FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT June 8, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
DAVID BRIAN MORGAN,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 16-6048
(D.C. No. 5:15-CV-01279-R)
(W.D. Okla.)
CARL BEAR, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
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ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
_________________________________
Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
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Oklahoma state prisoner David Morgan, proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability (COA) and permission to proceed in forma pauperis (ifp). Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we deny both requests and dismiss this matter.
I. BACKGROUND
Morgan I - In April 2014, Mr. Morgan filed an application under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
to challenge his 2011 convictions in Oklahoma state court for kidnapping, rape, and other
charges (Morgan I). The district court dismissed the application as untimely, Morgan v.
* This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive
value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Addison, No. CIV-14-337-R, 2014 WL 2197995, at *1 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2014), this
court denied a certificate of appealability, Morgan v. Addison, 574 F. App’x 852 (10th
Cir. 2014), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Morgan v. Addison, 135 S. Ct. 1496
(2015).
Morgan II - In July 2015, Mr. Morgan filed a habeas petition, which the
magistrate judge construed as seeking relief under §§ 28 U.S.C. 2241 and 2254 (Morgan
II). The district court dismissed the § 2241 claims as lacking merit and the § 2254 claims
as unauthorized second or successive claims under § 2244(b).
Morgan III - In November 2015, Mr. Morgan filed a “Motion to be Heard under
the All Writs Act 28 USCA 1651(A),” which the clerk docketed as a § 2254 application
(Morgan III). The magistrate judge construed the filing as a motion under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b) challenging the dismissal of Morgan II and determined it should
have been filed in that proceeding. The magistrate judge recommended that the motion
be stricken, that Morgan III be dismissed, and that Mr. Morgan be allowed to file his
Rule 60(b) motion in Morgan II. The magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation
(R&R) advised Mr. Morgan that he could object to this recommendation and warned that
failure to do so would waive the right to appellate review. Mr. Morgan did not object to
the R&R, but he did file a “Motion 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(B) Prisoner Release Orders.”
The district court denied the motion, adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation,
and dismissed Morgan III. Rather than file a Rule 60(b) motion in Morgan II, Mr.
Morgan moved for leave to file one in Morgan III, which the district court denied.
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Mr. Morgan now seeks a COA from this court to bring an appeal in Morgan III.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (requiring a COA to appeal “the final order in a habeas
corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a
State court”). He also seeks leave to proceed ifp.
II. DISCUSSION
To obtain a COA, Mr. Morgan must make “a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and “that reasonable jurists could debate
whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotations omitted).1
The magistrate judge determined Mr. Morgan had filed a Rule 60(b) motion in the
wrong proceeding, that it should have been filed in Morgan II rather than Morgan III.
The R&R therefore recommended the motion be stricken, Morgan III be dismissed, and
Mr. Morgan be allowed to file the motion in Morgan II. Mr. Morgan has not shown that
these recommendations, adopted by the district court, denied him a constitutional right,
1
Under the “firm-waiver rule,” “failure to make timely objections to a magistrate
judge’s recommendations waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions.”
Allman v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 2016) (brackets and quotations
omitted). “There are two exceptions when the firm waiver rule does not apply: when (1)
a pro se litigant has not been informed of the time period for objecting and the
consequences of failing to object, or when (2) the interests of justice require review.”
Duffield v. Jackson, 545 F.3d 1234, 1237 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). The
magistrate judge’s order advised Mr. Morgan of his right to object to the R&R by
December 16, 2015, and warned that “failure to timely object” waives the right to
appellate review, Morgan v. Bear, No. CIV-15-1279-R (W.D. Okla. Nov. 25, 2015), ECF
No. 5 at 5. We rely on grounds other than the firm-waiver rule to deny COA.
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nor can we discern any basis for such a showing. Reasonable jurists accordingly could
not debate the district court’s adoption of the R&R and consequent dismissal of Morgan
III, which precludes our granting a COA.
In addition to adopting the R&R, the district court also denied Mr. Morgan’s
motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(B), which permits a three-judge federal court to
order release of a state prisoner under limited circumstances. No reasonable jurist could
debate the district court’s ruling. Among other reasons, see Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493
(2011) (addressing requirements for a § 3626(a) action), this motion concerns Mr.
Morgan’s conditions of confinement and is not properly raised in a § 2254 application.
See Palma-Salazar, 677 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating “a prisoner who
challenges the conditions of his confinement must do so through a civil rights action”).
We deny COA on this issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We deny COA and ifp status and dismiss this matter.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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