FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT June 16, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
MADYUN ABDULHASEEB, a/k/a
Jerry L. Thomas,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 16-6053
(D.C. No. 5:15-CV-01113-W)
(W.D. Okla.)
JOE M. ALLBAUGH, Interim
Director, Oklahoma Department of
Corrections,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER
Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
Mr. Madyun Abdulhaseeb was convicted on state charges and is
serving his sentence in Oklahoma. Challenging the execution of his
sentence, Mr. Abdulhaseeb has brought four habeas claims under 28
U.S.C. § 2241:
1. improper denial of achievement credits,
2. improper denial of credits for blood donations, 1
1
See note 2, below.
3. improper denial of credits for his incarceration in private
prisons, and
4. loss of the state department of corrections’ jurisdiction over
the sentences based on enactment of the Oklahoma Truth in
Sentencing Act.
The federal district court dismissed the first two claims as time-barred,
dismissed the third claim as unexhausted (or, in the alternative, as time-
barred), and denied relief on the fourth claim.
Mr. Abdulhaseeb seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis and a
certificate of appealability so that he can appeal the dismissal of his
habeas petition. Because Mr. Abdulhaseeb has not met the standard for a
certificate of appealability, we dismiss the appeal and deny Mr.
Abdulhaseeb’s request for leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
I. Denial of a Certificate of Appealability
To appeal, Mr. Abdulhaseeb needs a certificate of appealability. 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). To obtain the certificate, Mr. Abdulhaseeb must
make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This showing is made only if reasonable jurists could
characterize the district court’s rulings as debatable or wrong. Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
II. Challenges to the Individual Claims
In part, Mr. Abdulhaseeb argues that the district court improperly
rejected each of his claims. These arguments are not reasonably debatable.
2
In his first claim, Mr. Abdulhaseeb contends that ODOC policy OP-
060211(II)(E)(5)(C) should retroactively apply to his sentences between
1982 and 2014. The district court rejected this contention, and this part of
the ruling is not subject to reasonable debate.
Mr. Abdulhaseeb’s argument is based on the state department of
corrections’ policy OP-060211(II)(E)(5(c), which states: “Effective July
1, 2014, beginning upon reception, all eligible offenders to include those
currently incarcerated, will be awarded 15 achievement credits every
month of continued good conduct.” Doc. 12-5 at 175. Mr. Abdulhaseeb
argues that the phrase “beginning upon reception” requires a retroactive
award of credits for the 32 years he spent in prison prior to the effective
date of the policy. This interpretation is not reasonable. In Oklahoma,
courts apply changes in the law “prospectively from their effective date”
in the absence of an express statement that the change is to apply
retroactively. State v. Salathiel, 313 P.3d 263, 266-67 (Okla. Crim. App.
2013). In applying Oklahoma law, no reasonable jurist could interpret the
2014 policy as a directive for prison authorities to add credits for each of
Mr. Abdulhaseeb’s prior 32 years in prison.
On appeal, Mr. Abdulhaseeb also alleges that the denial of
achievement credits (before 2014) constituted a violation of the Ex Post
Facto Clause. But this allegation did not appear in the habeas petition. As
a result, no reasonable jurist would regard this allegation as a basis for
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reversal. See Jones v. Gibson, 206 F.3d 946, 958 (10th Cir. 2000)
(declining to consider a claim omitted in the habeas petition).
Mr. Abdulhaseeb also contends that he was entitled to credits for
past blood donations. 2 The district court concluded that this claim is time-
barred. In our view, this conclusion is not subject to reasonable debate.
A one-year limitations period applies to state prisoners who petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitations period
begins to run when “the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented
could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).
The department of corrections stopped awarding credits for blood
donations in 1988. ODOC Policy OP-060211, Section II.L.5. That
development was not a secret, for Oklahoma requires that inmates receive
a monthly accounting of sentence credits. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 138.
Therefore, Mr. Abdulhaseeb could easily have discovered the “factual
predicate” for his claim in 1988 or soon thereafter. In these circumstances,
jurists could not reasonably question the district court’s application of the
time bar to deny relief to Mr. Abdulhaseeb on his claim involving credit
for donations of blood.
2
Mr. Abdulhaseeb included this allegation as part of his first claim.
For clarity, we refer to this claim as the second claim.
4
On appeal, Mr. Abdulhaseeb contends that the factual predicate did
not become discoverable until the decision on his administrative appeal.
In some circumstances, we have held that the factual predicate of a claim
does not become discoverable until the petitioner’s administrative appeal
becomes final. Dulworth v. Evans, 442 F.3d 1265, 1268-69 (10th Cir.
2006). But this is true only when the petitioner “timely and diligently
exhausts his administrative remedies.” Id. at 1268. In our view, no
reasonable jurist could regard Mr. Abdulhaseeb as diligent in bringing the
administrative action: He did not initiate the administrative action until he
had received monthly reports for over 20 years that showed no credits for
blood donations.
According to Mr. Abdulhaseeb, “[h]e is not responsible for the
execution of his own sentences.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 12. While
this may be true, federal law starts the one-year period of limitations as
soon as Mr. Abdulhaseeb reasonably could have discovered the absence of
credits. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). He does not suggest any reason to
question his ability to timely learn of the termination of blood-donation
credits in 1988 or soon thereafter. As a result, jurists could not reasonably
debate the district court’s conclusion that this claim is time-barred.
In his third claim, Mr. Abdulhaseeb contends that he was improperly
denied sentence credits for the time he spent in private prisons. Mr.
Abdulhaseeb filed a grievance on November 14, 2014, asserting that he
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was entitled to credits for his time served in private prisons beginning in
1999.
Mr. Abdulhaseeb would have known the “factual predicate” of his
claim in 1999 after receiving his monthly accounting of sentence credits.
Thus, he had to file a habeas claim on this issue by 2000. Instead, he
waited until 2014 to file his grievance and 2015 to file the habeas claim.
Accordingly, the district court’s ruling on this claim is not reasonably
debatable.
In his fourth claim, Mr. Abdulhaseeb contends that the state
department of corrections “lost jurisdiction” over his sentences when the
Oklahoma legislature passed the Oklahoma Truth in Sentencing Act. But
because the state statute was repealed one day before it was to go into
effect, the statute “did not create any federal constitutional claims for
those seeking habeas relief.” Collins v. Workman, 125 F. App'x 246, 248
(10th Cir. 2005). 3 Thus, the district court’s ruling on this claim is not
reasonably debatable.
III. Challenges to the District Court’s “Hybrid Disposition”
The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of some of Mr.
Abdulhaseeb’s claims based on nonexhaustion or timeliness. On other
3
Mr. Abdulhaseeb argues: “While the Truth in Sentencing Act may
have been repealed one day before it became effective, it actually, in fact,
de facto, became the common law practice in 1997.” Appellant’s Opening
Br. at 22. Mr. Abdulhaseeb fails to provide any explanation or authority
for this proposition.
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claims, the magistrate judge recommended denial on the merits. On
appeal, Mr. Abdulhaseeb argues that the district court erred by making a
“hybrid” disposition in two ways: (1) denying relief on some claims and
dismissing other claims and (2) finding some claims unexhausted and
denying relief on other claims.
Mr. Abdulhaseeb waived both appeal points in district court. To
preserve these appeal points, Mr. Abdulhaseeb would ordinarily need to
include the same arguments in objecting to the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation. Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1119
(10th Cir. 2005). In narrow circumstances, we sometimes excuse the
waiver in the interests of justice. In re Key Energy Resources, 230 F.3d
1197, 1199-1200 (10th Cir. 2000).
Though the magistrate judge recommended dismissal on some claims
and denial of others, Mr. Abdulhaseeb did not object on the ground that
the recommended ruling would constitute a hybrid disposition. In
addition, the record does not reflect any cogent basis to excuse this
omission. In his report and recommendation, the magistrate judge warned
Mr. Abdulhaseeb:
The failure to timely object to this Report and Recommendation
would waive appellate review of the recommended ruling.
Moore v. United States of America, 850 F.2d 656 (10th Cir.
1991); cf. Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir.
1996) (“Issues raised for the first time in objections to the
magistrate judge’s recommendations are deemed waived.”).
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Doc. 18 at 12. Heeding this objection, Mr. Abdulhaseeb filed a thorough
objection to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. In this
objection, however, Mr. Abdulhaseeb did not address the hybrid nature of
the recommended rulings. In these circumstances, any reasonable jurist
would regard these challenges as waived.
* * *
In these circumstances, we deny a certificate of appealability and
dismiss the appeal.
IV. Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis
Mr. Abdulhaseeb requests leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
Because Mr. Abdulhaseeb has not presented a reasoned, non-frivolous
argument, we deny his request. See Rolland v. PrimeSource Staffing, LLC,
497 F.3d 1077, 1079 (10th Cir. 2007).
V. Disposition
We deny the request for a certificate of appealability, dismiss the
appeal, and deny the request for leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
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