FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 01 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FRANCISCO ANDRES GONZALEZ No. 14-71864
SANTOS, AKA Francisco Gonzalez
Santos, Agency No. A205-317-804
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 24, 2016**
Before: REINHARDT, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Francisco Andres Gonzalez Santos, a native and citizen of Guatemala,
petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his
appeal from an immigration judge’s order of removal. Our jurisdiction is governed
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo constitutional claims, Singh v. Ashcroft,
367 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2004), and review for substantial evidence the
agency’s continuous physical presence determination, Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales,
439 F.3d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 2006). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition
for review.
Gonzalez Santos’ contention that the agency’s allegedly inadequate
translation at his hearing violated his due process rights is unavailing, where the
record indicates Gonzalez Santos understood the questions posed to him during his
hearing through the Spanish language interpreter and that he answered accordingly.
See Perez-Lastor v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing types of
evidence that indicate an inadequate translation).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Gonzalez
Santos failed to establish eligibility for cancellation of removal, where he testified
that he entered the United States after the date from which he would have had to
establish ten years of continuous physical presence. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1)(A).
We lack jurisdiction to review Gonzalez Santos’ unexhausted contention that
he was deprived of his right to counsel. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); see also Barron v.
Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[Section] 1252(d)(1) mandates
2 14-71864
exhaustion and therefore generally bars us, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
from reaching the merits of a legal claim not presented in administrative
proceedings below.”)
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
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