Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC14-1629
____________
RODOLFO VALLADARES,
Petitioner,
vs.
BANK OF AMERICA CORP., etc.,
Respondent.
[June 2, 2016]
LEWIS, J.
This case is before the Court to review the decision of the Third District
Court of Appeal in Bank of America Corp. v. Valladares, 141 So. 3d 714, 715 (Fla.
2014). This case concerns a falsely reported robbery that resulted in injuries to
Petitioner Rodolfo Valladares. The issue we must address today is whether those
who falsely report criminal conduct to law enforcement have a privilege or
immunity from civil liability for the false report. This issue implicates both police
officer and citizen safety concerns. Valladares asserts that the decision of the
Third District Court of Appeal expressly and directly conflicts with Pokorny v.
First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Largo, 382 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1980). Further,
the district court decision expressly disagreed with and rejected the decision in
Harris v. Lewis State Bank, 482 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). We conclude
that the decision below is in conflict with both Pokorny and Harris. We have
jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We hold that a cause of action is
available to one injured as a result of a false report of criminal behavior to law
enforcement when the report is made by a party which has knowledge or by the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have knowledge that the accusations are
false or acts in a gross or flagrant manner in reckless disregard of the rights of the
party exposed, or acts with indifference or wantonness or recklessness equivalent
to punitive conduct.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Falsely Reported Robbery
On the morning of July 3, 2008, an e-mail was circulated in the Williams
Island branch of Bank of America that advised staff to be on the lookout for a bank
robber. The e-mail included several photos of a white male wearing a Miami Heat
baseball cap, a T-shirt, and sunglasses.
At approximately 3:00 p.m. that same day, Rodolfo “Rudy” Valladares
walked into his local Bank of America with the intent to cash a $100 check.
Valladares, a Hispanic male, wore a loose-fitting athletic shirt, gym pants, a black
Miami Heat baseball cap, and dark sunglasses. Although sunglasses and Miami
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Heat attire are not at all uncommon, nor are they significantly descriptive in South
Florida, Meylin Garcia believed that Valladares, a Bank of America customer, was
the bank robber depicted in the morning e-mail as soon as he entered the bank. At
the time, she did not have possession of the e-mail to compare the robber’s photos
with Valladares’s appearance, and the bank had not provided copies of the photos
for the tellers’ desks. As Valladares approached her desk, without any suspicious
conduct, Garcia pushed the silent alarm.
Failure to Correct the Alarm
Valladares reached Garcia’s desk and properly presented her with his check
and driver’s license. Specifically, the check was a Bank of America check with
Valladares’s name on it, for which there was absolutely no suspicion. The name
on the check matched the name on his driver’s license, for which there was also no
suspicion. Yet, Garcia still failed to do anything to cancel the robbery alarm.
When asked why she did not do anything to cancel the alarm after being presented
with the matching check and license, Garcia testified:
I honestly thought that he was a bank robber at that moment as soon
as he walked in . . . . I had it set in my mind according to the
description I had seen that morning about the e-mail. As soon as Mr.
Valladares walked in the bank, I saw him, and since he was wearing a
Miami Heat hat, the sunglasses—I mean I saw him, and automatically
I panicked, I got scared.
After accepting the license and the check, Garcia excused herself and
informed Valladares that she would return shortly. Valladares had hoped to
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complete the transaction without delay because he had $400 worth of food in his
car in preparation for a Fourth of July family barbecue the next day.
As these events were occurring, assistant manager trainee Jimmy Alor
received a call from corporate security, which asked him to verify the basis for the
silent alarm that had been activated from Garcia’s teller station. Unaware of any
emergency, Alor scanned the area and saw that Garcia had left her desk to speak
with another bank employee. He approached them and asked about the silent
alarm that had been triggered. Notwithstanding that Garcia already had ample
opportunity to examine Valladares’s face, check, and driver’s license, and that no
hint of a robbery was presented, and Alor had ample time to know the true facts,
Garcia replied, “the robber is at my window.” Alor did not make any inquiry or
take any steps to confirm that Valladares was or was not in fact an armed bank
robber or a customer because he simply assumed from her body language that she
perceived a threat. Alor made only a quick glance toward Garcia’s window and
saw no suspicious conduct, but he did not attempt to gather or develop any further
information. Alor walked back to his desk and, without any confirmation or
verification, simply repeated Garcia’s words to the corporate security caller: the
robber is at her window. When asked by corporate security if the suspect was
armed, Alor responded that he had no idea but he had not seen any type of weapon.
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Alor then returned to his duties and simply acted as if there were no emergency
and ignored what was happening in his bank.
Garcia returned to her position with Valladares. Valladares proceeded to
make conversation with Garcia, asking her if she had plans for the Fourth of July
holiday, and even invited her to his family barbecue. She replied that she had a
boyfriend, to which he responded, “he’s welcome to come too.” She then studied
his license again and looked at Valladares, but still failed to differentiate
Valladares’s Hispanic characteristics from those of the white male depicted in the
e-mail she had seen earlier that day and failed to take any steps to report the
innocent transactional facts. Garcia asked Valladares to endorse the check, and
handed Valladares a pen.
Garcia left her desk again, with Valladares’s check and license in hand, to
present them to her manager, Bianca Mercado. In an attempt to further stall the
transaction, Garcia returned to her desk and informed Valladares that she could not
cash the check because the computers were down. Valladares was confused, as it
was apparent that other transactions were still taking place at the bank. He asked
to see the manager. When Mercado arrived, Valladares said, “What seems to be
the problem? It’s just a $100 check, on a Bank of America check. Look at my
driver’s license.” As yet another ruse to confuse Valladares, Mercado replied that
they could not cash his check because it was endorsed in the wrong colored ink.
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Mercado added that he had to leave the bank immediately. Valladares,
understandably, became irritated with the employees’ strange and rude behavior.
He expressed that he could not believe he was being thrown out of the bank on
these grounds, but turned around and started to leave. Approximately fifteen to
twenty minutes had elapsed from the time Valladares first presented his check to
his attempted exit. Absolutely nothing had occurred, suspicious or otherwise,
during the entire time to suggest or hint that Valladares was anything other than a
regular bank customer conducting normal banking business.
Garcia confirmed that during the entirety of Valladares’s interaction with
bank employees, he did not make any threats, present a note, make a demand, or
appear in any way to be armed or have a criminal intent. She conceded that
Valladares did nothing to elicit any suspicion that he intended to rob the bank or
engage in any unlawful behavior. Garcia even agreed that Valladares was very
nice to her during their interaction. Garcia simply attempted to insist that at no
point during the incident did she doubt that Valladares was the bank robber,
notwithstanding all of the facts to the contrary.
As Valladares attempted to exit the bank, he saw a team of police officers
armed with heavy weapons emerging from multiple sides of the building. The
team was led by Officer Sean Bergert, who was the only SWAT member among
the officers present. Upon arrival, Bergert realized the other non-SWAT officers
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had created a “fatal funnel,” meaning that they were taking cover behind the glass
windows of the building, which provides a dangerously false sense of security.
Bergert decided to take charge and had several officers line up with him to enter
the bank. Notwithstanding that multiple bank employees had been presented with
the valid check and matching proper license only moments earlier, Mercado and
the other bank employees not only failed to take any action to intervene when the
police stormed inside the bank, but Mercado even went a step further and pointed
to Valladares, signaling him as the robber. Bergert instructed everyone to lie on
the floor with their hands extended. Everyone in the bank, including Valladares,
complied with the command.
Valladares testified that he immediately went to the floor as ordered and
outstretched his hands, with his license and check still in hand. Then, a police
officer placed his boot on the back of Valladares’s head, handcuffed him, and
screamed at him, “Where’s the weapon?”. Valladares further testified that the
police officer kicked him in the head while he was already handcuffed:
[The police officer] started kicking me handcuffed on the floor . . . .
He kicked me on the side of the head. You know, they were lifting
me up by my hands . . . and sticking their hands all through my shirt
and everything, asking me, Why are you doing this? Why are you
doing this? Where is the weapon? And I’m like, I’m not doing
anything. I’m not doing anything.
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The officer with an AR-15 rifle admitted that he kicked Valladares in the head.
Valladares recalled, “I was in pain. I was terrified . . . I was afraid for my life. I
didn’t know what they were going to do with me.”
There is some limited surveillance video from the day of the incident,
however there happen to be suspicious, convenient breaks in the footage. The
video provided by the bank contains footage of Valladares as he lay on the floor
without handcuffs, and Valladares after he was already on the floor and
handcuffed, but the segment of the video showing Valladares being kicked is
conveniently missing. Bank of America denies that this footage was erased, and
asserts that the surveillance program is written to purposely create gaps in footage
to create an easily downloadable file.
The opinion below, in rendering a decision as a matter of law, incorrectly
relied exclusively on the police officer’s version of the facts. Valladares, 141 So.
3d at 715. However, we view the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party—in this case, Valladares. See Friedrich v. Fetterman & Assocs., P.A., 137
So. 3d 362, 365 (Fla. 2013). Furthermore, the evidence provided in the video does
not support the version of the facts that a kick occurred before Valladares was
handcuffed. The video revealed no kicks to the head before Valladares was fully
secured in handcuffs on the floor.
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The record does not clearly establish the exact moment that the officers
realized that Valladares was not a robber, but it does indicate that at some point the
police realized that after Valladares had been seriously injured, it was a totally
false alarm, and officers asked to speak with Garcia. Valladares testified that the
police verified his license and the check while he was still handcuffed.
An officer observed redness and bruising on the side of Valladares’s head
and called the paramedics. The paramedics advised Valladares to go to the
hospital. Alor, the assistant bank manager trainee who had spoken with corporate
security, approached Valladares while he was with the paramedics and asked if he
was okay. Valladares stated that Alor also admitted to him that they realized that
they had the wrong person and were terribly wrong.
During trial, Garcia admitted and confirmed that she was wrong in failing to
properly and fully inform Alor and Mercado that Valladares was a customer, and
that she was wrong in failing to say something to the police officers when they
rushed in and attacked Valladares.
Damages
Following the kicks to the head, Valladares experienced headaches that were
unlike any he had ever experienced, and was placed on pain medication.
Valladares sought attention at a local hospital for his head pain that became
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unbearable. However, after waiting about twenty hours in the emergency room,
the hospital refused to treat him because he lacked health insurance.
He next sought treatment with a neurologist, a neuro-ophthalmologist, and a
psychologist. The examinations by the neurologist revealed that Valladares suffers
from muscle contractions that cause persistent headaches on a daily basis.
Valladares suffers from sudden blurry vision, and as a result he can no longer
work. His neuro-ophthalmologist diagnosed Valladares as having traumatic optic
neuropathy, which could not be cured or corrected with corrective lenses.
Valladares’s older sister established that her brother, once a happy person
who hosted social gatherings at his apartment, became a social recluse after the
incident. Valladares was forced to return to live with his parents because he spent
the majority of his days bedridden and could no longer pay his rent. He has
become a hoarder and is embarrassed to allow others into his bedroom. Valladares
has installed a camera at his home because he fears he is being watched, and also
has installed two locks on his bedroom door. Valladares avoids the area where the
bank is located, no longer has any friends, and is unable to maintain a romantic
relationship as a result of sexual dysfunction. Based on these various medically
related problems, his psychologist diagnosed him as having post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) with anxiety and depression. The psychologist is of the opinion
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that Valladares is “[a]t the severe end of the [PTSD] spectrum” and opines that the
condition will only worsen.
Legal Proceedings
Following the incident at the bank, Valladares filed an action against Bank
of America for negligence, battery, and false imprisonment.1 In an apparent
attempt to comply with the legislatively established permissive scope of punitive
damages pursuant to Florida Statutes, section 768.72 (1999), Valladares did not
include an allegation for punitive damages in his initial complaint. Instead, he
sought punitive damages for the counts of battery and false imprisonment in his
Second Amended Complaint. However, as evidence developed, it became clear
that Valladares sought relief for punitive conduct, and the bank was aware of the
allegations. Further, Valladares consistently asserted acts beyond negligent
reporting. Specifically, the negligence count in Valladares’s original complaint
provided in part:
10. The Defendant, BANK OF AMERICA, breached its duty of
reasonable care in one or more of the following ways:
(a) Negligently and carelessly activating and failing to cancel the
silent robbery alarm, and failing to cancel said alarm when it knew or
in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that the Plaintiff
was not attempting to rob the bank;
(Emphasis added).
1. Because Valladares was neither arrested nor prosecuted, he had no action
for malicious prosecution.
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Following a lengthy trial, the jury was instructed on claims of negligence,
comparative negligence, false imprisonment, battery, and punitive damages. With
respect to vicarious liability, the jurors were instructed, “Bank of America is
responsible for any negligence of its employees in failing to supervise other
employees.” Furthermore, the punitive damages instruction provided:
Valladares claims that punitive damages should be awarded against
Bank of America for its employees’ conduct in in [sic] the battery and
false imprisonment of Valladares. Punitive damages are warranted if
you find by clear and convincing evidence that Bank of America’s
employees were personally guilty of intentional misconduct, which
was a substantial cause of injury to Valladares.
The verdict form itself did not specify that the punitive damages should be
awarded only if the jury found that Bank of America committed one of the
intentional torts.
The jury found that Bank of America was negligent, and that there was no
negligence attributed to Valladares. However, the jury found in favor of the
defendant bank on the claims for battery and false imprisonment. The instructions
stated that punitive damages should be awarded in conjunction with findings
against the bank if the bank employees were personally guilty of intentional
misconduct. Notwithstanding the battery and false imprisonment findings, the jury
found that the bank employees engaged in punitive conduct and the bank was
liable for punitive damages. The jury awarded $3,000 in past medical expenses;
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$100,000 in future medical expenses; $1.5 million for past pain and suffering; and
$1 million for future pain and suffering for a total of $2,603,000 in compensatory
damages. The jury additionally awarded $700,000 in punitive damages.
At the close of trial, the jury verdict appeared to be inconsistent in that the
jury found in favor of the bank on the battery and false imprisonment claims, but
the jury found in favor of Valladares that bank employees were personally guilty of
punitive misconduct on punitive damages. Valladares’s counsel brought this
verdict inconsistency to the attention of the trial judge and the bank. Valladares
requested that the matter be resubmitted to the jury. The bank objected to having
the jury consider the inconsistency, disagreed, and waived any objection to the
verdict. The bank later moved to set aside the judgment, for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, for new trial, and for remittitur. Each was denied and
judgment was entered in favor of Valladares.
District Court Proceedings
The Third District reversed and remanded for entry of judgment for the
bank. After offering only one paragraph summarizing the incident in a light most
favorable to the bank contrary to well established appellate principles, the Third
District concluded that a person who contacts law enforcement to report criminal
activity cannot be liable under a theory of simple negligence. Valladares, 141 So.
3d at 715.
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Primarily relying on Pokorny, the Valladares court determined that those
who report crimes are protected by a qualified privilege, and thus cannot be held
liable for making a good faith report to the police, absent a showing of malice. Id.
at 717. The court analogized the malice requirement to cases that concern
malicious prosecution, arrest, defamation, or slander. Id. at 718. Ultimately, the
court determined that the same malice standard should be applied to physical
injury caused by mistaken reports to law enforcement. Id. Based on this standard,
the court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to prove the elements required to
establish a cause of action because he failed to present a claim beyond simple
negligence.
Further, the court acknowledged that Harris was a case that cut against
applying a qualified privilege to reports of suspected criminal activity: “To the
extent Harris holds that a person can be liable for a negligent, but good faith,
mistake in summoning the police, it conflicts with the authority summarized above
which governs analogous situations. We respectfully disagree with it.” Id. at 718
(emphasis added). Valladares now seeks review by this Court.
ANALYSIS
This question presents a pure question of law and is, therefore, subject to de
novo review. See Jackson-Shaw Co. v. Jacksonville Aviation Auth., 8 So. 3d
1076, 1084-85 (Fla. 2008).
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A misunderstanding of Florida law in connection with reports of criminal
conduct to law enforcement has generated the foundation for the conflict we must
now resolve, which involves this case, Pokorny, and Harris. Contrary to the
understanding of the district court and Bank of America, Pokorny did not fully
resolve all issues of negligence in this false reporting context. Pokorny did outline
some parameters within which the law should operate regarding reports made to
law enforcement by discussing the importance of a judicially created qualified
privilege for those who may incorrectly but innocently report criminal conduct.
Harris, on the other hand, directly discussed negligence, recognizing that a cause of
action for negligent reports to law enforcement exists when the conduct goes
beyond an innocent misunderstanding. The decision below expressly states that it
disagrees with Harris. In addition, the decision below is in conflict with Pokorny
because it has improperly applied Pokorny to the facts in this case. It is critical
that we recognize and maintain a real, meaningful distinction between intentional
torts, malicious prosecution, false arrest, and negligent acts arising from conduct in
this context.
Although Valladares did not assert a claim of malicious prosecution, slander,
or defamation, the Third District nonetheless incorrectly looked only to these types
of cases for guidance. The confusion is not uncommon because these are the
causes of action that most commonly arise from incorrect reports to the police. See
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Valladares, 141 So. 3d at 718. However, the facts in the instant case are different.
Although similar to certain victims of malicious prosecution, slander, and
defamation, Valladares was wrongfully accused of committing a crime and
suffered damages as a result. This reliance upon Pokorny is misplaced because it
is not a negligence case. Further, Valladares lacked a cause of action under a
malicious prosecution theory because he was never arrested, nor was he
prosecuted.
The Third District primarily relied on Pokorny, which also involved a falsely
reported bank robbery. In Pokorny, the plaintiff alleged that the bank had engaged
in negligent, reckless, or intentional misconduct that proximately caused the false
imprisonment of the plaintiff. 382 So. 2d at 680. This Court considered two of the
five questions submitted for review:
1. Did the actions of the employees of the defendant, First Federal
Savings and Loan Association of Largo, Florida, constitute “direct
procurement” of an arrest under the teachings of Johnson v. Weiner, 19 So.
2d 699 (Fla. 1944), and its progeny?
2. Do the rules governing arrest and imprisonment by private citizens
apply in this case?
Id. at 680-81.2
2. Three other questions were certified to this Court but were not answered.
Pokorny, 382 So. 2d at 681, 683.
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The jury was instructed that the bank could not be held liable if it found that
the teller who reported the robbery acted reasonably in believing that a robbery
was occurring, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the bank. Id. at 680.
This Court concluded that the teller acted reasonably and in good faith, and
ultimately held in the arrest context that:
[U]nder Florida law a private citizen may not be held liable in tort
where he neither actually detained another nor instigated the other’s
arrest by law enforcement officers. If the private citizen makes an
honest, good faith mistake in reporting an incident, the mere fact that
his communication to an officer may have caused the victim’s arrest
does not make him liable when he did not in fact request any
detention.
Id. at 682.
Harris also involved a false report of criminal activity at a bank. 482 So. 2d
1378. Harris was a customer at Lewis State Bank who realized that a strange
name, “John Lewis,” had appeared on her account. Id. at 1381 n.8. After
informing Lewis State Bank of the apparent mistake, the bank told Harris that she
could continue to withdraw money from the account. Id. Harris returned to Lewis
State Bank and provided it with her social security and voter registration cards. Id.
The bank also taught her how to fill out a withdrawal slip and allowed her to
complete another withdrawal. Id. Harris made four additional withdrawals
without issue. Id. When John Lewis finally realized that $975 had been
withdrawn from his account, the bank indicated that someone had fraudulently
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withdrawn money from his account. Id. Over three months later, Harris returned
to Lewis State Bank and was apprehended by bank employees, who then reported
her to the sheriff’s department and delivered her into custody. Id.
Harris’s negligence claim was dismissed at the trial level based on the
language regarding negligence in Pokorny. Id. at 1383. Lewis State Bank argued
the negligence count should fail because the only cause of action available was
malicious prosecution.3 See id. The court in Harris found that this was a
misreading of Pokorny, reasoning:
It is at least arguable that in the case sub judice, the misinformation
allegedly reported to the police was not the result of an honest, good
faith mistake on the part of the bank. The allegations upon which all
the counts of appellant’s complaint are based include acts beyond the
innocent misunderstanding portrayed in Pokorny.
Id. at 1384 (emphasis added). Ultimately, the Harris court held that a negligence
action was proper once the conduct of the bank passed a certain threshold:
Because appellant’s complaint sufficiently alleged a relationship
voluntarily entered into by the bank which created a duty on the part
of the bank to protect appellant from false accusations of forgery and
theft, and because the allegations of the complaint, if taken as true,
indicate that the bank had knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable
diligence would have had knowledge, that its acts and omissions were
likely to result in injury to appellant, the trial court improperly
dismissed the count for negligence.
Id. at 1385 (emphasis added).
3. Lewis State Bank additionally claimed that false imprisonment and fraud
were not legitimate claims.
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Rather than relying on the direct holding of Pokorny, the district court in this
case focused on dicta—the discussion suggesting that malice is required to state a
cause of action for mistakenly reporting a crime in the arrest context—in
concluding that Valladares failed to allege a proper cause of action. However,
Pokorny did not address a cause of action for negligent reporting. Indeed, the
holding in Pokorny defined “direct procurement” under an arrest and false
imprisonment cause of action. The only statements made by this Court in Pokorny
regarding a cause of action for negligent reporting were made in dicta.
Furthermore, there is no statement in Pokorny that abolishes negligent reporting as
a cause of action, nor did Pokorny point to any other cases that prohibit a cause of
action for negligent reporting. Therefore, the Third District erred in holding that
this Court’s decision in Pokorny precluded a cause of action for negligent reports
to law enforcement.
Of course, this Court and others have long recognized that a judicially
created qualified privilege exists in regard to injuries resulting from malicious
prosecution, false imprisonment, defamation, and slander. See Fridovich v.
Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65, 68-69 (Fla. 1992) (holding that a qualified privilege
exists for defamatory statements made to police when such statements are not
made maliciously); Burns v. GCC Beverages, Inc., 502 So. 2d 1217, 1220 (Fla.
1986) (holding that a company was not liable for malicious prosecution when an
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employee, in good faith and without specifically requesting arrest, reported
suspected criminal activity to law enforcement); Myers v. Jim Russo Prison
Ministries, Inc., 3 So. 3d 411, 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (applying the qualified
privilege to slander arising from false reports made to police); Harris v. Kearney,
786 So. 2d 1222, 1225 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (reasoning under Pokorny that there
was no false imprisonment claim against Department of Children and Family
agents who filed a complaint that resulted in the arrest of the appellant because the
complaint was made in good faith); Manis v. Miller, 327 So. 2d 117, 118 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1976) (holding that there is no liability “for false imprisonment upon a
witness making an honest, good faith mistake in identifying a criminal suspect
where the identification contributes to arrest and prosecution of the suspect”).
This qualified privilege for mistaken, but good faith reports of suspected
criminal activity is rooted in a public policy concern. In Pokorny, this Court
recognized the dangers of a standard that would deter citizens from reporting
crimes for fear of liability:
Prompt and effective law enforcement is directly dependent upon the
willingness and cooperation of private persons to assist law
enforcement officers in bringing those who violate our criminal laws
to justice. Unfortunately, too often in the past witnesses and victims
of criminal offenses have failed to report crimes to the proper law
enforcement agencies. Private citizens should be encouraged to
become interested and involved in bringing the perpetrators of crime
to justice and not discouraged under apprehension or fear of
recrimination.
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Pokorny, 382 So. 2d at 682 (quoting Manis, 327 So. 2d at 117). At the same time,
this Court has considered the dangers of a standard that would provide absolute
immunity or an absolute privilege for those who report crimes. In Fridovich, this
Court considered whether false statements made to an officer are absolutely
privileged from liability for defamation, even when made maliciously. This Court
held that the privilege was not absolute because such a privilege would prevent the
Court from providing a forum for redress of every wrong. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at
69. The Court instead opted for a qualified privilege that precluded intentional or
malicious reports from privilege. Id. at 69.
Therefore, the standard necessary is one that maintains a balance between
protecting individuals from abusive accusations to the police, and encouraging
citizens to report suspected criminal activity, as expressed in Burns:
The tort of malicious prosecution is premised on the right of an
individual to be protected from unjustifiable litigation or unwarranted
criminal prosecution. Against this right, the need of society to bring
criminals to justice by protecting those who, in good faith, report and
legally prosecute persons apparently guilty of crime must be balanced.
The latter need, in addition to the public policy in favor of the
termination of litigation, dictates the plaintiff’s heavy burden of
proof.
Burns, 502 So. 2d at 1219.
Bank of America incorrectly interprets Pokorny to mean that the only cause
of action available to Valladares was malicious prosecution. However, Valladares
had no cause of action for malicious prosecution because he was never arrested or
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prosecuted. See id. A standard that would preclude any cause of action for
conduct beyond mere negligent reporting simply because the plaintiff was not
arrested would not support a careful balance between protecting victims of falsely
reported crimes and encouraging good faith reports. Indeed, the standard proposed
by the bank would prejudice victims such as Valladares. Further, such a standard
would shield negligent defendants from incurring liability for their tortious conduct
simply because law enforcement chooses not to prosecute an individual. Thus—
regardless of whether a wrongful reporting resulted in an arrest—public policy
supports the conclusion that those who are injured as a result of incorrect reports to
the police should have access to redress for injuries. Moreover, this Court is
obliged by the Florida Constitution to provide access to courts for every wrong.
See art. I, § 21, Fla. Const. We cannot turn a blind eye to those who cannot allege
malicious prosecution, but nonetheless sustain injuries due to incorrect reports to
police. At the same time, we recognize the importance of encouraging citizens to
report suspected crimes. Therefore, we hold that a cause of action for negligent
reporting arises when there is incorrect reporting plus conduct on the part of the
reporting party that rises to the level of punitive conduct.
The conduct required to allege punitive conduct reaches beyond simple
negligence. U.S. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla. 1983)
(“Punitive damages cannot be assessed for mere negligent conduct, but must be
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based on behavior which indicates a wanton disregard for the rights of others.”
(citing Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer, 171 So. 214 (1936))). This Court
has defined the level of negligent conduct necessary to warrant punitive damages
as follows:
The character of negligence necessary to sustain an award of punitive
damages must be of a “gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless
disregard of human life, or of the safety of persons exposed to its
dangerous effects, or there is that entire want of care which would
raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences, or
which shows wantonness or recklessness, or a grossly careless
disregard of the safety and welfare of the public, or that reckless
indifference to the rights of others which is equivalent to an
intentional violation of them.”
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Ballard, 749 So. 2d 483, 486 (Fla. 1999)
(quoting White Const. Co. v. Dupont, 455 So. 2d 1026, 1029 (Fla. 1984), receded
from on other grounds by Murphy v. Int’l Robotic Sys., Inc., 766 So. 2d 1010 (Fla.
2000)); Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Roy, 498 So. 2d 859, 861-62 (Fla. 1986) (also
quoting White Const. Co., 455 So. 2d at 1029); Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So.
2d 823, 824 (Fla. 1986) (citing Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16, 19-20 (Fla.
1959)); see also W.R. Grace & Co.—Conn. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d 502, 503 (Fla.
1994) (“Punitive damages are appropriate when a defendant engages in conduct
which is fraudulent, malicious, deliberately violent or oppressive, or committed
with such gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard for the rights of
others.”). In this context, Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Civil) 503.1(b)(2)
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defines gross negligence as conduct that is “so reckless or wanting in care that it
constitute[s] a conscious disregard or indifference to the life, safety, or rights of
persons exposed to such conduct.”
Relatedly, this Court has recognized that the required level of negligence for
punitive damages is equivalent to the conduct involved in criminal manslaughter.
Como Oil Co., Inc. v. O’Loughlin, 466 So. 2d 1061, 1062 (Fla. 1985) (discussing
the holding in White Const. Co., 455 So. 2d at 1029); see also Carraway, 116 So.
2d at 18-19 (“[T]he character of negligence necessary to sustain a conviction for
manslaughter is the same as that required to sustain a recovery for punitive
damages.”).
By requiring something more than simple negligence, but less than intent or
malice, a requirement that the conduct rise to the level of punitive conduct in cases
of incorrect reports to law enforcement accomplishes the task of encouraging
legitimate criminal reports while providing a safeguard against abuse. At one time
reporting criminal activity to law enforcement was viewed as a circumstance that
would not lead to unexpected problems. Unfortunately, with the amount of
violence and force that law enforcement officers face and encounter daily when
they respond to reports of suspected criminal activity, officers at times respond
with what may appear to the layman as significant force. The necessity of this
force is a harsh reality in a world that has become increasingly violent. However,
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if a party has information that he or she has incorrectly reported a particular
individual, or should have known it was incorrect, and the force was applied, such
a report is above and beyond a simple, innocent report of conduct. Therefore,
parties who engage in reckless, wanton, or culpable conduct in connection with
reporting a suspected crime to law enforcement are not protected by the qualified
privilege. Public policy supports a limited immunity for those who make innocent,
simple mistakes, but that limited immunity cannot extend to conduct that
recklessly disregards the rights of others. In the case of Valladares, the bank had
ample information and ample time to know the true facts and to correct the false
report, but failed to do so. Once there is information indicating that a crime is not
being committed, this limited privilege should not extend to a person’s failure to
alert law enforcement that a reported crime is a mistake or simply wrong. This
goes a step beyond negligence. A standard that demands more than simple
negligence, but does not overburden the plaintiff with proving intent or malice,
serves the interest of encouraging reports of criminal activity while protecting
victims from punitive conduct. It also protects law enforcement from being
incorrectly and unnecessarily involved in an event with force and violence that can
be avoided.
The Third District improperly applied the limited qualified privilege
discussed in Pokorny to the facts in the instant case. We hold that the privilege
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does not apply to incorrect and wrongful reports made to law enforcement when
the conduct rises to the level of punitive conduct. When the conduct in connection
with reporting suspected criminal activity evinces a reckless disregard of the safety
and rights of others—or as in this case—the parties involved either knew or should
have known that their conduct was likely to cause harm, the qualified privilege
cannot provide immunity to such behavior. Such an absolute immunity would
frustrate the purpose of the qualified privilege, which is meant to encourage police
reports by protecting only those who make innocent mistakes.
Additionally, we conclude that the case below is in conflict with Harris. The
case below interpreted Harris to hold that there is a cause of action for simple
negligence when a crime is misreported in good faith, and thus expressly disagreed
with it. Valladares, 141 So. 3d at 718. This was a mischaracterization of Harris.
Because we have confirmed that Pokorny did not abolish negligence as a
cause of action for incorrect reports to law enforcement, the holding in Harris is
consistent with Florida law. The trial court in Harris erred when it dismissed a
negligence claim because the acts of the defendant went “beyond the innocent
misunderstanding” in Pokorny. This language demonstrates a cause of action for
something beyond simple negligence, but not necessarily something at the level of
malice or intent. There is no basis to support that the trial court in Harris was
required to make a finding of actual knowledge or intent. Rather, the holding in
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Harris is consistent with the public policy concern to encourage reports to law
enforcement without condoning reckless, culpable conduct where the defendant
knows or should know that the conduct would result in harm to others. Bank of
America’s behavior was analogous to the behavior of the bank in Harris in that it
also committed acts that went beyond an innocent misunderstanding.
Valladares did not specifically allege punitive damages under the negligence
count in his original complaint in an attempt to comply with section 768.72,
Florida Statutes. Although this presents a problem with his award for punitive
damages, it should be noted that this statute, precluding an allegation of punitive
damages in the initial complaint, has no application to a cause of action for
negligent reporting of criminal conduct. Section 768.72 pertains only to a demand
for punitive damages. Thus, a plaintiff asserting a cause of action for conduct that
rises to the level of punitive conduct in the context of criminal reporting must
include that allegation in the initial complaint.
In this case, Valladares did plead beyond simple negligence in reporting in
his Second Amended Complaint. Valladares’s Second Amended Complaint
provides, in relevant part, under the count for negligence:
9. The Defendant, BANK OF AMERICA, owed a duty to use
reasonable care for the Plaintiff’s safety.
10. The Defendant, BANK OF AMERICA, breached its duty of
reasonable care in one or more of the following ways:
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(a) Negligently and carelessly activating and failing to cancel the
silent robbery alarm, and failing to cancel said alarm when it knew or
in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that the Plaintiff
was not attempting to rob the bank;
(b) Failing to properly train its employees, including but not limited
to Defendants ALOR and GARCIA, concerning the identification of
suspected bank robbers, and the handling of suspected robberies that
turn out to be unfounded.
(Emphasis added). Here, Valladares did not allege negligent reporting alone.
Valladares alleged negligent reporting, and separately alleged the bank’s failure to
cancel the report after the bank had sufficient information to know that Valladares
was not a bank robber.
Moreover, the bank cannot avoid responsibility by claiming that it does not
owe a duty to its customers. We have long recognized that businesses owe a duty
of reasonable care to their invitees to maintain safe conditions on business
premises. Fetterman & Assocs., 137 So. 3d at 365. Specifically, businesses owe
their invitees a duty of care to (1) maintain their premises in a way that ensures
reasonably safe conditions, and (2) advise the invitee of any reasonably unknown
hidden dangers of which the owner either knew or should have known. Id. at 365
(quoting Morales v. Weil, 44 So. 3d 173, 178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)). This duty not
only applies to dangerous conditions that arise and require correction, but also to
taking action to mitigate or eliminate the possibility of a foreseeable risk of harm
before it occurs. See Markowitz v. Helen Homes of Kendall Corp., 826 So. 2d
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256, 259-60 (Fla. 2002) (discussing the mode of operation theory). One may
establish foreseeability by a showing that the business had actual or constructive
knowledge that a dangerous condition that is likely to cause harm exists on the
premises. Hall v. Billy Jack’s, Inc., 458 So. 2d 760, 761 (Fla. 1984) (discussing
foreseeability in the context of a tavern’s knowledge of a person’s inclination to be
violent). If despite knowledge or actual knowledge of a risk of danger,
management still fails to take steps to avoid that danger, the business may have
breached its duty and thus be required to pay damages for resulting injuries to its
invitee. See id. at 762.
In this case, the jury instructions provided that a finding of negligence
against the bank was warranted if the jury found the bank to be vicariously liable
for the negligent actions of its employees, and the jury did make such a finding.
Additionally, our own review of the record reveals numerous wrongful actions
from the time Valladares entered the bank until he was severely injured by a
violent kick to the head.
However, because there was a failure to allege punitive conduct in the
pleadings, improper instructions to the jury regarding punitive conduct and
intentional conduct, an inconsistency in the verdict, and an inappropriate argument
that an intentional act is required for a cause of action for negligent reporting, we
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cannot simply reinstate the jury verdict. This case must be remanded for a new
trial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the decision below expressly
and directly conflicts with the decisions in Pokorny and Harris. We hold that
negligence is a valid cause of action for injuries arising from mistaken reports to
law enforcement when the conduct complained of demonstrates reckless, culpable
conduct to the level of punitive damages. We therefore quash the decision below,
and remand this case for new trial.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
CANADY, J., dissenting.
Because I conclude that the decision of the Third District in Bank of
America Corp. v. Valladares, 141 So. 3d 714 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014),
does not expressly and directly conflict with our decision in Pokorny v. First
Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Largo, 382 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1980), or the
decision of the First District in Harris v. Lewis State Bank, 482 So. 2d 1378 (Fla.
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1st DCA 1986), I would dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction under article V,
section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution.
“This Court may only review a decision of a district court of appeal that
expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal
or the Supreme Court on the same question of law.” Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d
1356, 1359 (Fla. 1980). This Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions of courts of
appeal for express and direct conflict is invoked by “the application of a rule of law
to produce a different result in a case which involves substantially the same
[controlling] facts as a prior case” or “the announcement of a rule of law which
conflicts with a rule previously announced by this court or another district[.]”
Mancini v. State, 312 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 1975); see Adams v. Seaboard Coast
Line R.R. Co., 296 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1974).
Valladares does not expressly and directly conflict with Pokorny because the
cases do not announce conflicting rules of law. In Valladares, the Third District
addressed whether a person can be held liable for simple negligence for contacting
the police to report suspected criminal activity and held that
[a] person calling the police to report a possible crime is not liable for
a good faith mistake even if the individual reported suffers personal
injuries at the hands of the police. Calling the police to report a crime
rises to the level of a tort only if the reporter acts maliciously,
meaning the reporter either knows the report is false or recklessly
disregards whether the report is false.
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Valladares, 141 So. 3d at 715, 718. In contrast, this Court in Pokorny addressed
whether a person may be held liable for unlawful detention or false imprisonment
based on contacting the police to report suspected criminal activity. In Pokorny we
held that
under Florida law a private citizen may not be held liable in tort where
he neither actually detained another nor instigated the other’s arrest by
law enforcement officers. If the private citizen makes an honest, good
faith mistake in reporting an incident, the mere fact that his
communication to an officer may have caused the victim’s arrest does
not make him liable when he did not in fact request any detention.
Pokorny, 382 So. 2d at 682. Although both Valladares and Pokorny involve fact
patterns in which the defendant allegedly made an erroneous report to the police,
they deal with different theories of liability. Valladares addresses a claim of
simple negligence and Pokorny addresses claims of unlawful detention and false
imprisonment. But the reasoning of the two cases is consistent: both recognize a
rule of no liability for good faith mistakes associated with erroneous reports to the
police. And nothing in Pokorny suggests that the good faith rule it articulates
should not be extended to a claim of simple negligence for making an erroneous
report to the police. Pokorny thus provides no basis for the Court to exercise
conflict jurisdiction over Valladares.
Nor does Valladares expressly and directly conflict with Harris. As
explained previously, Valladares addressed whether an individual can be held
liable for simple negligence for contacting the police to report suspected criminal
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activity, and the Third District held that a person calling the police to report a
possible crime is not liable for a good faith mistake even if the individual reported
suffers personal injuries at the hands of the police. Valladares, 141 So. 3d at 715,
718. The First District in Harris addressed the sufficiency of a negligence cause of
action to withstand a motion to dismiss, reasoned that “[i]t is at least arguable that
in the case sub judice, the misinformation allegedly reported to the police was not
the result of an honest, good faith mistake on the part of the bank[,]” and held that
[b]ecause appellant’s complaint sufficiently alleged a relationship
voluntarily entered into by the bank which created a duty on the part
of the bank to protect appellant from false accusations of forgery and
theft, and because the allegations of the complaint, if taken as true,
indicate that the bank had knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable
diligence would have had knowledge, that its acts and omissions were
likely to result in injury to appellant, the trial court improperly
dismissed the count for negligence.
Harris, 482 So. 2d at 1384-85 (emphasis added). Specifically, the complaint in
Harris alleged the bank had encouraged and facilitated withdrawals by the
appellant from a third person’s account; that “the bank did not reveal to [that
person] what had transpired between bank employees and appellant, but instead led
him to believe that someone with criminal intent had” made withdrawals based on
a forged signature; and that the appellant was “seized by bank employees” and
turned over to the custody of the police. Id. at 1381 n.8. These facts in Harris set
the case apart from Valladares, where a bank teller simply “mistook Valladares for
a bank robber” and made a report to the police. Valladares, 141 So. 3d at 715.
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Nothing in Harris suggests that liability can be predicated on a good faith mistake
in reporting a suspected crime to the police. There is no express and direct conflict
with Valladares.
This Court lacks jurisdiction under the Florida Constitution to review
Valladares. Accordingly, I dissent.
POLSTON, J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct
Conflict of Decisions
Third District - Case No. 3D12-1338
(Miami-Dade County)
Joel Stephen Perwin of Joel S. Perwin, P.A., Miami, Florida; and Mark Gabriel
DiCowden of Mark G. DiCowden, P.A., Aventura, Florida,
for Petitioner
Adam Matthew Topel, J. Randolph Liebler, and Tricia Julie Duthiers of Liebler,
Gonzalez & Portuondo, Miami, Florida,
for Respondent
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