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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CARMITA HUDENLL-TRIGGS,
Appellant No. 3610 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 19, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0004691-2015
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 13, 2016
Appellant Carmita Hudenll-Triggs1 appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County on
October 19, 2015, at which time she was sentenced to two years’ county
probation and restitution in the amount of $2,114.99 following her
negotiated guilty plea to one count of Criminal Mischief. 2 In addition,
Appellant's counsel has filed a petition to withdraw his representation and a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18
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1
We note that in both the trial court record and in documents filed with this
Court, Appellant’s name is spelled inconsistently. While in some instances it
is Hudenll-Triggs, in other it is Hudnell-Triggs.
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304(A)(5). This subsection indicates a person is guilty of
criminal mischief if she “intentionally damages real or personal property of
another[.]”
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 602 Pa. 159, 978
A.2d 349 (2009). After a careful review, we grant counsel's petition to
withdraw and affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
Appellant’s charges arose following an incident on May 19, 2015, at
which time Officer Arthur Erle responded to a report of criminal mischief at
32 Oxford Street, Upper Darby. Upon arrival, Officer Erle discovered pink
paint had been poured over a 2006 Chevrolet Equinox which had been
parked in the street. Officer Erle obtained video surveillance showing an
individual walking toward the vehicle and pouring a colored substance
thereon. On May 26, 2015, Appellant spoke with Officer Erle after reading
and signing the Upper Darby Township Police Advisement of Rights form.
Upon viewing a still photograph obtained from the video surveillance,
Appellant identified the individual as herself and completed a signed, written
statement wherein she admitted to pouring paint on the victim’s vehicle.
See Affidavit of Probable Cause, filed 7/15/15. Appellant was charged with
one count of criminal mischief, and the matter was held for court.
A preliminary hearing was held on August 7, 2015, and Appellant was
arraigned on September 2, 2015. On October 14, 2015, Appellant filed an
omnibus pretrial motion wherein she maintained she had not knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily waived her constitutional right to remain silent
and to be represented by counsel at her police interrogation. A hearing on
the motion was scheduled for October 19, 2015; however, at that time
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Appellant entered her negotiated guilty plea. After conducting an extensive
colloquy with Appellant, the trial court accepted her guilty plea and
subsequently sentenced her. Thereafter, Appellant filed a timely motion to
withdraw her plea on October 29, 2015, and on November 5, 2015, the trial
court held a hearing on that motion.
At the hearing, Appellant indicated that although she still was satisfied
with trial counsel’s representation of her, she had been “a little confused”
when she entered her plea, because she “did not do it.” N.T., 11/5/15, at 9-
10. Appellant generally asserted her innocence and stated she thought the
police wanted to question her because her grandson had been seen hanging
out of a window. Id. at 11. She claimed she had been “set up” by police
because she told them she did not damage the vehicle and did not know the
victim. Id. at 12. She further represented that due to numerous physical
impairments, it would have been impossible for her to cause the damage
and indicated she had problems reading and writing which affected her
ability to complete the written colloquy. Id. at 13, 17. She stated she lied
to police because they told her she would go to jail, and she was afraid. Id.
at 13, 24.
The trial court denied Appellant’s motion on November 5, 2015, and
Appellant filed a timely appeal on December 4, 2015. On December 7, 2015,
the trial court filed its Order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On December 22,
2015, appellate counsel filed his Statement of Matters Complained of on
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Appeal wherein he indicated his intent to file an Anders brief with this
Court. As noted above, counsel filed a petition to withdraw and an
Anders/Santiago brief with this Court on March 22, 2016.
Before reviewing the merits of the underlying issue Appellant presents,
we first consider counsel’s petition to withdraw. Commonwealth v.
Orellana, 86 A.3d 877, 879 (Pa.Super. 2014).
When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review
the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the
request to withdraw. Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d
287, 290 (Pa.Super. 2007) (en banc). Before counsel is
permitted to withdraw, he or she must meet the following
requirements:
First, counsel must petition the court for leave to
withdraw and state that after making a conscientious
examination of the record, he has determined that the
appeal is frivolous; second, he must file a brief
referring to any issues in the record of arguable merit;
and third, he must furnish a copy of the brief to the
defendant and advise him of his right to retain new
counsel or to himself raise any additional points he
deems worthy of the Superior Court's attention.
Santiago, 602 Pa. at 178–79, 978 A.2d at 361.2
FN2. The requirements set forth in Santiago apply to cases
where the briefing notice was issued after August 25, 2009, the
date the Santiago opinion was filed. As the briefing notice in
this case was issued after Santiago was filed, its requirements
are applicable here. Commonwealth v. Martuscelli, 54 A.3d
940, 947 (Pa.Super. 2012).
Commonwealth v. Bynum-Hamilton, 2016 WL 639004 at 3-4 (Pa. Super.
filed Feb. 17, 2016).
Herein, we have reviewed counsel’s Application to Withdraw
Appearance and his accompanying correspondence which he served upon
Appellant. In the letter, counsel indicated he was enclosing the Application
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to Withdraw along with his Anders brief and explained that if Appellant had
any issues she wished to pursue before this Court, she must do so
immediately either pro se or with the assistance of new counsel.3 We also
have examined the Anders brief counsel prepared. These documents
satisfy us that counsel has complied with all of the foregoing requirements;
therefore, we next analyze the issue of arguable merit counsel presented in
her Anders brief to make an independent judgment as to whether the
appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous. Commonwealth v. Bynum-Hamilton,
2016 WL 639004 at 4 (citing Santiago, supra). Specifically, Appellant
questions:
Whether the Hearing Court should have permitted
[Appellant] to withdraw her guilty plea after she professed her
innocence of the charge against her and stated she was confused
at the time she entered the plea.
Brief of Appellant at 1.
There is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, and the decision
as to whether to allow a defendant to do so is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378,
382 (Pa.Super. 2002). A trial court's decision to deny a defendant's motion
to withdraw her guilty plea is subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard of
review. Commonwealth v. Broaden, 980 A.2d 124, 128 (Pa.Super.
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3
Appellant has not responded to the application to withdraw as counsel.
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2009). Post-sentence motions to withdraw a guilty plea are subject to
higher scrutiny than those filed before one’s sentence is imposed to
discourage the entry of guilty pleas as “sentence-testing devices.” Id. at
129 (citation omitted). Thus, in order to withdraw a guilty plea after
sentence is imposed, a defendant must demonstrate that a manifest
injustice would result if the court were to deny her post-sentence motion to
withdraw her plea. Id. Manifest injustice is present when “the plea was not
tendered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” Id. (citation omitted).
When determining if a guilty plea is valid, we must examine the totality of
circumstances surrounding it. Id. (citation omitted). It is well-established
that a defendant's disappointment in the sentence imposed upon her does
not constitute “manifest injustice.” Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d
517, 522 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
Herein, the record belies Appellant’s contentions the trial court should
have permitted her to withdraw her guilty plea. At the outset of her guilty
plea hearing, Appellant indicated to the trial court that she fully had
reviewed with counsel and signed each page of her guilty plea statement
and that she would not need any additional time to speak privately with
counsel regarding information contained therein. N.T., 10/19/15, at 4-5.
However, Appellant added she was “trying to figure out why I’m signing
something that I don’t even know this lady. I don’t think—I don’t know her
at all.” Id. at 5. Following this assertion, the trial court explained to
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Appellant that she did not have to plead guilty, reminded her trial counsel
had filed a suppression motion, and stated that it would hear evidence on
the motion the next day if she so chose. The trial court further warned
Appellant that once it started to hear evidence, the Commonwealth would no
longer be committed to the plea deal and again offered Appellant an
opportunity to confer with counsel; Appellant did so. Id. at 5-6.4
Thereafter, Appellant indicated she intended to proceed with the plea and
had no additional questions or concerns for the trial court regarding the
Criminal Information itself or the description of it in the guilty-plea
statement. Id. at 7-8.
The trial court informed Appellant of the elements of criminal mischief
after which she indicated she was satisfied with counsel’s representation,
asked the trial court to accept her guilty plea and requested that the court
sentence her to the recommended probationary term. Id. at 9-10.
Appellant was informed of her post-sentence rights, and she indicated she
understood them without further explanation from counsel. Id. at 11.
The aforementioned contradicts Appellant’s assertions at the
November 5, 2015, hearing regarding her inability to comprehend the nature
of her guilty plea and her general claim of her innocence. Consequently,
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4
The notes of testimony indicate “[off the record from 1:12 p.m. to 1:29
p.m.]” N.T., 10/19/15, at 6.
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after an independent review of this appeal, we find Appellant’s issue to be
frivolous, and we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
Petition to Withdraw Granted. Judgment of Sentence Affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/13/2016
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