NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2016
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
In re: B SQUARED, INC., a California No. 13-60084
Corporation, dba All California Funding,
BAP No. 12-1410-PaMkTa
Debtor.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER*
DANNY WAYNE PRYOR,
Appellant,
v.
B SQUARED, INC.,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Pappas, Markell, and Taylor, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Submitted May 24, 2016**
Before: D.W. NELSON, GRABER, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Page 2 of 4
Danny Wayne Pryor appeals from a decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel (BAP) affirming three orders of the bankruptcy court: one imposing
sanctions against him for violating the automatic stay and discharge injunction
in the chapter 11 proceedings of B Squared, Inc.; one denying reconsideration of
an order dismissing his separate adversary proceeding against B Squared; and
another denying reconsideration of an order designating him a vexatious litigant.
We affirm.
1. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by imposing contempt
sanctions against Pryor for violating the automatic stay and discharge injunction in
B Squared’s bankruptcy case. An automatic stay prohibiting “the commencement
or continuation” of any preexisting claim against B Squared arose on March 10,
2009, when B Squared filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, and remained in
effect until March 11, 2011, when the bankruptcy court granted discharge and
entered the accompanying injunction. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(1), (c)(2)(C), 524(a)(3).
Notwithstanding the stay, throughout 2010 and 2011 Pryor continued to pursue a
state-court action against B Squared arising out of B Squared’s foreclosure on
Pryor’s properties, and he filed a separate state-court action in April 2010 alleging
substantially the same claims. Notwithstanding the discharge injunction, he filed
another state-court action in January 2012, immediately after the bankruptcy court
Page 3 of 4
stated its intention to permanently enjoin him from seeking to collect the
underlying debt from B Squared.
Pryor claimed not to have knowledge of the stay or the discharge injunction,
which would absolve him of liability. See In re Dyer, 322 F.3d 1178, 1191 (9th
Cir. 2003); In re Bennett, 298 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002). But Pryor does not
contest that he testified under oath that he knew of B Squared’s chapter 11
proceeding as early as January 2010, or that his counsel twice clarified (contrary to
Pryor’s telling) that she advised him not to pursue the post-stay actions in state
court. Nor does Pryor contest that he learned of the discharge injunction at the
very latest in September 2011, well before he filed his final state-court action
against B Squared’s affiliated entities. The contempt sanctions were entirely
proper.
2. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by denying Pryor’s
motion to reconsider the dismissal of his complaint in the separate adversary
proceeding. None of Pryor’s late-submitted documents cast doubt on the court’s
conclusion that Pryor failed to file his adversary complaint within the prescribed
180-day window after having received timely notice of the bankruptcy court’s
entry of the order confirming B Squared’s bankruptcy plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1144.
To the extent that Pryor challenges the underlying dismissal order, we lack
Page 4 of 4
jurisdiction over that decision because Pryor did not timely appeal from it, and the
late-filed motion for reconsideration did not toll the time for filing the appeal. See
In re Blixseth, 684 F.3d 865, 869–70 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); see also Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 8002(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 9023.
3. The bankruptcy court likewise did not abuse its discretion by denying
Pryor’s motion to reconsider the order designating him a vexatious litigant.
Contrary to Pryor’s claims, the court did review the late-filed submissions, none of
which undermined the court’s conclusions in the underlying order. As with the
adversary proceeding, we lack jurisdiction to resolve any challenges to the
underlying order, because Pryor did not timely appeal from it, and his motion for
reconsideration was untimely. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 9023.
4. We grant Pryor’s request that we take judicial notice of various court
records from the related proceedings. See Fed. R. Evid. 201.
AFFIRMED. Request for judicial notice GRANTED.