IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
MATTHEW FRAUENFELD, No. 70370
Petitioner,
vs.
THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE
FILED
KERRY LOUISE EARLEY, DISTRICT MAY 2 3 2016
JUDGE,
TRACIE K. LINDEMAN .
Respondents, CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
and BY
DEPUTY CLERK
THE STATE OF NEVADA
DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES,
Real Party in Interest.
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR PROHIBITION
This original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition
challenges the district court's refusal to expedite a petition for judicial
review of a driver's license revocation on the ground that the revocation
period will expire on May 30, 2016, arguably rendering the proceedings
moot under Langston v. State, Department of Motor Vehicles, 110 Nev.
342, 871 P.2d 362 (1994).
Having reviewed petitioner Matthew Frauenfeld's petition and
appendices, as well as real party in interest State of Nevada, Department
of Motor Vehicles' answer thereto, we conclude that our extraordinary
intervention is not warranted. NRS 34.160 (mandamus is available to
compel a legally required action); NRS 34.320 (prohibition is available to
arrest acts taken in excess of jurisdiction); Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004) (noting that the
petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary relief is
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warranted). In particular, Frauenfeld challenged his license revocation in
a full evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge and has
alleged no violation of that process. Although he asserts that his case
cannot receive full judicial review without expediting that procedure, he
has not demonstrated that this interferes with his constitutional right to
due process. See State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety v. Root, 113
Nev. 942, 947, 944 P.2d 784, 787 (1997); see also Mackey v. Montrym, 443
U.S. 1, 11, (1979) (discussing due process rights with respect to driver's
license revocation procedures); Carroll v. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 907 N.E.2d
16, 23 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) ("There is no constitutional due process right to
judicial review of an administrative decision.").
Further, NRS 233B.133(6) provides that "[t]he court, for good
cause, may extend the times allowed in this section for filing memoranda."
Frauenfeld has not shown that the briefing deadlines set forth in NRS
233B.133 are necessarily subject to shortening as well as extension,
despite the statute's failure to so state. See In re Estate of Prestie, 122
Nev. 807, 814, 138 P.3d 520, 524 (2006) ("We have previously recognized
the fundamental rule of statutory construction that the mention of one
thing implies the exclusion of another." (internal alterations and quotation
marks omitted)); Waite v. Burgess, 69 Nev. 230, 233-34 245 P.2d 994, 996
(1952) (indicating that the legislature may set fixed time limits for
individuals' actions but not for the actions of courts); cf. Urshan v.
Musicians' Credit Union, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 839, 843-44 (Ct. App. 2004)
(noting that courts do not have authority to shorten statutory minimum
notice periods for summary judgment hearings).
Finally, we are not convinced that the future deprivation
alleged—Frauenfeld's inability to pursue his challenge to the
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administrative decision and revocation after the revocation period's
expiration—will necessarily come to pass. In Langston, we concluded that
the expiration of the driver's license revocation period rendered the appeal
moot. 110 Nev. at 343-44, 871 P.2d at 363. In that case, however, the
appellant had not cogently argued that a collateral consequence exception
applied and we concluded that the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-
review exception did not apply because the issues were factually specific to
the appellant. Id. Here, it is unclear whether any exceptions to the
mootness doctrine might apply. Therefore, we
ORDER the petition DENIED.
Hardesty
(15aat
Saitta
cc: Hon. Kerry Louise Earley, District Judge
The Hayes Law Firm
Attorney General/Carson City
Attorney General/Las Vegas
Eighth District Court Clerk
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