FILED
Jun 10 2016, 8:37 am
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON REHEARING CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Yvette M. LaPlante Gregory F. Zoeller
Keating & LaPlante, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Evansville, Indiana Eric P. Babbs
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Myles K. Martin, Jr, June 10, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
82A01-1507-CR-966
v. Appeal from the Vanderburgh
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Robert J. Pigman,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
82D02-1404-FB-418
Najam, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Myles K. Martin, Jr. petitions for rehearing following our memorandum
decision in which we affirmed his convictions. See Martin v. State, No. 82A01-
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1507-CR-966 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2016). We grant Martin’s petition to
address the following issue: whether the trial court violated the prohibition
against double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution when the court entered its judgment of conviction against Martin
for both resisting law enforcement, as a Class D felony, and resisting law
enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor. We agree with Martin that the entry
of the judgment of conviction on both of those offenses violated double
jeopardy principles. Accordingly, we grant Martin’s petition for rehearing and
reverse his conviction for resisting law enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor,
and we remand with instructions that the trial court vacate that conviction and
its related sentence. In all other respects, we affirm our original memorandum
decision.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] We need not restate all the facts underlying Martin’s convictions in this
decision. Rather, as relevant to rehearing, we need only consider the following
facts: on March 29, 2014, officers attempted to stop Martin as he drove a stolen
SUV, but Martin used the vehicle to flee. After a brief chase, officers disabled
the vehicle, which Martin immediately abandoned. He then fled from the
officers on foot before being apprehended.
[3] According to the State’s ensuing charging information, Martin committed
resisting law enforcement, as a Class D felony, when he fled from officers in the
SUV. The State separately charged Martin with resisting law enforcement, as a
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Class A misdemeanor, when he fled on foot. The State’s evidence and
arguments at trial comported with the charging information, and the trial court
entered judgment of conviction against Martin on both counts.
Discussion and Decision
[4] The entry of the judgment of conviction against Martin for both resisting law
enforcement, as a Class D felony, and resisting law enforcement, as a Class A
misdemeanor, violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
As we recently explained, when a defendant flees from law enforcement by a
vehicle and then exits that vehicle to continue fleeing by foot, the defendant has
committed one continuous act of resisting law enforcement. Lewis v. State, 43
N.E.3d 689, 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (following Arthur v. State, 824 N.E.2d
383, 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied). Martin’s facts are substantively
identical to those in Lewis and Arthur. Accordingly, we grant Martin’s petition
for rehearing to clarify our original memorandum decision and correct this
constitutional error. We reverse Martin’s conviction for resisting law
enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor, and we remand with instructions that
the trial court vacate that conviction and its related sentence.
[5] In all other respects, we affirm our original memorandum decision.
May, J., concurs.
Riley, J., would deny rehearing without opinion.
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Page 3 of 3
Myles K. Martin, Jr. v. State of Indiana (rehearing)
Combined Opinion