This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1995
Hope Amundsen,
Respondent,
vs.
Great Glory Auto, Inc.,
Appellant,
Kehnny Alabi, et al., Defendants.
Filed May 23, 2016
Remanded
Smith, Tracy, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-14-8184
Steven T. Appelget, Appelget Law Office, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Mark K. Thompson, MKT Law PLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Ayodele M. Ojo,
Ayodele M. Ojo and Associates, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SMITH, TRACY, Judge
Appellant Great Glory Auto, Inc. appeals the district court’s denial of its motion
for relief from default judgment under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02.
Because the district court did not address Great Glory’s argument under rule 60.02(a) and
the record is insufficient to review for an abuse of discretion, we remand.
FACTS
In her complaint against Great Glory, respondent Hope Amundsen alleged as
follows. Amundsen saw an advertisement for a used vehicle and contacted “Amin,” the
supposed seller. After exchanging messages with the seller and seeing the vehicle,
Amundsen entered into a written purchase contract, which listed Kehnny Alabi as the
seller. Amundsen also received a dealer-reassignment form, indicating that Great Glory
owned the vehicle. Later, Amundsen learned that the title to her vehicle had been issued
to Great Glory and that the title was branded “prior salvage.”
Amundsen sued Great Glory, Alabi, and an individual named Amin Lot Fallu,
alleging claims for failing to disclose the vehicle’s salvage-title history and common-law
fraud.1 Amundsen did not name Great Glory’s owner, Ifechide Adigwe, in the complaint.
Amundsen alleged that Alabi and Fallu were Great Glory’s agents and that they
misrepresented the vehicle’s salvage-title history.
After a process server unsuccessfully attempted to serve Great Glory at its
corporate office, Amundsen used substitute service to serve Great Glory via certified mail
through the Minnesota Secretary of State. See Minn. Stat. § 5.25, subd. 1 (2014). Great
Glory failed to answer, so Amundsen moved for default judgment. The district court
granted Amundsen’s motion, dismissed Amundsen’s claims against the individual
defendants, and docketed the judgment.
1
Amundsen’s complaint alleges that Fallu and Alabi may be the same person.
2
Great Glory, through its owner, moved to vacate the default judgment under
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(a) and (c). Amundsen responded on the merits
of the motion and also argued that Great Glory’s motion should be dismissed because
Great Glory, a Minnesota corporation, was not represented by a licensed attorney. Great
Glory retained counsel who submitted an amended motion and memorandum, again
seeking relief under rule 60.02(a) and (c).
The district court denied Great Glory’s motion to vacate. The district court
summarily determined that rule 60.02(a) did not apply because Great Glory’s arguments
about Amundsen’s failure to effect proper service raised an issue only under rule
60.02(c), which provides for relief in the case of “[f]raud . . . , misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party.” The district court denied relief under rule 60.02(c)
because Amundsen attempted to serve Great Glory at its registered office and only then
attempted substitute service through the secretary of state.
Great Glory appeals.
DECISION
Great Glory challenges the district court’s denial of its motion for relief from
default judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(a). Generally, a district court has broad
discretion to grant or deny relief from judgment under rule 60.02. Northland Temps., Inc.
v. Turpin, 744 N.W.2d 398, 402 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Apr. 29,
2008). A district court’s decision to vacate judgment under rule 60.02 “will not be
reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” Meyer v. Best W. Seville Plaza Hotel, 562
N.W.2d 690, 694 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. June 26, 1997).
3
A party may obtain relief from a final judgment on the basis of “[m]istake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(a). A party’s
ability to obtain relief under rule 60.02 is determined by applying a four-factor test.
Northland Temps., 744 N.W.2d at 402. The test requires consideration of whether the
moving party has “(1) a reasonable defense on the merits; (2) a reasonable excuse for the
failure or neglect to answer; (3) acted diligently after notice of entry of the judgment; and
(4) demonstrated that no prejudice will occur to the judgment creditor.” Id. “Default
judgments are to be liberally reopened to promote resolution of cases on the merits.”
Imperial Premium Fin., Inc. v. GK Cab Co., 603 N.W.2d 853, 857 (Minn. App. 2000)
(quotation omitted).
Great Glory and Amundsen dispute Great Glory’s right to relief under rule
60.02(a). But the district court conducted no analysis of the rule 60.02 factors.
Generally, we do not address matters not considered and decided by the district court.
Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Moreover, when, as here, the district
court has broad discretion, Minnesota appellate courts have demanded a well-developed
record for review. See In re Amitad, Inc., 397 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Minn. App. 1986)
(“Where the [district] court has broad discretion, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
demonstrated persistence in demanding findings to explain the [district] court’s exercise
of discretion.”); see also Stich v. Stich, 435 N.W.2d 52, 53 (Minn. 1989) (remanding for
further findings because “[e]ffective appellate review . . . is possible only when the
[district] court has issued sufficiently detailed findings of fact to demonstrate its
consideration of all factors”).
4
The district court concluded that rule 60.02(a) did not apply because Great Glory’s
assertion of “abuse of process and a fraud upon the court” only implicated rule 60.02 (c).
Great Glory’s original motion to vacate and its amended motion, however, explicitly
requested relief under rule 60.02(a) and addressed all four rule 60.02 factors. The only
mention of Amundsen’s service methods was in Great Glory’s discussion of its
reasonable excuse for failing to answer. The district court’s failure to make findings on
Great Glory’s request for relief under rule 60.02(a) left a record that is insufficient for us
to conduct “[e]ffective appellate review.” See Stich, 435 N.W.2d at 53. Consequently,
we remand for the district court to consider and make findings on Great Glory’s rule
60.02(a) motion and to determine whether relief from judgment is warranted.
Remanded.
5
Hope Amundsen v. Great Glory Auto, Inc., Kehnny Alabi
Combined Opinion