J-A06037-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
VERONICA HONIS IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
GIANT FOOD STORES, INC.
Appellee No. 1245 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 31, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Civil Division at No: 9603-2012
BEFORE: LAZARUS, STABILE, and DUBOW, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JUNE 16, 2016
Appellant, Veronica Honis, appeals from the judgment entered on
August 31, 2015,1 following denial of her motion to remove the nonsuit
entered in her premises liability case against Appellee, Giant Food Stores
____________________________________________
1
Although Appellant suggests she is appealing from the trial court’s July 1,
2015 order, the appeal properly lies from judgment entered on the order
denying removal of the nonsuit. See, e.g., Harvey v. Rouse Chamberlin,
Ltd., 901 A.2d 523, 524 n. 1 (Pa. Super. 2006).
We note that this case proceeded to trial on February 3, 2015. At the close
of Appellant’s case, Giant moved for a compulsory nonsuit, which the trial
court granted after hearing argument on the motion. By order dated July 1,
2015, the trial court denied Appellant’s post-trial motion seeking removal of
the nonsuit. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on July 21, 2105. By order of
this Court dated August 27, 2015, we quashed the appeal for failure to enter
final judgment on the July 1 order. By subsequent order entered September
3, this Court vacated the August 27 order and reinstated the appeal in light
of Appellant’s motion for reconsideration accompanied by evidence that
judgment was entered on the order on August 31, 2015.
J-A06037-16
(“Giant”). Appellant argues there was sufficient evidence for a jury to
conclude Giant created a dangerous condition that caused her to fall and/or
failed to conduct a reasonable inspection that would have discovered the
dangerous condition. We disagree and, therefore, affirm.
In its July 1, 2015 memorandum opinion, the trial court aptly
summarized the evidence Appellant presented in her case-in-chief at the
jury trial held on February 3, 2015. Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 7/1/15,
at 3-6. We adopt the trial court’s summary as our own and incorporate it
herein by reference in this Memorandum. Briefly, Appellant and her
husband testified that they went to the Giant on Locust Street in Hazelton on
June 23, 2010. When they were in the checkout aisle, they realized they
forgot to get ice cream. While her husband was bagging their groceries,
Appellant went to an end cap display where the on-sale ice cream was
located. She returned to the checkout aisle and, as she placed the ice cream
on the conveyor, she stepped on a small bottle of Red Bull and fell, causing
injuries to various parts of her body. Neither she nor her husband observed
the bottle in the aisle before Appellant fell.
As part of her case-in-chief, Appellant called a Giant service associate
to testify as on cross-examination. The associate, who did not witness the
incident, explained the “clean sweep” procedure by which she and other
employees would survey the store for hazards. She explained that she
would use a gun to swipe “tags” in the aisles, indicating the aisle was
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inspected. While there were no tags in the individual checkout aisles, those
aisles were inspected as part of the “front end” inspection. The employee
would swipe a tag in the front end indicating the aisles and other front end
areas were checked for hazards. The associate also explained that there
were small refrigerators placed in front of the checkout aisles and that items
were stocked in and on them. However, as the trial court observed, “[t]here
was no testimony offered that the Red Bull was one of the items in the
refrigerator or on display.” T.C.O., 7/1/15, at 6.
Following the grant of nonsuit, Appellant filed a motion seeking
removal of the nonsuit. The trial court denied the motion on July 1, 2015.
Appellant filed an appeal to this Court and filed a statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant presents
one issue for our consideration, which fairly embodies the errors alleged in
her Rule 1925(b) statement.
A. Did the learned trial judge err in granting the motion for
compulsory nonsuit of [Giant] by reason that, there existed
sufficient evidence from which the jury could have reasonably
concluded that [Giant] created the dangerous condition that
caused [Appellant’s] injuries and/or that, [Giant] failed to
conduct a reasonable inspection of the premises that would
have discovered the dangerous condition?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
We begin by setting forth our standard of review.
Our standard of review is well-established: “A nonsuit is proper
only if the jury, viewing the evidence and all reasonable
inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, could not reasonably conclude that the elements of the
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cause of action had been established.” Brinich v. Jencka, 757
A.2d 388, 402 (Pa. Super. 2000), appeal denied, 565 Pa. 634,
771 A.2d 1276 (2001) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Furthermore, all conflicts in the evidence must be
resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. See Gigus v. Giles &
Ransome, Inc., 868 A.2d 459, 461 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal
denied, [895 A.2d 550 (Pa. 2006)]. In reviewing the evidence
presented we must keep in mind that a jury may not be
permitted to reach a verdict based on mere conjecture or
speculation. See Brinich, 757 A.2d at 402. We will reverse
only if the trial court abused its discretion or made an error of
law. See Weiner v. Fisher, 871 A.2d 1283, 1285 (Pa. Super.
2005).
Harvey v. Rouse Chamberlin, Ltd., 901 A.2d 523, 526 (Pa. Super. 2006).
In its memorandum opinion, the trial court examined Pennsylvania law
applicable to premises liability cases and acknowledged that Pennsylvania
has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343. Section 343
(Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by Possessor) provides:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm
caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if,
he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would
discover the condition, and should realize that it involves
an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them
against the danger.
Restatement (Second) Torts § 343. The trial court proceeded to examine
case law applying § 343 and reviewed the trial testimony to ascertain
whether Appellant presented evidence tending to prove that Giant deviated
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from the duty of reasonable care under the circumstances existing in
Appellant’s case. The trial court also reviewed and distinguished cases upon
which Appellant relied. Ultimately, the trial court determined that Appellant
failed to present evidence proving that Giant deviated from its duty of
reasonable care.
We find the trial court’s analysis is sound and its conclusions are
properly based on appropriate and relevant authority. As the trial court’s
analysis confirms, Appellant failed to present evidence that Giant either
created a dangerous condition that caused Appellant to fall or failed to
conduct a reasonable inspection of its premises. We find no abuse of
discretion or error of law in the trial court’s conclusion. Therefore, we shall
not disturb it.
We adopt the entirety of the trial court’s July 1, 2015 opinion as our
own and incorporate it herein by reference as it fully set forth. In the event
of further proceedings, the parties shall attach a copy of the opinion to any
filings.
Judgment affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/16/2016
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Circulated 05/25/2016 02:59 PM
Veronica Honis, In the Court of Common Pleas
Plaintiff of Luzerne County
vs. Civil Action At Law
Giant Food Stores, LLC, Jury Trial Demanded
Defendant No. 2012 - 9603
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On June 23, 2010 the Plaintiff, Veronica Hanis, and her husband were shopping at
the Defendant grocery store located at 70 South Locust Street, Hazleton, Luzerne County,
Pennsylvania. On this date, as the Plaintiff entered the checkout aisle, she stepped on a
can of Red Bull on the floor and fell, sustaining injuries to her lower back, right wrist and
right ankle. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the Defendant alleging that the Defendant
failed to inspect the checkout aisle in order to insure that a dangerous condition did not
exist.
The parties agree that Honis was at the Giant Food Store as an invitee, and thus
the following principles of law are applicable. c;n
Pennsylvania has adopted Section 343 of the Restatement (2d) of Torts, which F
'
states:
~
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm ..
(..)
caused to his invitees by a condition on the land, if, but only _,
w
if, he:
a. knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the
condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of
harm to such invitees, and
b. should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will
fail to protect themselves against it, and
c. fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
1111 ~1·:tti~rt~IJIIIf I
Filing ID: 2076676
2012-09603-0059 Opinion
Luzerne County Civil Records 1
71212015 7:59:45 AM
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Restatement (2d) of Torts Section 343. Our Pennsylvania Court has explained the
import of this section as follows:
The mere existence of a harmful condition in a public place of
business, or the mere happening of an accident due to such a
condition is neither, in and of itself, evidence of a breach of the
proprietor's duty of care to his invitees, nor raises a presumption
of negligence. In order to recover damages in a slip and fall case
such as this, the invitee must present evidence which proves that
the store owner deviated in some way from his duty ofreasonable
care under the existing circumstances. This evidence must show
that the proprietor knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have known, of the existence of the harmful condition.
Section 343 also requires the invitee to prove either that the store
owner helped to create the harmful condition, or that it had actual
or constructive notice of the condition. Zito v. Merit Outlet Stores,
647 A.2d 573, 575 (Pa. Super. 1994) (internal citations and quotations
mark omitted).
The principle of law from which this rule of the Restatement was derived is that a
possessor of land is not an insurer of the safety of those on his premises. Martinov.
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 419 Pa. at 229, 213 A.2d 608 (1965); Winkler v. Seven
Springs Fann, Inc. 240 Pa. Super at 646, 359 A.2d at 442. As such the mere existence of
a harmful condition in a public place of business, or the mere happening of an accident
due to such a condition is neither, in and of itself, evidence of a breach of the proprietor's
duty of care to his invitees, nor raises a presumption of negligence. Amon v. Shernaka,
419 Pa. 314, 214 A.2d 238, 239 (1965); Calhoun v. Jersey Shore Hosp., 250 Pa. Super.
567, 571, 378 A.2d 1294 (1977); Jones v. Sanitory Mkt. Co., 185 Pa. Super. 163, 137
A.2d 859, (1958). Therefore, in order to impose liability on a possessor of land, the
invitee must present other evidence which tends to prove that the possessor deviated in
some particular way from his duty of reasonable care under the existing circumstances.
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Logically, the invitees case in chief must consist of evidence which tends to prove
either that the proprietor knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care ought to have known,
of the existence of the harm causing condition. Martino, Supra.; Katz v. John
Wanamaker, Inc., 381 Pa. 477, 482, 112 A.2d 65 (1955); Markman v. Fred P. Bell Stores
Co., 285 Pa. 378, 382, 132 A. 178, 180 (1926); McMilan v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc.
240 Pa. Super. At 254, 367 A.2d at 1109; Winkler v. Seven Springs Fann, Inc. Supra.;
Borsa v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 207 Pa. Super. 63, 215 A.2d 289 (1965); Jones v.
Sanitary Mkt. Co., Supra.
At trial, the Plaintiff, Veronica Hanis testified that she completed her shopping,
and when she and her husband got to the checkout, she forgot the ice cream, so she went
back for it. (N.T. P 31, L 25 - P32, L2). She then stated that when she returned to the
aisle with the ice cream, she went to put the ice cream on the conveyor belt, and that
when she stepped, she stepped on a small sport bottle. (N.T. P 32, LIJ-16). Mrs.
Honis testified that she never saw the bottle before she fell. (N.T. P 33, LB-14). Mrs.
Hanis testified that she did not pay attention to the displays when she was entering the
checkout aisle. (N.T. P60, L19-23). Mrs. Honis did not see any items on the floor when
she went for the ice cream. (N.T. P 61, P 20). When Mrs. Honis left the checkout aisle
there was nothing on the floor. (N.T. P 62, L4). She had no idea how long that bottle
was on the floor prior to her fall. She could not testify as to how long the bottle was on
the floor. (N.T. P 62, LI 1-16).
Robert Honis, the Plaintiffs husband, testified that he did not see the bottle until
after his wife had fallen. He was already through the aisle when she fell. (N.T. P65,
Ll7).
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Interestingly, on cross, Mr. Honis testified as follows:
Q. (By Mr. Connolly): I believe it was your deposition --- at your deposition you
testified you were checking out and you noticed the gentleman with an armful of
groceries approaching your checkout aisle; is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Okay. And at your deposition it was your opinion that this gentleman decided
not to enter your checkout aisle once he saw you, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And you believe this gentleman knocked the bottle from the display rack; is
that correct?
A: I couldn't say he did and I can't say he didn't. But I was unloading the
groceries - or packing the groceries as they were coming toward the end and putting
them in bags, and he just walked away. So, I don't know if he saw the big order that we
had or he didn't want to wait.
Q: Right.
A: That's not for me to say that's the reason he left. I don't know.
Q: Okay. But you believe that the gentleman knocked this energy bottle from the
display at the end.
A: He may have. Idon't know.
A: He may have. I didn't see him do that. (N.T. P 70 -71)
The questioning continued. Counsel showed the witness his deposition testimony,
and the following colloquy occurred:
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Q: Question: "Did you see or hear him answer anything?" You answered:
"No." I'm sorry, the question was "Did you see or hear him drop anything?" The answer
was "No."
A: No.
Q: The question then continues: "Did you see or hear him knock anything over?"
Answer: "Not really, no." And then this question here: "Do you think that's when the
item fell?" Answer: "I surmise that's probably when it was knocked down, to be very
truthful with you." Did I read that correctly?
A: Yes, you did.
Q: From the time that gentleman left the area, it was a matter of seconds before
your wife came back with the ice cream?
A: Very shortly after, yes.
Q: And you have no idea how long that item was on the floor prior to your wife-
A: I have no idea.
Q: You don't know how long the item was on the floor prior to your wife's fall,
correct?
A: Correct.
The Plaintiff then offered the following testimony from Margaret Kasarda, a
service associate from Giant Market. Miss Kasarda testified that she worked at the
Defendant business for 15 years. She testified that the Defendant utilized a process of
"clean sweeping" to check the aisles. The employer would put a name on the board at the
premises each day and whoever was assigned to that duty would do a check. (N.T. P 76,
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18-20). Miss Kasarda described the check as follows: "You take a gun, you put your
name in it and your code, and they have little tags, and you start checking the areas and
swiping the tags." She testified that she would go down the aisle and tag it so that the
employer knew when she inspected the aisle. (N.T. P 77, L5-l l). She stated that the
Defendant did not have a tag for the check out aisle. (N.T. P 77, Ll 7). The witness also
indicated that there are tiny refrigerators placed in front of the aisles. They are waist high
and all sorts of items are stocked on them. There was no testimony offered that the Red
Bull was one of the items in the refrigerator or on display.
Moreover, on cross, the witness testified that it takes 35-40 minutes to do a clean
sweep of the store. She specifically testified that there is a sweep of the checkout aisle.
The sweep of the checkout aisle is included with the front end inspection of the store.
(N.T. P. 79-80).
The Plaintiff argues that the display placed in front of the aisle was a harmful
transitory condition. However, there was no testimony offered to prove that the red bull
was part of a display. Moreover, the plaintiff fell as a result of a can of Red Bull. There
was no evidence that this can or bottle was traceable to the possessor or his agent's acts,
(that is, a condition created by the possessor or those under his authority). There was no
evidence offered that the condition is one which the owner knows has frequently
recurred. Likewise, if a patron dropped the can, the law provides that if the transitory
condition is traceable to persons other than those for whom the owner is, strictly
speaking, ordinarily accountable, the jury may not consider the owner's ultimate liability
in the absence of other evidence which tends to prove that the owner had actual notice of
the condition or that the condition existed for such a length of time that in the exercise of
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reasonable care the owner should have known of it. The Plaintiff could not show that the
owner had actual notice of the condition or that the condition existed for such a length of
time that in the exercise of reasonable care, the owner should have known of it.
The instant case is governed under the above rules and by Martino, Supra. In
Martino, the plaintiff, an invitee, brought an action against a self service store for injuries
sustained when she stepped on a grape on the floor. As in the instant case, there was no
evidence as to how the fruit got onto the floor, or how long it had been there prior to the
fall. The Court held that because there was no proof presented as to the cause of the
grapes' being on the floor, there was no evidence from which a jury might conclude that
the store breached its duty in not removing it. See also Mac Donald v. Gimbel Bros .• Inc.
321 Pa. 25, 183 A. 804 (I936).
In the instant case the record is void of any evidence from which the jury could
have inferred either that the presence of the drink on the floor was due to an act or acts by
customers which had occurred in the past and remained uncorrected, or that the harm
causing act or acts likely occurred because of the manner in which the can was packaged,
displayed or sold.
There was no evidence that the drink was in the refrigerator or how many were in
the refrigerator or if they were over stacked, etc. There was no testimony to suggest how
the Red Bull got on the ground. On the other hand, the jury heard the testimony of a
store manager that there were inspections performed on a daily basis, and that as part of
the inspection of the front end of the store, the checkout aisles were "checked" by the
employees.
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This case is similar to the case of Moultrey v. Great A&P Tea Co, 281 Pa. Super.
525, 422 A.2d 593 ( 1979), a case cited by the Plaintiff is his brief. There the court stated:
While our research has revealed cases in other jurisdictions which
have modestly expanded the grounds for liability in supermarket
fall down cases, even if we were to accept their rationale, they would be
unavailing for Ms. Moultrey. See generally, Note, Supermarket Liability:
Problems in Proving the Slip and Fall Case in Florida, 18 U.Fla.L.Rev.
440 (1965). One line of cases permits the fact finder to infer notice of a
harmful condition from proof of the prior uncorrected existence of the
continuing and recurrent condition, despite the absence of proof that such
condition existed for an extended period of time immediately before the
particular accident. Hetzel v. Jewel, 457 F.2d 527 (ih Cir. 1977).A second
line of cases allows an inference of notice from circumstances within the
proprietor's knowledge sufficient to create a reasonable probability that
the specific harmful condition would occur. See F. W. Woolworth Co. v.
Stokes, 191 So.2d 411 (Miss. 1966); Mahoney v. J.C. Penney Co., 71
N.M. 244, 377 P.2d 633 (1962). Such circwnstances will arise from the
nature of the business, the general conditions of the premises, a pattern of
conduct or recurring incidents. Bozza v. Vornado, Inc. 42 N.J. 355, 200
A.2d 777 (1964).
In Moultrey, Ms. Moultrey entered Defendant's store accompanied by her
teenaged children, Louis and Linda, to do some food shopping. As she entered the store,
she secured a shopping cart and proceeded to the produce counter. The vegetable counter
was to her right and the fruit counter was to her left. As she moved into the aisle between
the two counters, she observed some water and some leaves of lettuce and cabbage on the
floor. She maneuvered her cart to avoid the water in order to get to the banana stand,
intending to purchase some bananas. She pushed the cart to the left side of the aisle close
to the banana stand and circled the cart to obtain the bananas. After picking them up, she
ventured back toward her cart, slipped and fell to the floor. While on the floor, she
looked back and saw one squashed cherry, the seed of which was on her shoe. The
cherry was not in the water, but rather was in a dry area closer to the cart.
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The court held:
Accordingly, the Restatement 2d. ss 343 and 344 and our cases support the
proposition that the invitee must prove either that the proprietor had a
hand in creating the harmful condition, or that he had actual or
constructive notice of such condition. Since such proof was absent, the
appellee's motion for a compulsory nonsuit was granted.
In the instant case, there was not any evidence offered from which the jury could
infer that the can of Red Bull on the floor was a recurring and uncorrected condition,
arising from the shopper's mishandling the bottle and the store's inadequate efforts to
clean the floor. Additionally, there was no evidence offered as to how the can was
displayed, whether this method of display had led to the can's falling to the floor in the
past, and whether the store had adopted any measures to prevent accidents of this type.
Plaintiff relies upon a portion of the Restatement, wherein Pennsylvania Courts
have uniformly held that if the harmful transitory condition is traceable to the possessor
or his agent's acts, (that is, a condition created by the possessor or those under his
authority), then the plaintiff need not prove any notice in order to hold the possessor
accountable for the resulting harm. See Penn v. Isaly Dairy Co., 413 Pa. 548, 198 A.2d
322 () 964); Finney v. G.C. Murphy Co., 406 Pa. 555, 178 A.2d 719 (1962). In a related
context, where the condition is one which the owner knows has frequently recurred, the
jury may properly find that the owner had actual notice of this condition, thereby
obviating additional proof by the invitee that the owner had constructive notice of it. See,
Borsa v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Supra.; Clark v. Glosser Bros. Dept. Stores, 156 Pa.
Super. 193, 39 A.2d 733 (1944).
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The case cited by the Plaintiff as most illustrative is the 2014 case from Monroe
County, 31 D&C 5th 487, Signoule v. Femwood 426 4108 Court of Common Pleas of
Monroe County on a Motion for Summary Judgment and is not precedential. The plaintiff
cites this case mistakenly as a Commonwealth Court case. This case involved a rusty
screw on the floor for an unknown length of time. In Signoule there were two witnesses
who testified the screw came from a nearby sauna door. In other words, the witesses
identified an area from where the defect came. The evaluation of the constructive notice
factors is usually a task for the jury unless the evidence "requires the jury to resort to
conjecture, guess or suspicion." Lanni v. Pennsylvania RR Co., 88 A.2d 889 (1952).
That was the case in our matter subjudice.
In another case of Farina v. Miggsy Corp. Five and Six, cited in Plaintiffs brief at
2010 WL 302 4752 (M.D. Pa. 2011), Judge James Munley denied a Motion for
Summary Judgment because the Plaintiff fell on a sticky and gritty floor, which the court
found as sufficient evidence of constructive notice. In the case herein, there was no such
evidence presented concerning the condition of the floor, so Plaintiffs reference to the
Middle District Court decision is neither controlling nor persuasive.
Where, however, the evidence indicates that the transitory condition is traceable
to persons other than those for whom the owner is, strictly speaking, ordinarily
accountable, the jury may not consider the owner's ultimate liability in the absence of
other evidence which tends to prove that the owner had actual notice of the condition or
that the condition existed for such a length of time that in the exercise ofreasonable care
the owner should have known of it. Katz v. John Wanamaker, Supra., Parker v. McCrory
Stores, 376 Pa. 122; 101 A.2d 377 (1954); Sheridan v. Horn & Hardart, 366 Pa. 485, 77
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A.2d 362 (1951 ); Borsa v. Great Alt. & Pac Tea Co., Supra; Potter v. Glosser Bros. Dept.
Stores, 146 Pa. Super. 129, 130-31, 22 A.2d 28, 29 (1941).
As such, under Restatement 2d. ss 343 and 344 and the supporting case law, since
such proof was absent from the record in the instant case, the trial court herein denies the
post trial motion of Plaintiff.
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