IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
CARLOS A. HUERTA, AN INDIVIDUAL; No. 67595
CARLOS A. HUERTA AS TRUSTEE OF
THE ALEXANDER CHRISTOPHER
TRUST, A TRUST ESTABLISHED IN
NEVADA AS ASSIGNEE OF
INTERESTS OF GO GLOBAL, INC., A FILED
NEVADA CORPORATION,
Appellants, JUN 2 0 2016
vs. TRACIE K LINDEMAN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
SIG ROGICH, A/K/A SIGMUND ROGICH BY
DEPUTY CLERK
AS TRUSTEE OF THE ROGICH
FAMILY IRREVOCABLE TRUST,
Respondent.
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This is an appeal from post-judgment orders awarding
attorney fees and costs.' Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County;
Nancy L. Allf, Judge.
The district court awarded attorney fees to respondent under
paragraph 7(d) of the Purchase Agreement, which provides that if an
action is "instituted to interpret or enforce the terms and provisions of
[the] Agreement," then the "prevailing party" is entitled to attorney fees.
The district court determined that attorney fees were warranted because
appellants "instituted" the underlying action to enforce the provisions of
the Agreement and because respondent "prevailed" by obtaining summary
judgment in his favor on all of appellants' claims against him.
We direct the clerk of the court to modify the caption on the docket
for this case to conform with the caption on this order, which reflects that
Eldorado Hills, LLC is not a party to this appeal.
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Appellants contend that the district court erred in
determining that respondent was a "prevailing party" because although
respondent was granted summary judgment in his favor, he did not obtain
summary judgment by refuting the factual and legal basis for appellants'
claims. 2 This court's case law defining "prevailing party" imposes no such
requirement, see Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't v. Blackjack Bonding, Inc.,
131 Nev., Adv. Op. 10, 343 P.3d 608, 615 (2015) ("A party prevails if it
succeeds on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the
benefit it sought . . . ." (internal quotation omitted)), and the other
authorities cited by appellants do not stand for such a proposition.
Accordingly, we agree with the district court that respondent was entitled
to attorney fees under the unambiguous language of paragraph 7(d). See
Davis v. Beling, 128 Nev. 301, 321, 278 P.3d 501, 515 (2012) (reviewing de
novo an attorney fee award when the only dispute involves the
interpretation of a fee provision in a contract, and recognizing that if an
attorney fee provision in a contract "is clear and unambiguous [then it]
will be enforced as written"). We therefore affirm the award of attorney
fees in the district court's February 10, 2015, order. 3
2 Tothe extent that appellants are also contending that respondent
needed to obtain a money judgment to be a• prevailing party, that
argument is meritless. Cf. Davis v. Beling, 128 Nev. 301, 321-22, 278 P.3d
501, 515 (2012) (recognizing that defendants were prevailing parties under
a contract's attorney fee provision even though the defendants were not
awarded a money judgment in relation to the claims brought against
them).
is unclear whether appellants are challenging the specific
3 It
amount of fees awarded or are disputing whether the award was imposed
against the proper parties. In any event, a challenge to the specific
amount would fail for lack of a cogent argument, see Edwards v. Emperor's
continued on next page...
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Appellants have also appealed the district court's February 23,
2015, award of costs, but they make no arguments with regard to that
award. Accordingly, we affirm the award of costs in that order.
It is so ORDERED.
'3 A J.
Douglas
CAgarmak,
Che
Cial,^7-1
„ j
Gibbons
cc: Hon. Nancy L Allf, District Judge
Cohen Johnson Parker Edwards
Fennemore Craig Jones Vargas/Las Vegas
Eighth District Court Clerk
...continued
Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006),
and a dispute regarding the proper parties is moot, see Rust v. Clark Cty.
Sch. Dist., 103 Nev. 686, 689, 747 P.2d 1380, 1382 (1987) (oral
pronouncements are invalid for any purpose).
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