United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-1417
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
HÉCTOR SANTIAGO-GONZÁLEZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
Jedrick H. Burgos-Amador, on brief for appellant.
Mainon A. Schwartz, Assistant United States Attorney, Rosa
Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, and Nelson Pérez-
Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division,
on brief for appellee.
June 6, 2016
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Héctor
Santiago-González ("Santiago") was charged in a two-count criminal
indictment alleging bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113
(a), (d) ("Count One"), and use of a firearm during and in relation
to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) ("Count Two"). Following trial, the jury
returned a guilty verdict against Santiago on both counts. The
district court sentenced Santiago to 120 months' imprisonment as
to Count One and eighty-four months' imprisonment as to Count Two,
to be served consecutively for a total of 204 months. Santiago
now appeals, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. He also
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him as well
as the reasonableness of the district court's imposed sentence as
to Count One.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment
below, without prejudice, however, to appellant's right to raise
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction
relief proceeding brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
I.
On August 15, 2011, an armed assailant entered the Banco
Popular branch in Morovis, Puerto Rico. Upon entering the bank,
the assailant covered his face with a mask and told bank teller
Lilia López-Rodríguez ("López-Rodríguez"), at gunpoint, to fill a
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white plastic bag with money. López-Rodríguez complied with the
assailant's instructions, but she also placed two red security dye
packs1 inside the plastic bag. The bank robbery was captured by
the bank's video surveillance equipment.
After the assailant left the bank, Agent Orlando Guzmán-
Vélez ("Agent Guzmán"), an off-duty Puerto Rico Police Department
("PRPD") officer who was at the bank at the time of the robbery,
ran after Santiago and unsuccessfully attempted to detain the
assailant. At trial, Agent Guzmán testified that he observed the
assailant remove his mask as he exited the bank and get in the
driver's side of a dark brown Nissan Pathfinder.
On August 24, 2011, Officer Carlos González-Sotomayor
("Officer González"), an investigating agent and crime scene
technician with the PRPD Bank Robbery Division, received an
anonymous tip concerning a different bank robbery at CitiFinancial
in Orocovis, Puerto Rico. The record is not developed as to the
precise nature of the information provided by the anonymous
tipster. However, Officer González testified that the tipster
told him about a man known as "Bartolo," who owned a "dark burgundy
1 A security dye pack is a security device utilized by some banks
to identify money stolen during a bank robbery. The security dye
pack explodes and emits dye and pepper gas when removed from the
bank. Banco Popular utilized security dye packs that emitted a
red dye.
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or brown colored" Nissan Pathfinder and a "white Honda Accord."
Officer González also testified that he confirmed that Santiago
was known as Bartolo.
The next day, Officers González and Joel Rodríguez-Cruz
("Officer Rodríguez") went to Santiago's address to corroborate
the information provided by the tipster. After remaining in the
area for several hours, the officers observed Santiago arrive in
a white Honda Accord. At this juncture, the officers decided to
request assistance from a patrol car so that Officer Rodríguez
could approach the residence under the pretext of investigating a
domestic disturbance call.2
When he arrived at the residence, Officer Rodríguez was
met by Julio Santiago-González ("Julio Santiago"), Santiago's
brother, and Gladys González-Fragosa ("González-Fragosa"),
Santiago's mother, who told the officer that her other son was
taking a bath.
Officer Rodríguez requested that Santiago come out of
the home when he was finished. When Santiago came outside, he
provided Officer Rodríguez with identification and was placed
under arrest for bank robbery. Officer Rodríguez advised Santiago
of his rights in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
2 Officer Rodríguez was accompanied by three other police officers
in the patrol car, while Officer González remained behind.
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(1966). After reading Santiago his rights, Officer Rodríguez
asked Santiago if he had the weapon or money connected to the bank
robbery. Santiago stated that he had disposed of the gun, but
reported that he had money inside the house. Santiago added that
the money was damaged because it was stained red.
Santiago, Julio Santiago, and González-Fragosa signed a
consent form authorizing a search of the residence. Santiago then
led Officer González to his bedroom and showed him where he had
stored money obtained during the robbery, which exhibited red
stains and exuded a strong pepper gas odor. Santiago told Officer
González that he also stored money from the robbery inside the
Honda Accord.3 Further, he told Officer González that he had
utilized the Nissan Pathfinder to commit the bank robbery.
González-Fragosa, the owner of the Nissan Pathfinder,
signed a second consent form authorizing the search of her Nissan
Pathfinder, which revealed that the passenger seat was stained
red. Similarly, Santiago signed a consent form authorizing the
search of the Honda Accord, yielding additional money that was
stained red.
3 Specifically, Santiago told Officer González that he had stashed
money inside the Honda Accord and in his wallet, which was located
inside the vehicle.
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Subsequently, Officers Rodríguez and González
transported Santiago to the police station. As they were driving,
Santiago, without prompting, told the officers that he was
repentant. The next day, Santiago, who was still under arrest,
told Officer Rodríguez that he wanted to apologize for the bank
robbery. Officer Rodríguez provided Santiago with additional
Miranda warnings, after which he provided Santiago with a pen and
a piece of paper. Santiago then wrote a note asking forgiveness
for committing the Banco Popular robbery in Morovis. That same
day, Agent Guzmán identified Santiago as the person who robbed the
Banco Popular in Morovis on August 15, 2011, during an in-person
lineup.4
II.
Appellate courts are usually "ill-equipped to handle the
fact-specific inquiry" required by ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. United States v. Rodríguez, 675 F.3d 48, 55 (1st
Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Ofray–Campos, 534 F.3d 1, 34
(1st Cir. 2008)). As a result, "'[w]e have held with a regularity
bordering on the monotonous' that ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, which require a showing of deficient attorney
4 Agent Guzmán testified at trial that he identified Santiago
during an in-person lineup; however, the record is largely silent
as to how the lineup was conducted.
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performance and prejudice to the defendant, 'must originally be
presented to, and acted upon by, the trial court.'" Id. (quoting
United States v. Mala, 7 F.3d 1058, 1063 (1st Cir. 1993)).
Further, "the insights of the trier, who has seen and heard the
witnesses at first hand and watched the dynamics of the trial
unfold, are often of great assistance." Id. at 56 (quoting United
States v. Moran, 393 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2004)). Accordingly,
only in exceptional cases where there are no critical facts in
dispute and the record is sufficiently developed will we entertain
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal.
Ofray–Campos, 534 F.3d at 34 (citing United States v. Torres–
Rosario, 447 F.3d 61, 64 (1st Cir. 2006)).
Santiago contends that his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance of counsel because she failed to seek
suppression of the evidence against him. Santiago's principal
contention is that there was no probable cause to arrest him, which
tainted the evidence introduced against him.5 Santiago further
claims that his mother and brother lacked any authority to consent
to a search of his bedroom. Alternatively, Santiago posits that
5 Santiago does not dispute that he was read his rights in
accordance with Miranda. Instead, he posits that the warnings did
not attenuate the taint of his arrest.
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Agent Guzmán's lineup identification was suppressible because the
lineup was suggestive.
Here, the record is not sufficiently developed for us to
assay Santiago's claims of ineffective assistance. The record is
unclear as to what probable cause existed for Santiago's arrest.
Moreover, the record is not sufficiently developed as to whether
Santiago's mother and brother could consent to a search of
Santiago's bedroom. The record is also devoid of any guidance as
to why Santiago's trial counsel did not pursue suppression of the
physical evidence against Santiago or Agent Guzmán's lineup
identification.
This undeveloped record renders us unable to
"reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct,
and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the
time." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
Accordingly, we decline Santiago's invitation to address these
issues on direct appeal.
III.
"We review sufficiency of the evidence challenges de
novo." United States v. García-Carrasquillo, 483 F.3d 124, 129-
30 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Boulerice, 325 F.3d
75, 79 (1st Cir. 2003)). In doing so, we affirm the conviction
when, "after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable
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to the government and indulging all reasonable inferences in the
government's favor, a rational factfinder could conclude that the
prosecution proved all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt." Id. Notably, we avoid credibility judgments as part of
this analysis. United States v. Negrón-Sostre, 790 F.3d 295, 307
(1st Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Agosto-Vega, 617 F.3d
541, 548 (1st Cir. 2010)).
When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we
consider all the evidence offered by the government that was
admitted by the court, "even if the court erroneously admitted
some of that evidence." United States v. Ramírez-Rivera, 800 F.3d
1, 16 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 34,
40-41 (1988)); see also United States v. Claxton, 685 F.3d 300,
312 n.20 (3rd Cir. 2012).
Santiago challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
presented against him. Specifically, he argues that "given the
illegality of [his] arrest and its illegal fruits," we are
preempted from considering the evidence presented at trial.
Santiago also challenges Agent Guzmán's identification as not
being credible.
Here, the Government presented ample evidence to support
Santiago's conviction.6 Specifically, the Government presented
6 Santiago was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a), (d).
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evidence that: (1) Santiago admitted to committing the robbery and
showed the arresting officers where he had hidden the proceeds
from the bank robbery; (2) López-Rodríguez, the Banco Popular bank
teller, testified that she placed two security dye packs in the
bag used to commit the bank robbery; (3) the money found in
Santiago's bedroom and vehicle was stained red; (4) a search of
González-Fragosa's Nissan Pathfinder showed that the passenger
seat was stained red; (5) there was surveillance video that showed
a masked assailant identified as Santiago utilizing a gun to commit
the bank robbery and fleeing in a Nissan Pathfinder; and (6) Agent
Guzmán observed Santiago flee the robbery in a dark brown Nissan
Pathfinder.
Although the evidence outlined so far is sufficient to
end Santiago's sufficiency claim, we note that Agent Guzmán
identified Santiago during a police lineup and again in court.
Section 2113(a) punishes the forcible taking of money or property
from a bank: "Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation,
takes . . . from the person or presence of another . . . any
property or money . . . belonging to . . . any bank." Section
2113(d) punishes whoever assaults or "puts in jeopardy the life of
any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device" during the
commission of an offense defined in § 2113(a).
The jury also convicted Santiago of carrying a firearm in
relation to the bank robbery pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)
(A)(ii). A conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) requires proof
that the defendant used a real firearm when committing the
predicate offense. See United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 975
(1st Cir. 1995).
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Santiago claims that Agent Guzmán's identifications are
inadmissible because the record belies that he was able to observe
Santiago's face. However, we do not engage in credibility
determinations when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. In
any event, there was sufficient evidence presented against
Santiago aside from Agent Guzmán's identifications.
We further note that Santiago failed to advance any
argument that we should consider a suppression argument on appeal.7
Accordingly, we conclude that Santiago waived this argument. See
United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1292 (1st Cir. 1996)
(noting settled appellate rule that issues not briefed and properly
developed on appeal are waived); United States v. Zannino, 895
F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ("It is not enough merely to mention a
possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to
7 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 was amended in 2014.
Prior to the amendment, Rule 12 stated that party motions not
brought prior to the trial court's deadline were waived. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 12(e) (effective until Dec. 1, 2014). In contrast, the
new rule states: "If a party does not meet the deadline for making
a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the motion is untimely." Fed. R. Crim.
P. 12(c)(3). However, "a court may consider the defense,
objection, or request if the party shows good cause." Id. Rule
12(b)(3) motions include pre-trial motions requesting the
suppression of evidence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C). This
change in wording has prompted some Circuits to conclude that plain
error review is proper even in the absence of good cause, while
others have opted to review unpreserved Rule 12 issues only upon
a showing of good cause. See United States v. Burroughs, 810 F.3d
833, 838 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (collecting cases). Given Santiago's
failure to address this issue, we need not address it here.
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do counsel's work, create the ossature for the argument, and put
flesh on its bones.").
Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the jury's verdict, we find that there was sufficient evidence
presented as to both counts.
IV.
Lastly, Santiago challenges the reasonableness of the
district court's sentence as to Count One.8 The district court
calculated Santiago's guidelines sentencing range ("GSR") as
seventy to eighty-seven months' imprisonment. 9 However, the
district court made an upward variance of thirty-three months and
sentenced Santiago to a total of 120 months. The statute of
conviction provides a maximum sentence of twenty-five years. 18
U.S.C. § 2113 (a), (d).
We generally review the district court's sentencing
decisions for reasonableness under an abuse of discretion
standard. United States v. Trinidad–Acosta, 773 F.3d 298, 308
(1st Cir. 2014) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
8 Santiago styles his claim as a substantive reasonableness
challenge. However, he seems to advance, as well as cite case law
in support of, both procedural and substantive reasonableness
claims. As a result, we will consider procedural reasonableness
to the extent that it has any bearing on his sentence.
9 Santiago's total offense level was calculated at twenty-three
and he had a criminal history category ("CHC") of IV.
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(2007)). "Appellate review of federal criminal sentences is
characterized by a frank recognition of the substantial discretion
vested in a sentencing court." United States v. Flores–Machicote,
706 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 2013).
When assaying procedural reasonableness, we "'review
factual findings for clear error, arguments that the sentencing
court erred in interpreting or applying the guidelines de novo,
and judgment calls for abuse of discretion simpliciter.'"
Trinidad–Acosta, 773 F.3d at 309 (quoting United States v.
Serunjogi, 767 F.3d 132, 142 (1st Cir. 2014)). Procedural
reasonableness "includes errors such as failing to consider
appropriate sentencing factors, predicating a sentence on clearly
erroneous facts, or neglecting to explain the rationale for a
variant sentence adequately." United States v. Del Valle-
Rodríguez, 761 F.3d 171, 176 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing United States
v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2008)).
In contrast, substantive unreasonableness encompasses
whether the sentence survives scrutiny when examined under the
totality of the circumstances. Id. "The hallmarks of a
substantively reasonable sentence are 'a plausible sentencing
rationale and a defensible result.'" United States v. Díaz-
Bermúdez, 778 F.3d 309, 313 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Martin, 520
F.3d at 96).
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According to Santiago, the district court improperly
deviated from the GSR when it based the variance on his prior
criminal record, which was already contemplated in his CHC. He
relies on Ofray-Campos for the proposition that:
[w]hen a factor is already included in the
calculation of the guidelines sentencing range, a
judge who wishes to rely on that same factor to
impose a sentence above or below the range must
articulate specifically the reasons that this
particular defendant's situation is different from
the ordinary situation covered by the guidelines
calculation.
534 F.3d at 43 (quoting United States v. Zapete–García, 447 F.3d
57, 60 (1st Cir. 2006)).
Santiago ignores that a sentencing judge "may consider
whether a defendant's criminal history score substantially
underrepresents the gravity of his past conduct" as part of the
inquiry of the defendant's history and characteristics. Flores-
Machicote, 706 F.3d at 21 (citing United States v. Lozada–Aponte,
689 F.3d 791, 792 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Walker, 665
F.3d 212, 233-34 (1st Cir. 2011)). As a result, a district court
may vary a sentence upward in an effort to reflect past leniency.
Id.
Here, the district court noted that Santiago had an
extensive criminal history that encompassed a conviction for
burglary and various arrests for illegal appropriation, controlled
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substances, and robbery.10 Notably, said conviction and arrests
did not factor into the calculation of Santiago's criminal history
score. The court also highlighted that because the majority of
these arrests resulted in dismissals, Santiago had enjoyed
significant leniency from the state courts. The district court
was also well aware of the fact that Santiago did not qualify as
a career offender under the sentencing guidelines because of a
technicality.11 These factors readily support our conclusion that
10 In United States v. Cortés-Medina, we recently recognized that
our precedents expressed in dicta that a series of arrests may
"'legitimately suggest a pattern of unlawful behavior even in the
absence of any convictions.'" No. 14-1101, 2016 WL 2755987, at
*3 (1st Cir. May 12, 2016) (citations omitted). Despite our
previous statements, we counseled sentencing courts against
relying on this dicta moving forward. Id. Nonetheless, we
concluded that in the absence of a prior warning, it was not plain
error for the district court to consider the defendant's arrest
record.
Santiago failed to advance any argument that the district court
impermissibly relied on his arrest record during sentencing,
thereby waiving his argument. As a result, we need not enter into
that discussion here. Notwithstanding Santiago's waiver, we note
that had Santiago advanced such a claim on appeal, it would be
subject to plain error review because he failed to raise it below.
See United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001).
Thus, applying the reasoning employed by the panel in Cortés-
Medina, we would similarly conclude that it was not plain error
for the sentencing court to take Santiago's arrest record into
account. We also emphasize that Santiago's sentence was not
exclusively premised on his arrest record. The sentencing court
justified the imposed variance after the permissible consideration
of Santiago's previous convictions, as well as the fact that
Santiago did not qualify as a career offender under the sentencing
guidelines because of a technicality.
11 Although a sentencing court is obligated to provide plausible
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the court's sentence was largely premised on an understanding that
Santiago's criminal history score severely underrepresented his
criminal behavior.
Santiago also contends that the district court's imposed
variance is "not modest" and requires that the court provide a
compelling reason to justify it. He correctly notes that "the
greater a deviation from the GSR, the more compelling the
sentencing court's justification must be." Del Valle-Rodríguez,
761 F.3d at 177 (citing United States v. Smith, 445 F.3d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 2006)). Here, the sentencing court sufficiently indicated
that Santiago's sentence was necessary because his CHC did not
properly reflect his previous and numerous criminal
transgressions. In doing so, the sentencing court made clear that
Santiago's situation is distinct from the norm. See id. As such,
and coherent reasoning for a variance, it is not required to be
pedantic in its reasoning. Del Valle-Rodríguez, 761 F.3d at 177.
We may infer a district court's reasoning "by comparing what was
argued by the parties or contained in the pre-sentence report with
what the judge did." United States v. Rivera-Clemente, 813 F.3d
43, 50 (1st Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. May 5,
2016) (No. 15-9248) (citations omitted). At the sentencing
hearing, the Government explained that Santiago had a prior
controlled substance offense from 2010. In addition to that
conviction, Santiago pleaded guilty to robbing a CitiFinancial
branch on July 31, 2011, which was approximately two weeks before
the Banco Popular robbery. Because Santiago pleaded guilty to
robbing the CitiFinancial branch after the jury found him guilty
for robbing the Banco Popular branch in this case, Santiago did
not qualify as a career offender. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(c).
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we are satisfied that the court sufficiently justified the imposed
variance.12
Given the district court's preoccupation that Santiago's
criminal history score did not adequately reflect his criminal
past, we can reasonably infer that the court was concerned with
Santiago's potential for recidivism, as well as the need to protect
the public. Thus, the court could conclude that Santiago's
extensive criminal antecedents and the state court's leniency
resulted in Santiago's failure to respect the law and necessitated
an above-guidelines sentence in order to prevent future crimes.
Furthermore, the district court did not double count
Santiago's criminal history. To the extent that the district
court may have taken into account any of Santiago's crimes that
were already factored into his criminal history score, the court
did not utilize the same factor twice to calculate his GSR.
Instead, the court took into account those crimes that factored
into his criminal history score to calculate his GSR and then
12 We also note that in Zapete-García, the sentencing court
imposed a forty-eight month sentence when the top end of the GSR
was six months. 447 F.3d at 58-59. In other words, the sentencing
court imposed a variance of 800 percent. Here, the district court
imposed a sentence that was thirty-three months over the top end
of the GSR, which is significantly more modest. This distinction
is of import because, as we already noted, "the greater a deviation
from the GSR, the more compelling the sentencing court's
justification must be." Del Valle-Rodríguez, 761 F.3d at 177
(citing Smith, 445 F.3d at 4).
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considered all the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors, which included his
history and characteristics. See United States v. Romero-
Galíndez, 782 F.3d 63, 72 n.8 (1st Cir. 2015).
Similarly, the district court did not double count the
elements of the bank robbery offense. Rather, the district court
noted that Santiago brandished his weapon at bank employees and
customers and never "expressed remorse or empathy for the people
at the bank or the tellers that he held at gunpoint." It is beyond
cavil that this proclamation was not, in effect, double counting
the bank robbery elements.13
13 It is well established that district courts may take into
account a defendant's lack of remorse during sentencing. See
United States v. Cruzado–Laureano, 527 F.3d 231, 237 (1st Cir.
2008). Surprisingly, Santiago does not call our attention to the
fact that he did write a letter asking for forgiveness and
expressing regret for the Banco Popular robbery. In any event,
Santiago's efforts would have been unsuccessful if he had. While
it is true that Santiago did express regret for the Banco Popular
robbery in his note, he later disavowed that statement and denied
committing the robbery. Moreover, the district court permissibly
opted to consider Santiago's refusal to recognize the offense of
conviction during sentencing. See United States v. McClain, 2
F.3d 205, 207 (7th Cir. 1993). Thus, we cannot find that the
district court committed clear error in concluding that Santiago
lacked remorse for the commission of the offense. See United
States v. Maisonet-González, 785 F.3d 757, 765 (1st Cir. 2015)
("We will not find clear error unless 'on the entire evidence [we
are] left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.'" (quoting United States v. Brown, 298 F.3d 120,
122 (1st Cir. 2002))).
Neither do we agree with Santiago's contention that the fact
that he was crying during sentencing necessarily reflected that he
felt remorseful. While tears may be an adequate expression of
remorse in some circumstances, they are not necessarily so in every
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Santiago also argues that his sentence was substantively
unreasonable. As previously stated, Santiago was sentenced to 120
months' imprisonment as to Count One and eighty-four months as to
Count Two, to be served consecutively. Although the district
court handed out a considerable sentence, it was clearly less than
half than the statutory maximum and outlined a plausible rationale
that falls "within the expansive universe of reasonable
sentences." United States v. King, 741 F.3d 305, 308 (1st Cir.
2014).
Additionally, Santiago's personal characteristics
support the imposed variance. United States v. Santiago-Rivera,
744 F.3d 229, 234 (1st Cir. 2014) ("A sentencing court's reasons
for a variance 'should typically be rooted either in the nature
and circumstances of the offense or the characteristics of the
offender.'" (quoting Martin, 520 F.3d at 91)). The district court
noted that Santiago's criminal history was not adequately
reflected by the GSR and that he was on probation when he committed
the robbery at issue. These considerations militate in favor of
a higher sentence. Given Santiago's criminal history, the fact
that he was on probation at the time, and that he robbed two
circumstance. Santiago may have been crying out of self-pity or
because of the impending punishment. As a result, we are unable
to conclude that based on this record, Santiago's tears, without
more, constituted an adequate expression of remorse.
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different banking institutions within weeks of each other, the
district court could conclude that the above-guidelines sentence
was necessary to promote respect for the law and deter further
criminal conduct.
Accordingly, we find that the imposed sentence was
procedurally and substantively reasonable.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment below,
without prejudice to Santiago's right to raise his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction relief
proceeding brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Affirmed.
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