FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY 23 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HIEDY AZUCENA PERDOMO- No. 13-73703
SALGERO,
Agency No. A095-787-033
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 10, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: FARRIS, O’SCANNLAIN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Hiedy Azucena Perdomo-Salgero is a Guatemalan citizen who petitions this
Court for review of the denial of her application for protection under the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Convention Against Torture. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a). We have jurisdiction
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.
Perdomo-Salgero argues that the agency failed to give reasoned
consideration to her expert’s testimony and to three documents she submitted. See
Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 771 (9th Cir. 2011).
As to the expert’s testimony, the IJ discussed the testimony, but found that
the expert did not provide a sufficient factual basis for his opinion that Perdomo-
Salgero had a 75 to 80 percent chance of being attacked, raped, or killed in
Guatemala. The expert did not provide any statistics on violence against lesbians
in Guatemala to support his conclusion. Nor did he provide any specific factors
that made Perdomo-Salgero particularly likely to be attacked, except to say that
Perdomo-Salgero had a masculine presentation and would immediately be
recognized as a lesbian. The expert made this assessment without having met
Perdomo-Salgero, and without knowing where Perdomo-Salgero planned to live or
work. The IJ gave reasoned consideration to the expert’s testimony, and then
reasonably chose to reject the expert’s conclusion.
As to the documentary evidence, Perdomo-Salgero is correct that the IJ did
not specifically mention the three documents that Perdomo-Salgero cites.
However, the agency is not required to discuss every document in the record. See
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Cole, 659 F.3d at 771. The IJ’s factual descriptions of conditions in Guatemala
were generally consistent with the descriptions in the documents Perdomo-Salgero
cites. Cf. id. at 772 (stating that remand may be appropriate when the agency
misstates the record or fails to mention “highly probative or potentially dispositive
evidence”). Once again, Perdomo-Salgero’s true complaint is with the agency’s
conclusion, but that does not mean the agency failed to give reasoned
consideration.
Perdomo-Salgero also argues that the agency failed to consider her
aggregate risk of torture from: (1) her gender; (2) her sexuality; and (3) her history
of living in the United States for the last twenty-five years. See Cole, 659 F.3d at
775. There is no evidence that the agency compartmentalized Perdomo-Salgero’s
risk of torture. Cf. id. at 779 (Callahan, J., dissenting) (explicitly
compartmentalizing the risk of torture from different factors). The IJ’s decision
mentioned all three of Perdomo-Salgero’s risk factors, and then concluded that
Perdomo-Salgero had not shown a greater than fifty percent chance she would be
tortured if returned to Guatemala. The agency did not err.
DENIED.
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