UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4677
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN WALL, III,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:15-cr-00201-CCE-1)
Submitted: May 24, 2016 Decided: June 14, 2016
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stacey D. Rubain, QUANDER & RUBAIN, P.A., Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Clifton Thomas Barrett, Assistant United
States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Benjamin Franklin Wall, III, appeals his sentence of 87 months
of imprisonment following his plea of guilty to distribution of
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)
(2012). Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), concluding that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal. We affirm.
A guilty plea is valid where the defendant voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently pleads guilty “with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”
United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 464 (4th Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Before accepting a guilty
plea, a district court must ensure that the plea is knowing,
voluntary, and supported by an independent factual basis. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(b); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th
Cir. 1991). *
Because Wall neither raised an objection during the Rule 11
proceeding nor moved to withdraw his guilty plea in the district
court, we review his Rule 11 proceeding for plain error. United
* In the Anders brief, counsel for Wall states that a waiver
of appellate rights, contained in the plea agreement, is valid,
but asks this court to assess its validity. Because the Government
has not invoked the waiver, however, we need not do so, instead
conducting our full review under Anders without applying the
waiver. See United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 271 (4th
Cir. 2007).
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States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir. 2014). Our review of
the record reveals that the district court fully complied with
Rule 11 in accepting Wall’s guilty plea after a thorough hearing.
Accordingly, we conclude that his plea was knowing and voluntary,
Fisher, 711 F.3d at 464, and thus “final and binding,” United
States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
We review Wall’s sentence for reasonableness “under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v.
McCoy, 804 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). This review entails appellate
consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We presume
that a sentence imposed within the properly calculated Sentencing
Guidelines range is reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756
F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district
court properly calculated the Guidelines range, treated the
Guidelines as advisory rather than mandatory, gave the parties an
opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the
18 U.S.C. § 3353(a) (2012) factors, selected a sentence not based
on clearly erroneous facts, and sufficiently explained the chosen
sentence. Furthermore, Wall’s sentence of 87 months fell within
the range recommended by the Guidelines. Therefore, we conclude
that Wall’s sentence is reasonable.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm Wall’s conviction and sentence. This court
requires that counsel inform Wall, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If Wall requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Wall.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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