FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT June 6, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
LOWELL L. MOORE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 15-3232
(D.C. No. 2:14-CV-02334-DDC)
PHILIPS ELECTRONICS NORTH (D. Kan.)
AMERICA CORPORATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Lowell L. Moore, pro se, appeals from the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of Philips Electronics North America Corporation
(Philips) on his claims for race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and
retaliatory discharge under Kansas law. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Background
Mr. Moore, who is African American, worked at the Philips fluorescent lamp
production plant in Salina, Kansas, for nearly twenty years until he was terminated
on June 15, 2013. His job duties included operating a forklift, loading and unloading
trucks, maintaining and removing shrinkage bins, and cleaning and maintaining
production equipment.
The Philips employee manual contains a progressive disciplinary plan and
steps for reporting workplace incidents. Progressive discipline has four steps from
least to most severe: (1) “Written Warning I”; (2) “Written Warning II”; (3) “Final
Written Warning, to include suspension when appropriate”; and (4) “Termination.”
R. at 454. The employee manual, however, permits Philips to vary from the plan or
skip disciplinary steps:
Philips reserves the right to administer appropriate disciplinary action for
all forms of disruptive and/or inappropriate behavior. Each situation will
be dealt with on an individual basis, based on the facts and circumstances
surrounding the infraction. Depending upon the seriousness of the
infraction, not all discipline will follow the steps of the [progressive
disciplinary plan].
Id.
The employee manual further requires that “[a]ll powered vehicle incidents must
be reported immediately to a supervisor regardless of severity.” R. at 445. It is
undisputed that a forklift is a “powered vehicle” and an “incident” is defined as “any
contact made with an unplanned object, or a near-miss that may have resulted in contact
with an unplanned object. Failure to report such incidents may result in immediate
termination per Salina Plant Rules.” Id. Mr. Moore admitted in his deposition that he
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was aware of the incident reporting policy and further understood that the failure to
timely report an incident could result in termination.
Relevant here, Mr. Moore’s direct supervisor was Richard Jester, who in turn
reported to Bob Knoth. Dan Mendicina, the plant director, was the final link in the
chain of command.
In October 2011, Mr. Moore damaged the floor of the plant while operating a
forklift. Instead of immediately reporting the incident, he continued to work with the
intention that he would fix the damage later. But before he could carry out his plan,
he was approached by his supervisor and confessed. Mr. Moore received a “Written
Warning II,” which repeated the requirement to immediately report all incidents, and
also cautioned him that “[f]urther occurrences may result in additional disciplinary
action up to and including termination.” R. at 238.
In early April 2013, Mr. Moore got into a heated argument with a Caucasian
male co-worker. The incident was so unsettling that a female co-worker immediately
went to Mr. Jester for help. When Mr. Jester arrived he found Mr. Moore and his
co-worker still arguing. He told Mr. Moore, who had just completed his shift, to go
home and calm down, and directed the co-worker, who was starting his shift, to also
calm down and get back to work. Mr. Jester conducted an investigation and then met
with Mr. Knoth and Bryan Herwig, the company’s human resources manager.
Mr. Herwig advised him to issue Mr. Moore a “Written Warning II.” The April 15
warning stated:
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Lowell got into a heated confrontation with [a co-worker] at shift change on
Monday night. Lowell raised his voice and was speaking in a loud and
threatening manner which was reported as “very disturbing and scary” by
other employees in the area. The content of their discussion was over
material placement issues which could have been handled through the
mastergroup or the supervisors and not in a confrontation on the back end
of the line. Lowell has since apologized to [his co-worker] for the way in
which he handled the situation.
R. at 61. Once again, Mr. Moore was warned that “[f]urther occurrences may result in
additional disciplinary action up to and including termination.” Id.
What is known as the shrinkage bin incident involved a belated report by
Mr. Moore of a near miss incident that allegedly took place sometime in March 2013.
The incident was revealed by Mr. Moore in late April 2013, during a meeting with
Mr. Herwig about problems he was having with a Caucasian female co-worker.
According to Mr. Moore, this woman came dangerously close to grazing his leg with
the forklift she was using to pick up a shrinkage bin that he was cleaning.
Mr. Herwig spoke with the female co-worker and an alleged witness about the
incident. He also spoke to Mr. Jester, who had never been informed of any problem.
Ultimately, Mr. Herwig wrote a memo to the file, but took no disciplinary action
against either Mr. Moore or his co-worker.
The final incident, and the one that culminated in Mr. Moore’s termination,
took place near the end of his shift on May 18, 2013. Once again, Mr. Moore
damaged the plant with his forklift but failed to promptly report the incident.
Instead, he planned to make the repairs himself at a later date, but never got around
to it. The incident came to light at the conclusion of a safety meeting on June 6
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during which Mr. Moore and his co-workers were reminded of the need to report
such incidents promptly. Only then did he admit to the May 18 incident. Messrs.
Knoth and Mendicina decided to terminate Mr. Moore’s employment after receiving
a recommendation to that effect from Mr. Herwig. They testified to having no
knowledge of the shrinkage bin incident at the time they made their decision to
terminate Mr. Moore’s job.
Analysis
“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same legal standard as the district court.” Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp.,
659 F.3d 987, 997 (10th Cir. 2011). Mr. Moore, who was represented by counsel,
filed suit under § 1981 for race discrimination and retaliatory discharge in response
to his report of the shrinkage bin incident.1 The district court entered a well-reasoned
and comprehensive memorandum and order that considered the undisputed evidence
presented on summary judgment as it pertained to the elements of Mr. Moore’s
claims. As to each claim, the court correctly concluded that Mr. Moore needed to
come forward with some evidence of pretext, but that he had failed to do so.
Concerning the retaliation claim, “we have recognized that evidence of
temporal proximity has minimal probative value in a retaliation case where
intervening events between the employee’s protected conduct and the challenged
1
Mr. Moore also filed a claim for breach of an implied contract of
employment, but his counsel eventually dropped that claim. Mr. Moore argues on
appeal that counsel’s decision “violates our contract agreement.” Aplt. Opening Br.
at 4. We do not address this issue because this appeal does not concern claims
between Mr. Moore and his former counsel.
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employment action provide a legitimate basis for the employer’s action.” Id. at
1001-02. Here, Mr. Moore’s alleged protected activity was his report of the
shrinkage bin incident to Mr. Herwig in late April 2013. However, some three weeks
later, Mr. Moore caused damage to the plant while operating a forklift and failed to
timely report the incident. In addition to the fact that neither decision maker had any
knowledge of the shrinkage bin incident, this intervening event provided a legitimate
basis for the company’s decision to terminate Mr. Moore’s employment.
As to the § 1981 claim, Mr. Moore argues that he demonstrated pretext
because he was disciplined following the heated argument incident, but his Caucasian
co-worker was not. This is insufficient to establish pretext. “Mere conjecture that
the employer’s explanation is a pretext for intentional discrimination is an
insufficient basis for denial of summary judgment.” Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d
1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). As we
have explained, although “[a] satisfactory showing that similarly situated employees,
who do not belong to the protected class, [are] treated differently with regard to
violation of a work rule [can] len[d] support to [a] pretext argument,” Mr. Moore’s
argument fails because he “did not show that any other [co-worker] had a record of
[forklift incidents] similar to [his] own.” Id. at 1324.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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