15-1485
Lugo v. Le Pain Quotidien
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 8th day of June, two thousand sixteen.
PRESENT:
PETER W. HALL,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
DENNY CHIN,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
NORBERTO LUGO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 15-1485
LE PAIN QUOTIDIEN,
Defendant-Appellee.
_____________________________________
For Plaintiff-Appellant: Norberto Lugo, pro se, Bronx, New York.
For Defendant-Appellee: Diane Krebs, Gordon & Rees, LLP, New York, New
York.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Furman, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Appellant Norberto Lugo, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Le Pain Quotidien (“LPQ”) on his claims of discrimination and retaliation in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying
facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
Lugo has waived any challenge to his claims of discrimination under Title VII, as well as
all claims under the ADEA. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1995)
(holding that issues not raised in pro se appellate brief are considered abandoned). We consider
only his retaliation claim under Title VII.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, with the view that
“[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only when ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Sotomayor v. City of N.Y., 713 F.3d
163, 164 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). We must “resolve all ambiguities and
draw all factual inferences in favor of the [non-movant].” Nationwide Life Ins. v. Bankers
Leasing Ass’n, 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins., 46 F.3d 196,
202 (2d Cir. 1995)). Summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
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Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment in
favor of LPQ on Lugo’s retaliation claim under Title VII. We affirm for substantially the reasons
stated by the district court in its thorough April 13, 2015 decision.
On appeal, Lugo also contends that he should have been appointed counsel in the district
court proceedings, that he was not permitted to depose certain witnesses, and that he was not
advised about how to respond to LPQ’s summary judgment motion. Those arguments are
unpersuasive. First, he never sought appointment of counsel in the proceedings below, and “a
litigant has no legal right to counsel in civil cases.” Guggenheim Capital, LLC v. Birnbaum, 722
F.3d 444, 453 (2d Cir. 2013). Second, nothing suggests that Lugo was deprived of the
opportunity to conduct discovery. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 517 F.3d 76, 103
(2d Cir. 2008) (“A party must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to establish the facts necessary
to support his claim.”). In the district court he never raised his concern that additional depositions
were necessary. Moreover, LPQ’s counsel informed the district court that they never received
any discovery requests from Lugo—an assertion that Lugo does not contradict. Third, Lugo was
advised of the nature and consequences of summary judgment because a “Notice to Pro Se Litigant
Who Opposes a Motion for Summary Judgment” and a copy of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
were attached to LPQ’s summary judgment motion. See Vital v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., 168 F.3d
615, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1999).
We have considered all of Lugo’s arguments and find them to be without merit.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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