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No. l5-1250C
Filed May 19,2016
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
FILED
MAY I I 2016
)
PERCY R. MOORMAN, ) U.S, COURT OF
FEDERAL C|jIMS
)
Plaintiff, )
) Pro Se; Rule 12(bxl), Subject-Matter
) Jurisdiction; Rule l2OX6), Failure to
) State a Claim; In Fortna Pauperis.
THE T]NITED STATES, )
)
Defendant. )
)
Percy R. Moorman, Richmond, Y A, plaintiff pro se.
Elizabeth Anne Speck, Trial Attomey, Reginald T. Blades, Jr., Assistant Direclor, Robert
E. Kirschman, -/r., Director and Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attomey
General, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC, for defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRIGGSBY. Judee
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffpro se, Percy R. Moorman, has brought this action seeking to liquidate certain
government securities held by plaintiff on behalf of a private family trust. The govemment has
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to Rules l2(b)(1) andl2(b)(6) ofthe Rules of
the United States Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC"). Plaintiff has also moved to proceed in this
marter informa pauperis. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the goverffnent's
motion to dismiss and GRANTS plaintiff s motion to proceed informa pauperis.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUNDI
A. Factual Background
Plainriff pro se, Percy R. Moorman, commenced this action on October 26, 2015. See
generally Compl. Plaintiff s complaint is difficult to follow. Nonetheless, it appears that
plaintiffseeks to liquidate certain govemment securities that he holds in his capacity as the
executor for a private family trust known as the Moorman Dynasty Trust. Id at 1.
Specifically, in the complaint, plaintiff alleges that the United States Department of the
Treasury ("Treasury Department") has placed him "in extreme hardship" by being unwilling to
liquidate these securities. 1d. at 3. In this regard, plaintiffpoints to the United States Federal
Reserve's bond-buying stimulus program, known as QE3, as well as the Treasury Department's
decision to issue a Floating Rate Note in 2013, as the govemment policies that have led to his
injury. Id. at2-3.
Plaintiff further alleges that he is entitled to recovet monetary damages from the
govemment due to these policies, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, Article VI and the
Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and 31 U.S.C. $ 311l. Id. at 1, 5. As
relief, plaintiffseeks "full payment including all interest due for all notes or mutually agreed
upon anangemenls." Id. at 6.
B. ProceduralBackground
Plaintiff filed the complaint in this matter on October 26,2015, along with a motion for
leave to proceed informa pauperis. See generally Compl.; Mot. to Proceed In Forma Pauperis.
On December 21, 2015, the government filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff s complaint for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
pursuant to RCFC 12(bXl) and 12(b)(6). See generally Def. Mot. Plaintiff failed to file a timely
response to the govemment's motion and on February 1, 201 6, the Court issued an Order to
Show Cause directing plaintiffto show cause why this matter should not be dismissed and to file
his response to the governrnent's motion on or before February 16,2016. See Show Cause
I The facts recited in this Memorandum Opinion and Order are taken from plaintiff s complaint
("Compl."); the govemment's motion to dismiss ("Def. Mot."); plaintiff s response ("P1. Resp."); and the
government's reply ("Dei Reply").
Order, Feb. 1,2016. On February 16,2016, plaintiff filed a document styled as "Plaintiff Show
Cause Motion," which the Court construed to be plaintiff s response to the Court's Order to
Show Cause and plaintiffs response to the government's motion to dismiss. See generally Pl.
Resp. On March 4, 2016,the govemment filed a reply in support of its motion to dismiss. See
generally Def. Reply. The matter having been fully briefed, the Court addresses the pending
motion to dismiss.
UI. STANDARDSOFREVIEW
A. Pra Se Litigants
Plaintiff is proceeding in this matter pro se, without the benefit of counsel. And so, the
Court applies the pleading requirements leniently. Beriont v. GTE Labs., [nc.,535 F.App'x919,
925-26n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,501 F.3d 1354, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2007)). When determining whether a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff is sufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss, this Court affords more leeway under the rules topro se plaintiffs
than to plaintiffs who are represented by counsel. See Haines v. Kerner,404 U.S. 519,520
(1972) (holding that pro se complaints, "however inartfully pleaded," are held to "less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"); Matthews v. United Stotes,750 F.3d 1320,
1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
But, there "is no duty on the part ofthe trial court to create a claim which [the plaintiff]
has not spelled out in his pleadings." Lengen v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 317 ,328 (2011)
(brackets existing; citations omitted). And so, while "a pro se plaintiff is held to a less stringent
standard than that of a plaintiff represented by an attomey, . . . the pro se plaintiff, nevertheless,
bears the burden ofestablishing the Court's jurisdiction by a preponderance ofthe evidence."
Riles v. I/nired States,93Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010) (citing Taylor v. United States,303 F.3d
1357 , 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Given this, the Court may excuse ambiguities, but not defects, in
the complaint. See Colbert v. United States,617 F. App'x 981,983 (Fed. Cir.2015); see also
Demes v. United States,52 Fed. Cl. 365, 368 (2002) ("[T]he leniency afforded pro se litigants
with respect to mere formalities does not relieve them ofjurisdictional requirements.").
B. Jurisdiction, RCFC l2(bxl)
When deciding a motion to dismiss upon the ground that the Court does not possess
subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(bX1), this Court must assume that all
undisputed facts alleged in the complaint are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the
non-movant's favor. Ericl