United States v. Rene Ramirez-Jimenez

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4204

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RENE RAMIREZ-JIMENEZ,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (3:13-cr-00486-JFA-5)

Argued: May 12, 2016 Decided: June 20, 2016

Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Harris wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Gregory joined.

ARGUED: Aimee Zmroczek, A.J.Z. LAW FIRM, LLC, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Jimmie Ewing, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, John David
Rowell, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:

Rene Ramirez-Jimenez was convicted by a jury of federal

drug-trafficking offenses. His sole challenge on appeal is to

the denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence uncovered

during a traffic stop and later used to identify him at trial.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

A.

On September 27, 2012, Drug Enforcement Administration

(DEA) agents, assisted by a Richland County Sheriff’s Department

task force, arranged a controlled drug purchase. The target of

their investigation was Eduardo Valencia-Gaeta, a

methamphetamine dealer who went by the nickname “Lelo.” The DEA

agents outfitted their confidential informant, Dennis Kasabian,

with concealed audio and video equipment, and sent him to a

Lowe’s parking lot to meet Lelo.

Shortly after Kasabian met Lelo, a dark Chevrolet Silverado

truck with two occupants parked directly behind Lelo’s vehicle,

leading the agents to wonder whether the Silverado was involved

in the deal. Lelo told Kasabian that they would need to go to a

nearby restaurant, Monterrey’s, to break down the package of

methamphetamine to be purchased. The agents’ interest in the

Silverado heightened when Lelo, Kasabian, and the occupants of

2
the Silverado all drove to Monterrey’s in their respective

vehicles. Once they arrived at the restaurant, Lelo and the

occupants of the Silverado went inside, and a short time later

Lelo returned outside to complete the transaction with Kasabian.

Kasabian understood the occupants of the Silverado, whom he had

not met previously and did not know by name, to be the suppliers

of the methamphetamine. After the buy, DEA agents met Kasabian

at a secure location to debrief and retrieve the purchased

drugs.

At the DEA’s direction, Kasabian called Lelo to negotiate

another purchase for later the same day, and it was agreed that

Kasabian would purchase four ounces of methamphetamine for

$5,400. Kasabian promptly returned to Monterrey’s to meet Lelo.

Before completing the transaction with Kasabian, Lelo again

spoke with the occupants of the Silverado inside Monterrey’s.

According to DEA agents observing the restaurant, the Silverado

had remained at Monterrey’s the entire time. After the deal was

done, Kasabian rendezvoused with the DEA agents and gave them

the drugs that he had acquired. Lab testing showed that the

substance from both buys was methamphetamine.

Following the second controlled buy, the DEA maintained

continuous surveillance on the Silverado. In an effort to

identify the occupants of the Silverado — but without tipping

its hand as to the ongoing drug investigation — the DEA

3
requested that the South Carolina Highway Patrol initiate a

traffic stop of the vehicle. At approximately 4:02 p.m.,

Trooper Michael Shank spotted a littering violation and pulled

the truck over.

Because the ensuing stop is the focus of this appeal, we

recount it in some detail. Trooper Shank first asked the driver

and passenger of the Silverado for their identification.

Neither had a driver’s license, but both provided identification

cards. The driver of the vehicle was identified as Omar Gomez-

Suarez, and the passenger as the appellant, Rene Ramirez-

Jimenez. Trooper Shank then asked both occupants to exit the

vehicle. When Gomez-Suarez and Ramirez-Jimenez stood outside of

their vehicle, the police’s in-car video recording captured

their likenesses. At approximately 4:06 p.m., Trooper Shank

asked Gomez-Suarez for consent to search the vehicle, which

Gomez-Suarez granted. Trooper Shank then commenced an initial

search of the truck.

Around this time, a second South Carolina Highway Patrol

officer, Trooper Derrick Melton, arrived on the scene and took

charge of the traffic violation component of the stop. Trooper

Melton began preparing citations for littering and failing to

produce a driver’s license. At approximately 4:22 p.m., once

the citations were complete, Trooper Melton called dispatch to

verify the identification cards. Just over ten minutes later,

4
Melton was able to confirm Gomez-Suarez’s address and learn that

he did not possess a valid driver’s license. At that point, at

roughly 4:35 p.m., Trooper Melton took photographs of the

identification cards and returned them to Gomez-Suarez and

Ramirez-Jimenez.

In the meantime, at the instruction of the DEA, Trooper

Shank continued to search the Silverado for evidence of drugs or

money from the controlled drug transactions. After failing to

uncover any contraband in his initial pass-through of the

vehicle, Shank called on the York County Interdiction Team to

execute a more comprehensive search. The search continued until

the police found a wad of money tied up in a washcloth, slightly

less than one hour after the vehicle originally was stopped.

The DEA asked the troopers not to arrest the Silverado’s

occupants. Instead, Trooper Melton informed Gomez-Suarez and

Ramirez-Jimenez that they could leave, but would need to post

bond for driving without a license. The troopers then returned

the money found inside the washcloth, less the amount of the

bond, and let Gomez-Suarez and Ramirez-Jimenez go.

The entire stop lasted just over one hour. The troopers

did not seize any evidence. But during the course of the

traffic stop, Shank and Melton were able to observe several

distinctive tattoos on the passenger’s arms, including one of

the appellant’s first name, “Rene.”

5
 B.

In June 2013, a grand jury in the United States District

Court for the District of South Carolina charged Ramirez-Jimenez

with two methamphetamine-related offenses: one count of

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more

of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and one

count of possession with intent to distribute and distribution

of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). Ramirez-Jimenez was arrested in

April 2014.

Ramirez-Jimenez planned to argue at trial that he had been

misidentified, and was not in fact the passenger in the

Silverado. In aid of that defense, he moved to suppress the

identification evidence recovered from the September 27 traffic

stop: the in-car video recordings and still photographs showing

his likeness, and the troopers’ observations of his tattoos.

Ramirez-Jimenez conceded that the initial stop of the car was

valid, based on probable cause of a littering violation. The

problem, Ramirez-Jimenez argued, was that the duration of the

roughly hour-long stop was excessive. Once Trooper Melton

finished preparing the citations and checking background

information, Ramirez-Jimenez contended, the tasks tied to the

traffic violation were completed, and he should have been

6
released — more than 20 minutes before he actually was given the

go-ahead to leave.

The district court rejected that argument and denied the

motion to suppress. The initial stop of the vehicle, the

district court held, was justified on two independent grounds:

Not only was there probable cause of a traffic violation, or

littering, but the officers also had probable cause to believe

that the occupants of the Silverado were engaged in drug-

trafficking activity. The district court noted that the stop

was extended by the absence of driver’s licenses and the need to

verify the occupants’ identification cards. And the court

determined that Gomez-Suarez gave valid consent to search the

vehicle, requiring additional time. With “all those factors

coming together,” the district court concluded, the “duration of

the stop was not unreasonable.” J.A. 35.

At trial, Ramirez-Jimenez continued to press his

misidentification defense, arguing that he was not in fact the

passenger in the Silverado on the day in question. The

government rebutted with testimony from Lelo, the target of the

investigation, and Gomez-Suarez, the driver, who both identified

Ramirez-Jimenez as the passenger in the Silverado and were able

to describe his role in the drug operation. Trooper Shank,

Trooper Melton, and a Richland County task force officer who

assisted the DEA during the operation also identified Ramirez-

7
Jimenez as the passenger, based on their own observations during

the traffic stop and preceding surveillance. For good measure,

the government also introduced video and still photographs from

the traffic stop to show that Ramirez-Jimenez was the passenger

in the truck. The photographs included several shots of the

passenger’s distinctive tattoos, which matched Ramirez-

Jimenez’s, and the picture of the passenger’s identification

card.

The jury convicted Ramirez-Jimenez of the two drug-

trafficking offenses with which he was charged. The district

court sentenced Ramirez-Jimenez to 365 months’ imprisonment

followed by five years of supervised release. This timely

appeal followed.

II.

Ramirez-Jimenez’s sole challenge on appeal is to the

district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the

identification evidence from the traffic stop. We review the

factual findings underlying a motion to suppress for clear error

and the district court’s legal determinations de novo. See

United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 233 (4th Cir. 2012). When

a suppression motion has been denied, we construe the evidence

in the light most favorable to the government. See United

States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998). For the

8
reasons discussed below, we affirm the district court’s denial

of the motion to suppress.

A.

As the Supreme Court has explained, a “routine traffic

stop” is a Fourth Amendment seizure akin to a so-called Terry

stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and like a Terry

stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to accomplish its

purposes. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614

(2015). Once “tasks tied to the traffic infraction” — checking

identifications, writing citations, and the like — have been

completed, the purpose of a traffic stop has been fulfilled and

a vehicle’s occupants generally are free to go. Id.; see United

States v. Ortiz, 669 F.3d 439, 444 (4th Cir. 2012); United

States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008). Appealing

to this well-established case law, Ramirez-Jimenez argues that

the duration of his approximately hour-long stop was

constitutionally excessive, extending beyond the time required

to prepare citations and check identification by at least twenty

minutes.

What Ramirez-Jimenez overlooks, however, is that his was

not a “routine traffic stop,” 135 S. Ct. at 1614, of the sort

contemplated by Rodriguez. When the police pulled over the

Silverado, they had reason to suspect its occupants not only of

littering but also of drug trafficking. And when the police

9
have some distinct justification, independent of the initial

traffic violation, for a prolonged detention, then they are not

bound by the usual time limits on traffic stops. See United

States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 507 (4th Cir. 2011); Branch,

537 F.3d at 336. A reasonable suspicion of illegal activity

apart from the traffic violation will authorize a separate

investigatory stop under Terry, see Branch, 537 F.3d at 336; and

probable cause of such illegal activity, a more demanding

standard, will authorize a more intrusive seizure, up to and

including an actual arrest, see Ortiz, 669 F.3d at 444.

We agree with the district court that the police here

possessed probable cause of drug trafficking, sufficient to

justify the protracted detention of the Silverado’s occupants. 1

“Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard,” requiring

only that the “facts available to the officer would warrant a

man of reasonable caution in the belief” that the suspect has

committed a crime. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)

(plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under

the “collective-knowledge” doctrine, we consider not only the

1Accordingly, we need not consider the government’s
alternative contention that despite its roughly hour-long
duration, the seizure also may be sustained as an investigatory
Terry stop based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) (sustaining 20-
minute stop as within the scope of Terry and declining to set
outer time limit for Terry stops).

10
first-hand observations of the police officers actually making

the stop, but also the facts known to the DEA agents and

transmitted to those officers. See United States v. Massenburg,

654 F.3d 480, 492 (4th Cir. 2011). Evaluating the totality of

the circumstances, as we must, see Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S.

366, 371 (2003), we find ample support for a probable-cause

determination.

The undisputed evidence 2 indicates that in the hours

immediately before the traffic stop, the DEA carefully monitored

two controlled purchases of methamphetamine, with the occupants

of the Silverado playing a role in each. Soon after Kasabian,

the DEA’s confidential informant, and Lelo, the target

methamphetamine dealer, first met in a parking lot, the DEA

agents observed the occupants of the Silverado travel in tandem

with Lelo and Kasabian to the restaurant, Monterrey’s. And once

the vehicles arrived at Monterrey’s, the occupants of the

Silverado accompanied Lelo inside — where, Lelo told Kasabian,

the package of methamphetamine could be divided. As one of the

DEA agents leading the operation testified, that conduct

indicated that the occupants of the Silverado were Lelo’s

suppliers. The Silverado remained at Monterrey’s through the

2Ramirez-Jimenez does not contest the government’s
description of the conduct preceding the traffic stop, nor offer
any alternative, innocent explanation for that conduct.

11
second buy at the restaurant. And significantly, the DEA

maintained constant surveillance on the Silverado as the driver

and passenger left the restaurant, drove to the highway, and

ultimately were stopped by the police, confirming that the

occupants remained the same throughout the day’s events.

When these facts are “viewed from the standpoint of an

objectively reasonable police officer,” Ornelas v. United

States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996), it is plain that they support

the troopers’ reasonable belief that the occupants of the

Silverado were involved in a conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine. The inculpatory evidence was robust, and we

routinely uphold probable-cause searches based upon less. See,

e.g., United States v. Laing, 538 F.2d 83, 84–85 (4th Cir. 1976)

(per curiam) (probable cause to search defendant for narcotics

possession where main evidence was tip of reliable informant).

Given the probable cause of drug trafficking, the police were

justified in conducting an extended stop.

B.

We also conclude, as a separate and additional basis for

our decision, that even if the prolonged detention exceeded

constitutional limits, the outcome of this case would remain the

same. To the extent any of the identification evidence to which

Ramirez-Jimenez objects could have been tainted by an

unconstitutionally extended detention, its admission was

12
harmless error, in light of the overwhelming evidence of

Ramirez-Jimenez’s guilt. See United States v. Holness, 706 F.3d

579, 598 (4th Cir. 2013) (constitutional error harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt where “judgment was not substantially swayed by

the error” (internal quotation mark omitted)).

First, the government presented extensive evidence,

entirely independent of the traffic stop in question, that

Ramirez-Jimenez was indeed the passenger in the Silverado on

September 27, 2012. The first witness to make the

identification was a Richland County task force officer who,

along with the DEA, monitored the Silverado at Monterrey’s. The

second was Lelo, who identified Ramirez-Jimenez from his own

observations on September 27. Finally, Gomez-Suarez, the driver

of the Silverado, not only identified Ramirez-Jimenez as his

passenger, but also testified that he worked with him for

roughly a year prior to September 27, meeting with him four

times a week to deliver drugs. And to confirm that witness

testimony, the government introduced still photographs of the

Silverado’s passenger entering and exiting the vehicle in the

Monterrey’s parking lot.

Second, the government presented additional evidence of

identification that, though acquired in connection with the

traffic stop, could not have been tainted by any

unconstitutional extension of that stop. For instance, Troopers

13
Shank and Melton were able to identify Ramirez-Jimenez as the

Silverado’s passenger, in part because of his distinctive

tattoos. And both observed Ramirez-Jimenez during the initial

portion of the stop, devoted to tasks related to the traffic

violation, which Ramirez-Jimenez concedes was constitutional.

The jury also viewed substantial physical evidence from the stop

that linked Ramirez-Jimenez to the Silverado: footage from the

troopers’ in-car video systems depicting Ramirez-Jimenez and

still photographs of Ramirez-Jimenez and his identification

card. Again, all of that evidence was acquired while the

officers addressed the littering violation — the portion of the

stop that Ramirez-Jimenez leaves unchallenged.

Taken together, this independent evidence of

identification was overwhelming. We are confident that even if

the duration of Ramirez-Jimenez’s detention had crossed the

constitutional line, the suppression of any tainted

identification evidence would not have affected the outcome of

the trial.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.

AFFIRMED

14