MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jun 16 2016, 8:48 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
John T. Wilson Gregory F. Zoeller
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Robert J. Henke
James D. Boyer
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of: K.M., I.M., June 16, 2016
H.M., & G.M. (Minor Children): Court of Appeals Case No.
48A04-1512-JC-2134
C.K. (Mother), Appeal from the Madison Circuit
Appellant-Respondent, Court
The Honorable G. George Pancol,
v. Judge
The Honorable Randall Hainlen,
Indiana Department of Child Senior Judge
The Honorable Jack L. Brinkman,
Services,
Juvenile Referee
Appellee-Petitioner.
Trial Court Cause Nos.
48C02-1503-JC-70, 48C02-1503-
JC-71, 48C02-1503-JC- 72, 48C02-
1503-JC-73
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Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] T.M. (“Father”) and C.K. (“Mother”) are the parents of K.M., I.M., H.M., and
G.M. (collectively, the “Children”). In March of 2015, the Indiana Department
of Child Services (“DCS”) received three separate reports that the Children
were the victims of physical abuse and neglect by their parents. DCS also
learned that the Children were the subject of child-welfare cases initiated in
New York in 2014. After investigating the reports of abuse and neglect, DCS
initiated legal proceedings in which DCS alleged that the Children were
children in need of services (“CHINS”).
[2] Father subsequently admitted that the Children were CHINS. Mother did not
contest the facts relating to the allegations of abuse and neglect, but argued that
the juvenile court could not properly exercise jurisdiction over her and the
Children. The juvenile court determined otherwise and, following an
evidentiary hearing, found the Children to be CHINS.
[3] On appeal, Mother does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the juvenile court’s CHINS determination. Instead, Mother contends that the
juvenile court erred by exercising jurisdiction over her and the Children.
Concluding that the juvenile court properly exercised jurisdiction over Mother
and the Children, we affirm.
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Facts and Procedural History
[4] The facts of this case are undisputed. Mother and Father1 are the parents of the
Children. The family moved frequently as a result of Father’s employment as a
truck driver. Prior to moving to Indiana in early 2015, the family had resided in
New York.
[5] On March 6, 2015, DCS received a report that the Children were the victims of
physical abuse and neglect. At some point, DCS also learned that the Children
were the subjects of pending child-welfare cases initiated in New York in June
of 2014. The New York child-welfare cases involved allegations of unsanitary
home conditions, neglect, and domestic violence.
[6] DCS subsequently received two more reports that the Children were the victims
of physical abuse and neglect. The reports indicated that
the [C]hildren were unattended outside. Um that [I.M.] and
[K.M.] were nude on the front porch on several occasions. Um
that there was a school bus incident where the [C]hildren were
running out towards the road. Um the allegations were that the
bus driver had to honk to get the kids out of the road. Um there
were allegations that um mom was locking the [C]hildren in their
bedrooms, that the [C]hildren could be heard screaming and
yelling from outside of the home, um and that there were
allegations that one or more of the [C]hildren were feces
1
Father does not appeal the trial court’s order finding the Children to be CHINS.
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smearing and Mom was not cleaning up the feces that was being
smeared.
Tr. pp. 71-72. In responding to these reports, DCS completed an assessment
during which DCS case assessor Virginia Jarnagin found the following:
[K.M.] c[a]me running from the downstairs bedroom. He [w]as
completely nude, he was his hands and face were very dirty. Um
I asked if I could see the other children. Um I went to the
upstairs bedrooms. Um the first bedroom that I went into um
there was a lock, a sliding lock on the outside of the door. I went
in um and [I.M.] was laying in a toddler bed. He was completely
nude, his hands, his face, um were completely covered with feces.
There was feces in his bed, among his blankets, um an
extensive amount of feces on the floor and smeared onto the wall.
I then went into the adjoining bedroom. [H.M.] was in a
crib. Um she was nude, um … also [her] hands, face, um were
covered in feces. She was laying, I took the blanket off her,
which was soaked in urine. It had both dry urine and soaked
urine that … was laying on top of her. Um like I said she was
nude. She was laying on top of a mattress that was plastic so the
urine was actually … pooled on the mattress and she was laying
in it. Her hair was completely saturated with urine. She had a
sippy cup. Um there was urine, um there was feces all over the
crib slats and all over the mattress. I then went downstairs, back
downstairs, [G.M.] was in his car seat. Um that’s where he was
sleeping. Um his car seat or his …diaper was completely
saturated um to where the diaper was jelling up and falling out.
Um he smelled um strongly like urine, feces, spoiled milk. Um
which was pretty overwhelming.
Tr. pp. 72-73. Jarnagin further indicated that the smell of the home “quite
frankly [made her] want to throw up.” Tr. p. 78.
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[7] Elwood Police Officer John Davis, Sr., who accompanied Jarnagin to the
home, further stated that the Children were “dirty” and the family’s home was
“overwhelmingly smelly.” Tr. p. 90.
It was like human urine mixed with decaying. I mean the only
way I can describe it, not to be too vulgar but the last time I
smelled such strong odors it was death. It was very, very bad.
****
We went threw [sic] all of the house and the kitchen was very[,]
very bad. There was, I can only assume, several weeks’ worth of
trash built up on the floor. It was like climbing up the walls. Um
there was decaying food everywhere. The sink was full [ ] of dirty
dishes and the smell was really[,] really bad in there. It was
obvious that it hadn’t been maintained in quite some time.…
[P]robably the most disturbing place was upstairs.… [Mother]
would describe each room as to which kid slept here … it was
overwhelming[], the smell was even worse, … I couldn’t image it
being worse then [sic] what I had already experienced but it was
even worse. There was like piles of human poop on the floor. It
had been there for a long time because they were hardened at this
point. There was poop just smeared all over the walls. [Mother]
described one small bed as her daughter’s bed and the bed was
plastic material. You know you’re supposed to put a mat or a
cover over it and everything but that plastic, you could see where
a child had slept in it a long time cause it had kind of a form of a
body there. And that … was, you know there was pee, standing
pee in there.… There was one room where there was a big lock
on the lock and [Mother] said well my husband locks our son in
there because [ ] he is so uncontrollable and that room might
have been the worst. There was more of the pee and poop and
smeared everywhere.
Tr. pp. 90, 92-93.
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[8] Following Jarnagin and Officer Davis’s visit to the family’s home, Mother was
arrested for neglect and the Children were removed from the home. On March
13, 2015, DCS filed petitions alleging that the Children were CHINS. In these
petitions, DCS alleged that the Children suffered physical abuse and neglect at
the hands of their parents. DCS also alleged that parents had prior child
welfare history in New York.
[9] On May 19, 2015, Mother filed a motion to dismiss the CHINS cases or, in the
alternative, to transfer the cases to New York. Specifically, Mother argued that
New York was the proper jurisdiction because Mother still had an open child
welfare case in New York. The juvenile court took Mother’s May 19, 2015
motion under consideration and gave DCS time to respond.
[10] The juvenile court conducted a hearing on May 27, 2015. During this hearing,
Father admitted that the Children were CHINS and agreed to participate in
services. Also during the hearing, Mother made an oral motion to transfer the
cases to New York. In response to Mother’s oral motion, DCS indicated that
the New York cases were in the process of being transferred to Madison
County. After considering the arguments of both parties, the juvenile court
denied Mother’s oral motion. The juvenile court subsequently conducted a
hearing on Mother’s May 19, 2015 motion to dismiss. Following this hearing,
the juvenile court denied Mother’s motion to dismiss.
[11] On October 2, 2015, the juvenile court conducted a fact-finding hearing as to
Mother. At the beginning of the hearing, Mother renewed her motion to
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dismiss, which the juvenile court denied. In response, DCS again reiterated that
officials in New York had indicated to DCS that they were in the process of
transferring the family’s open New York cases to Indiana. At the conclusion of
the hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated the Children to be CHINS. This
appeal follows.
Discussion and Decision
[12] Initially, we note that Mother does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain the juvenile court’s determination that the Children were CHINS.
Instead, Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by asserting personal
jurisdiction over her and the Children. Personal jurisdiction “refers to the right
of the court to exercise jurisdiction over the particular parties who are brought
before the court.” Truax v. State, 856 N.E.2d 116, 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). In
arguing that the juvenile court erred by asserting personal jurisdiction over her
and the Children, Mother claims that the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act (the “Act”) applies, and that under the Act, New York was the proper
jurisdiction for any custody issues concerning Mother and the Children. We
disagree.
[13] Under the Act, an Indiana court has an affirmative duty to question its
jurisdiction when it becomes aware of an interstate dimension in a child-
custody dispute. Barwick v. Ceruti, 31 N.E.3d 1008, 1013 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)
(citing Bowles v. Bowles, 721 N.E.2d 1247, 1249 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)). “When
confronting an interstate custody dispute, the trial court must engage in a multi-
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step analysis to determine: 1) whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction; 2)
whether there is a custody proceeding pending in another state which would
require the court to decline its jurisdiction; and 3) whether the trial court should
exercise its jurisdiction because Indiana is the most convenient forum.” Id.
(citing Bowles, 721 N.E.2d at 1249). Although a CHINS case is not a custody
dispute per se, we have held that when considering a CHINS case, a juvenile
court must exercise its jurisdiction within the framework and policy
considerations of the Act. See Matter of E.H., 612 N.E.2d 174, 182 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1993) (providing that “a CHINS court can and must” exercise its
jurisdiction within the framework and policy considerations of the Act).
[14] We review a juvenile court’s determination regarding jurisdiction for an abuse of
discretion. Barwick, 31 N.E.2d at 1013. “An abuse of discretion occurs when
the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the court.” Id. “The court also abuses its discretion when
it misinterprets or misapplies the law.” Id. The Act provides that an Indiana
court has jurisdiction if Indiana is the home state of the children at issue when
the proceedings were commenced or if the home state declines to exercise
jurisdiction. Id. (citing Ind. Code § 31-21-5-1).
[15] Mother argues that the case should have been transferred to New York because
New York did not decline to exercise jurisdiction over the instant matter.
However, Mother fails to establish that such an act was necessary before the
juvenile court could exercise jurisdiction over the instant matter. The record
indicates that DCS became involved with Mother and the Children after
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receiving numerous reports of neglect and abuse. The reported neglect and
abuse was alleged to have occurred in Madison County. Further, although
Mother and the Children had previously lived in and were the subject of prior
child-welfare proceedings in New York, at the time DCS became involved with
Mother and the Children, the family was living in Madison County. The
record also reveals that during the May 27, 2015 hearing, DCS informed the
juvenile court that since the family had moved to Indiana, the New York court
was in the process of relinquishing jurisdiction by transferring its prior child-
welfare cases involving Mother and the Children to Indiana.2 These facts
demonstrate that as of the date of the initiation of the underlying CHINS
proceedings, the family was residing in Indiana, Indiana had an interest in
protecting the Children as they were living within its borders, and Indiana was
the most convenient forum to address the concerns relating to the neglect and
abuse of the Children. As such, we conclude that the juvenile court properly
exercised jurisdiction over the underlying CHINS proceedings.
[16] Further, we observe that in arguing that jurisdiction belonged in New York,
Mother claimed that she intended to move back to New York at some point.
Mother, however, did not present any evidence relating to any concrete plans to
move back to New York or to a time frame in which she intended to make this
potential move. The juvenile court was not required to credit Mother’s
2
This fact clearly distinguishes the instant case from In re the Matter of E.H., in which the Texas
court indicated that while Indiana had jurisdiction over certain custody issues, it was retaining
jurisdiction over the issues of visitation, child support, and attorney’s fees. 612 N.E.2d at 179.
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unsupported claim regarding her possible future intentions. See generally
McCullough v. State, 985 N.E.2d 1135, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (providing that
the jury, acting as the trier of fact, was under no obligation to credit defendant’s
statement to police as evidence that he acted without fault or that his actions
were reasonable).
Conclusion
[17] Again, on appeal, Mother only challenges the juvenile court’s exercise of
jurisdiction. Because we conclude that the juvenile court properly exercised
jurisdiction over the underlying CHINS proceedings, we affirm the judgment of
the juvenile court.
[18] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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