FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY 24 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEANNA L. KELLEY, No. 14-16020
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-02369-MHB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Michelle H. Burns, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 9, 2016
San Francisco, California
Before: FARRIS, O’SCANNLAIN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Deanna Kelley appeals from the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The administrative law
judge (“ALJ”) found that Kelley was not disabled because she had the residual
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work and was capable of performing
past relevant work as a grocery store cashier. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The ALJ identified “specific, clear and convincing reasons” to justify
her decision to grant little probative weight to Kelley’s testimony. Treichler v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The ALJ reasonably concluded that the record was not
consistent with Kelley’s descriptions of her daily activities. Kelley testified that
she needed to lie down all day and that her children would handle all household
responsibilities. Yet the ALJ identified portions of the record that showed Kelley
was able to perform at least light household chores, such as doing laundry and
preparing meals, and that she was able to drive, shop, and speak with others on the
phone.
2. The ALJ assigned little weight to Dr. Casey’s opinions regarding
Kelley’s limitations because they were based on Kelley’s subjective self-reports.
In light of Kelley’s adverse credibility determination, this is a “specific and
legitimate” reason supported by substantial evidence in the record. Reddick v.
Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998).
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3. The ALJ’s RFC determination did not turn on treatment notes that
pre-date the onset date of Kelley’s alleged disability. Thus, even if the ALJ erred
by citing the evidence, that error was harmless. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d
676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A decision of the ALJ will not be reversed for errors
that are harmless.”).
4. The ALJ did not express Kelley’s RFC on a function-by-function
basis, but the ALJ is not required to do so where she relies on medical opinions
that define the relevant functional limitations. Cf. Reed v. Massanari, 270 F.3d
838, 843 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (warning against the “practice of determining a
claimant’s ability to perform past work on the sole basis of a categorical RFC
assessment” (emphasis added)); see also Lind v. Astrue, 370 F. App’x 814, 817
(9th Cir. 2010) (“The ALJ is not required to repeat the function-by-function
analysis [provided in the record].”). Here, the ALJ adopted medical opinions that
offered function-by-function analyses. Those analyses are substantial evidence
supporting the ALJ’s RFC finding.
5. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Kelley had past
relevant work as a grocery store cashier. Kelley worked as a construction store
cashier for 13 years, which the vocational expert testified would allow her to learn
the job of grocery store cashier in the month she worked. Moreover, Kelley’s
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earnings records show she earned enough in the month she worked as a grocery
store cashier for the position to qualify as substantial gainful activity.
AFFIRMED.
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