This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1216
Semaj Williams, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent
Filed March 28, 2016
Affirmed
Worke, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File Nos. 27-CR-11-22629, 27-CR-11-22627
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and
Johnson, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his petition
for postconviction relief because it was fair and just to allow him to withdraw his guilty
plea. We affirm.
FACTS
On May 15, 2012, faced with a first-degree-murder charge, appellant Semaj
Williams expressed his intent to accept a plea to a lesser offense of second-degree
intentional murder. The district court continued the matter to May 23, for a plea hearing.
On May 23, Williams did not accept the state’s offer because he intended to hire
an expert for trial. Williams next appeared on November 6, 2012, for jury selection. On
November 7, the district court denied Williams’s request for another continuance.
Williams subsequently accepted the state’s offer for a reduced sentence and pleaded
guilty to aiding and abetting second-degree intentional murder. During Williams’s plea,
the following occurred:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Do you feel that you’ve had enough
time to talk with me and that I’ve explained everything to
you?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And that I’m fully informed as to the
facts of this case?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
DEFNENSE COUNSEL: And is this your signature –
DEFENDANT: Somewhat.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: What was—“somewhat” to what?
DEFENDANT: Phone records. We still didn’t get the phone
records, but that was the only thing. But, yes. Other than
that, yes.
2
DEFENSE COUNSEL: It’s your feeling and belief that of all
the evidence that we have, I fully understand it and we’ve
talked about it?
DEFENDANT: Correct.
After the plea, the district court scheduled a sentencing hearing.
In January 2013, Williams moved to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Minn.
R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. Williams argued that plea withdrawal was fair and just
because he was a young man facing a lengthy sentence, pleading guilty was not in his
best interests, and he wished to hire a cellphone expert. Williams also argued that his
motion was “timely” and “made with due diligence.” The state opposed, arguing that the
motion was not timely, withdrawal was not fair and just, and withdrawal would prejudice
the state. The district court denied Williams’s motion.
On March 26, 2013, the district court sentenced Williams. Williams filed a notice
of appeal but voluntarily dismissed his appeal. In March 2015, Williams filed a petition
for postconviction relief, claiming that his plea should be vacated because: (1) the district
court analyzed his withdrawal motion using an incorrect standard; and (2) it was fair and
just to grant his presentence motion. The postconviction court denied Williams’s
petition. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Postconviction relief
Williams argues that his guilty plea should be vacated because plea withdrawal
was fair and just. “When reviewing a postconviction court’s decision, we examine only
whether the postconviction court’s findings are supported by sufficient evidence.”
3
Lussier v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). We will reverse
only if the postconviction court abused its discretion. Id. But the postconviction court’s
legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Greer v. State, 836 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Minn.
2013).
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after
entering it. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). A district court must
allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea if, upon a timely motion, the defendant
presents sufficient proof that withdrawal is necessary to correct a “manifest injustice.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Before sentencing, a defendant may also be allowed to
withdraw his guilty plea if it is “fair and just.” Id., subd. 2. Under the fair-and-just
standard: “The [district] court must give due consideration to the reasons advanced by the
defendant in support of the motion and any prejudice the granting of the motion would
cause the prosecution by reason of actions taken in reliance upon the defendant’s plea.”
Id. This standard “is less demanding than the manifest injustice standard, [but] it does
not allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea for . . . any reason.” State v. Theis, 742
N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted).
Here, Williams asserts that plea withdrawal was fair and just because he was a
young man facing a lengthy sentence. But Williams fails to cite any caselaw supporting
this consideration. Moreover, the record indicates that he understood the consequences
of pleading guilty. Williams was 22 years old when he pleaded guilty, and he agreed that
he: (1) had time to think about his options, (2) was satisfied with his attorney’s
representation, (3) understood the proceedings, and (4) wanted to plead guilty because he
4
committed the crime. Thus, Williams’s first reason supporting withdrawal is
unpersuasive. See State v. Abdisalan, 661 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Minn. App. 2003) (holding
that withdrawal was not appropriate when “[n]othing objectively in the record
suggest[ed] that [the defendant] failed to comprehend the nature, purpose, and
consequences of [the] plea”), review denied (Minn. Aug. 19, 2003).
Williams next asserts that withdrawal was fair and just because he wished to
obtain a cellphone expert. But the district court previously granted Williams a nearly six-
month continuance to obtain a cellphone expert, and Williams never did so. “[T]he
decision to grant or deny a continuance lies within the discretion of the district court.”
State v. Larson, 788 N.W.2d 25, 30–31 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). Thus,
Williams’s second reason supporting withdrawal is unpersuasive. See State v.
McLaughlin, 725 N.W.2d 703, 713–14 (Minn. 2007) (stating that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by denying a mid-trial continuance to procure an expert witness).
Williams finally asserts that withdrawal was fair and just because he no longer
believed that the state’s offer was in his best interests. The belief that pleading guilty is
no longer in one’s best interests is not sufficient to warrant plea withdrawal. See Kim v.
State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989) (rejecting the notion of accepting plea
withdrawals for any reason or without good reason at any time before sentence is
imposed). In Kim, the supreme court stated:
If a guilty plea can be withdrawn for any reason or without
good reason at any time before sentence is imposed, then the
process of accepting guilty pleas would simply be a means of
continuing the trial to some indefinite date in the future when
5
the defendant might see fit to come in and make a motion to
withdraw his plea.
Id. (quotation omitted). Thus, Williams’s final reason supporting withdrawal is
unpersuasive.
Because Williams did not meet his burden of establishing a valid reason for
withdrawing his guilty plea under the fair-and-just standard, the state was not required to
prove that withdrawal would cause prejudice. See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 98 (stating
that a district court may deny a plea-withdrawal request even if the state suffers no
prejudice if the defendant “failed to advance reasons why withdrawal was ‘fair and
just’”). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams’s
petition.
Williams also argues that the district court erred because it did not consider his
request using the proper considerations. Here, the district court recognized the factors
Williams proposed in favor of plea withdrawal under the fair-and-just standard and
determined that they were meritless. The district court next concluded that the state
would be prejudiced by granting Williams’s request, citing the state’s release of
subpoenaed witnesses. The district court also recognized the interest of the victim’s in
the finality and certainty of conviction. Therefore, the district court did not err by failing
to use “proper considerations.”
Williams finally argues that the district court incorrectly applied the manifest
injustice standard to deny his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In
analyzing Williams’s petition for postconviction relief, the postconviction court
6
concluded that the district court did not apply the wrong standard. Williams claims that
the district court’s reference to Black v. State, 725 N.W.2d 772 (Minn. App. 2007), and
“due diligence” proves that it applied the wrong standard. We are not persuaded.
In its order, the district court referenced the fair-and-just standard multiple times.
The district court also considered the reasons advanced by Williams in support of his
motion and the prejudice to the state. Moreover, under the fair-and-just standard, a
“[district] court must give due consideration to the reasons advanced by the defendant.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2 (emphasis added). The district court’s reference to
Black and “due diligence” was in response to Williams’s presentence motion when he
cited Black and argued that withdrawal was fair and just because his motion was timely
and made with due diligence. Referencing factors that are relevant to the manifest-
injustice standard does not necessarily mean the district court failed to correctly apply the
fair-and-just standard. Therefore, the postconviction court did not err when it concluded
that the district court correctly applied the fair-and-just standard.
Affirmed.
7
Semaj Williams v. State of Minnesota
Combined Opinion