016
John E. Minnick appeals pro se from the order entered July 30, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, that dismissed, as
untimely, his second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541–9546. Minnick contends the PCRA court erred
“by calculating the 60 day time period [provided in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2)]
from the date [Minnick] learned of the new witness instead of the date
[Minnick] received the affidavit supporting the PCRA petition[.]” Minnick’s
Brief at 5. Based on the following, we affirm.
The PCRA court summarized the facts and procedural history of this
case as follows:
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Defendant, John E. Minnick was tried before this Court and a
jury in the early fall of 2009 and at the conclusion of the trial the
jury found defendant guilty of third-degree murder and certain
weapons offenses. These charges arose out of an incident that
occurred on January 20, 2008, during which [Minnick] and an
accomplice fired numerous shots at Eduardo Tubens killing him.
Two witnesses identified [Minnick] as one of the persons firing
guns the night of the incident. On April 8, 2010, [Minnick]
received an aggregate sentence of twenty to forty years'
incarceration. [Minnick] later appealed and on July 22, 2011, the
Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence.
Commonwealth v. Minnick, 32 A.3d 279 (Pa. Super. 2011) .[1]
[Minnick] thereafter sought re-argument before the Superior
Court. That request was denied. [Minnick] did not file a petition
for allowance of appeal.
On October 24, 2011, [Minnick] filed a pro se petition pursuant
to the Post-Conviction Act, (PCRA) 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq.
Counsel was appointed to represent [Minnick]. However, on July
9, 2012, [Minnick] was granted permission to represent himself
following a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier,
____________________________________________
1
In Minnick’s direct appeal, this Court rejected, inter alia, Minnick’s
sufficiency challenge, stating:
In the instant case, even assuming the accuracy of Minnick’s
claim that he did not fire any of the shots that resulted in the
victim’s death, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the third-
degree murder conviction. Minnick does not dispute that the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as the verdict winner, established that he shot at
the victim on the night in question. See Brief for Appellant at 8
(acknowledging that the police statements of Gomez and Roman
established that Minnick had shot at the victim); id. at 10
(stating that Minnick had used a .40 caliber handgun). The
evidence also showed that there were multiple shooters.
Accordingly, even if Minnick did not fire any of the shots that
struck the victim, there was ample evidence for the jury to find
Minnick guilty of murder as an accomplice.
Commonwealth v. Minnick, 32 A.3d 279 (Pa. Super. 2011) (unpublished
memorandum, at 4–5).
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713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998), with respect to his PCRA petition. On
March 18, 2013, after [Minnick] was sent a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907
Notice of Intent to Dismiss, this Court denied [Minnick] PCRA
relief without a hearing. [Minnick] thereafter filed a notice of
appeal. On March 14, 2014, the Superior Court affirmed this
Court’s order denying defendant post-conviction collateral relief.
(950 EDA 2013) [Commonwealth v. Minnick, 103 A.3d 307
(Pa. Super. 2014)]. [Minnick] did not file a petition for allowance
of appeal.
On July 14, 2014, [Minnick] filed a second PCRA petition.
Following this Court’s review of the petition and the service upon
[Minnick] of a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice of Intent to Dismiss, this
Court denied [Minnick’s] request for collateral relief on July 30,
2015, without a hearing after concluding that [Minnick’s] most
recent PCRA petition had been untimely filed.
PCRA Court Opinion, 8/24/2015, at 1–3 (footnotes omitted). This appeal
followed.2
The principles that guide our review are well settled:
The standard of review for an order denying post-
conviction relief is limited to whether the record supports
the PCRA court’s determination, and whether that
decision is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings
will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the
findings in the certified record.
Commonwealth v. Allen, 2012 PA Super 144, 48 A.3d 1283,
1285 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted).
****
It is well-established that “the PCRA’s timeliness requirements
are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed; courts
may not address the merits of the issues raised in a petition if it
is not timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Leggett, 2011 PA
Super 40, 16 A.3d 1144, 1145 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
____________________________________________
2
The PCRA court did not order Minnick to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
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omitted). Generally, a PCRA petition must be filed within one
year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final unless
the petitioner meets his burden to plead and prove one of the
exceptions enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii), which
include: (1) the petitioner’s inability to raise a claim as a result
of governmental interference; (2) the discovery of previously
unknown facts or evidence that would have supported a claim;
or (3) a newly-recognized constitutional right. 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). However, the PCRA limits the reach of the
exceptions by providing that a petition invoking any of the
exceptions must be filed within 60 days of the date the claimfirst
could have been presented. Leggett, 16 A.3d at 1146 (citing 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2)).
Commonwealth v. Walters, ___ A.3d ___, ___ [2016 PA Super 42, 2016
Pa. Super. LEXIS 114] (Pa. Super. February 19, 2016).
Here, there is no dispute that Minnick’s petition, filed on July 14, 2014
is facially untimely. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on July
22, 2011, and Minnick’s judgment of sentence became final on Monday,
August 22, 2011, when the 30-day period for filing a petition for allowance
of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expired. 3 See Pa.R.A.P.
903. Thereafter, Minnick had one year, until August 22, 2012, to file a PCRA
petition, and this petition — his second — was filed nearly two years after
the PCRA’s time limit. Consequently, there is no jurisdiction to review
Minnick’s petition unless on the PCRA’s statutory exceptions to the time bar
applies.
____________________________________________
3
Since the thirtieth day from July 22, 2011 was a Sunday, the following day,
Monday, August 22, 2011, was the final day of the appeal period. See 1
Pa.C.S. § 1908 (“Computation of time”).
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Minnick relies on Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), which provides an exception
to the PCRA’s one-year time bar when “the facts upon which the claim is
predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).
Minnick maintains he has satisfied the requirement of Section 9545(b)(2) by
filing his petition “within 60 days of the date the claim could have been
presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
In his present PCRA petition, Minnick alleged:
On April 13, 2014, [Minnick] was on a visit at … [State
Correctional Institution] – Rockview and learned there was a
witness who saw [Minnick] inside the bar when the [2008]
shooting occurred outside. On June 16, 2014 the witness signed
a notorized affidavit which [Minnick] received on June 30, 2014
and the instant petition was filed.
Minnick’s PCRA Petition, 7/14/2014, at 3. Minnick attached the affidavit to
his petition. The affidavit states, in part,
I, Margarita Maladonado, state the below to be true and
correct:
On January 20, 2008, I attended an after hour bar named Jazzo.
As I was leaving [the] bar, I heard popping sounds like fire
crackers and people were running and I realized it was gun
shots. I went back inside the bar and a few minutes later they
sent us out a different exit to get out of the bar. …
…
[O]n April 13, 2014, I went to visit a friend at a state prison,
which John Minnick was also receiving a visit. During this visit I
learned for the first time that [Minnick] was incarcerated for that
shooting that occurred down at the bar. …
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… I told [Minnick] that before I lef[t] the bar the first time I seen
him in the bar before I left and I heard the gun shots after that.
….
[Minnick] asked me if I would be willing to tell the court what I
told him today and I told him I would because he could not have
been out there shooting because I seen him before I went out
the door the first time.
I will be available to testify at any court hearing in this matter to
the same.
Affidavit, 6/16/2014, at 1 (bold in original).4
On June 26, 2015, the PCRA court issued notice of intent to dismiss
the petition, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907. The
PCRA court determined the petition was untimely for two reasons.
Specifically, the PCRA court explained to Minnick:
In attempt to satisfy the PCRA’s timeliness exception, you
presented an affidavit from a purported alibi witness named
Margarita Maladonado. Although you acknowledge section 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)[(1)](ii), you made no attempt to explain why
the information contained in M[s]. Maladonado’s affidavit could
not, with the exercise of due diligence, have been obtained
earlier. Your complete silence on the issue of due diligence was
found insufficient to satisfy your burden of proof under section
9545(b)(1)(ii).
You also failed to prove that you raised your after-discovered
evidence claim within sixty days of the date the new facts were
first discovered pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
According to your petition as well as M[s]. Maladonado’s
affidavit, you were informed of the exculpatory information on
April 13, 2014. Your petition, filed on July 14, 2014, fell outside
the sixty-day window. Thus, your petition fails to prove an
____________________________________________
4
The affiant’s signature at the end of the affidavit is “Margarita Maldonado,”
a different spelling from the surname appearing in the affidavit.
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exception to the timeliness provision specified in section
9545(b). The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional
in nature, and a court may not address the merits of the issues
raised if the PCRA petition was not timely filed.
PCRA Court’s Notice Pursuant to [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 907, 6/26/2015.
Thereafter, on July 16, 2015, Minnick filed a response to the PCRA
court’s notice and, on July 30, 2015, the PCRA court dismissed Minnick’s
petition. In its opinion authored in support of its decision, the trial court
reasoned that the petition was untimely because Minnick failed to satisfy the
60-day requirement of Section 9545(b)(2) by filing his petition on July 14,
2014, which was more than 90 days after April 13, 2014, when he spoke to
the newly discovered witness. See PCRA Court Opinion, 8/24/2015. Based
on our review, we discern no basis upon which to disturb the decision of the
PCRA court.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has previously described a
petitioner’s burden under the newly-discovered evidence exception as
follows.
[S]ubsection (b)(1)(ii) has two components, which must be
alleged and proved. Namely, the petitioner must establish that:
1) “the facts upon which the claim was predicated were
unknown” and 2) “could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) (emphasis
added).
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1272 (Pa. 2007) (emphasis in
original). “Due diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps
to protect his own interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not have
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learned the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence. This rule is
strictly enforced.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 35 A.3d 44, 53 (Pa. Super.
2011) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 50 A.3d 121 (Pa. 2012).
Additionally,
[t]he statutory exceptions to the timeliness requirements of the
PCRA are also subject to a separate time limitation and must be
filed within sixty (60) days of the time the claim could first have
been presented. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). The sixty (60)
day time limit … runs from the date the petitioner first learned of
the alleged after discovered facts. A petitioner must explain
when he first learned of the facts underlying his PCRA claims and
show that he brought his claim within sixty (60) days thereafter.
Id. (some citations omitted).
Minnick maintains that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his petition
because he satisfied Section 9545(b)(2)’s 60-day requirement by filing his
petition within 60 days of the date he received the witness’s affidavit. See
Minnick’s Brief at 9. However, even accepting this argument arguendo, we
find Minnick has not demonstrated that he exercised due diligence as
required by Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). Here, Minnick offers no explanation in
his PCRA petition or response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice as to why
he could not have obtained the information contained in Ms. Maladonado’s
affidavit at an earlier date. Minnick only addresses the due diligence
requirement in his response to the Rule 907 notice, where he simply states:
[A] defendant can not exercise due diligence for something he is
unaware to exercise such diligence for. Ms. Maladonado never
knew that [Minnick] was connected to the shooting that occurred
on January 20, 2008. In fact, Ms. Maladonada [sic] thought
[Minnick] was incarcerated for a parole violation and she had no
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idea he was charged with a murder. Furthermore, Ms.
Maladonado never knew that someone had died that night and
she did not know wny [sic] further information regarding that
matter until April 13, 2014. Thus, there was no reason for
[Minnick] to seek this information previously before this date.
Therefore, [Minnick] could not have obtained this information
contained in the affidavit with the exercise of diligence because
there was nothing to exercise diligence for prior to April 13,
2014.
Minnick’s Response to [PCRA] Court’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss PCRA
Petition and Further Clarification, 7/16/2015, at 2.
The fact that Ms. Maladonado did not reveal information about the
shooting to Minnick until April 14, 2014, does not relieve Minnick from his
burden to prove he exercised due diligence. Significantly, Minnick’s
response does not explain any efforts that he or trial counsel made prior to
April 14, 2014, to locate favorable witnesses, nor does he explain why he
could not have located Ms. Maladonado sooner.5 Consequently, we agree
with the PCRA court’s rationale set forth in the Rule 907 notice, that because
Minnick has failed to demonstrate that he exercised due diligence in
attempting to find the new witness his petition does not satisfy Section
9545(b)(1)(ii). Therefore, even without considering the 60-day requirement
of Section 9545(b)(2), Minnick’s petition is untimely. Accordingly, we affirm.
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5
According to Ms. Maladonado’s affidavit, Minnick was inside the bar at the
time of the shooting, and he would have known this fact. However,
Minnick’s PCRA petition and response to the Rule 907 notice provide no
explanation regarding attempts to find anyone also in the bar who could
attest to his presence there.
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Order affirmed.6
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/19/2016
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6
Although the PCRA court’s opinion only discusses the Section 9545(b)(2)
60-day requirement as the basis for its decision to dismiss Minnick’s petition,
we may affirm the PCRA court on any grounds. See Commonwealth v.
Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 179 (Pa. Super. 2015).
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