NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 23, 2016
Decided May 25, 2016
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
No. 15‐2680
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellee, Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.
v. No. 15‐CR‐02
PAUL W. STEWART, James D. Peterson,
Defendant‐Appellant. Judge.
O R D E R
After selling heroin to undercover officers, Paul Stewart pleaded guilty to one
count of possessing heroin with intent to distribute. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district
court determined that Stewart was a career offender, see 21 U.S.C. § 851(a), and
sentenced him to 151 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of the calculated guidelines
range. Stewart filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyer, who also represented
Stewart in the district court, asserts that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw.
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Stewart has not accepted our invitation to
respond to counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). Counsel has submitted a brief that
explains the nature of the case and addresses potential issues that an appeal of this kind
might be expected to involve. Because the analysis in counsel’s brief appears to be
No. 15‐2680 Page 2
thorough, we limit our review to the subjects discussed by counsel. See United States v.
Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir.
1996).
Counsel first considers whether Stewart could challenge the voluntariness of his
guilty plea or the adequacy of the plea colloquy. Counsel does not say, however, if he
consulted Stewart about challenging his conviction on this ground. See United States v.
Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349–50 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71
(7th Cir. 2002). Regardless, our own review of the record persuades us that any challenge
to the plea would be frivolous. The transcript demonstrates that the district court
substantially complied with the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.
See Konczak, 683 F.3d at 349; United States v. Bowlin, 534 F.3d 654, 656–57 (7th Cir. 2008).
The court neglected to mention the possibility of forfeiture or restitution, see FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(J), (K), but the omission was inconsequential because the court did not
impose these financial penalties. See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 975 (7th Cir.
2002); United States v. Fox, 941 F.2d 480, 484–85 (7th Cir. 1991).
Counsel next considers whether Stewart could argue that his 151‐month prison
term is substantively unreasonable but correctly concludes that such a challenge would
be frivolous. The court imposed the lowest sentence recommended by the guidelines,
and within‐guidelines prison sentences are presumed reasonable on appellate review.
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007); United States v. Martinez, 650 F.3d 667, 671
(7th Cir. 2011). Counsel has not identified any reason to question the presumption of
reasonableness, nor have we. Counsel acknowledges that the district court weighed the
sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), in particular Stewart’s “extensive” criminal
history (noting that defendant’s criminal history in the last 10 years has “shown a
commitment to a life of crime”), the seriousness of his offense (stating that his drug
crimes involved aggressive, violent behavior including the use of a BB gun), and the
need to provide him with educational or vocational training (acknowledging that
Stewart likely had chosen a life of crime because he did not have job skills or job history
that would enable him to secure conventional employment).
Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.