NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 16-1307
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STEVEN A. JOHNSON,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN LEWISBURG USP
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(M.D. Pa. No. 1:16-cv-00013)
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 16, 2016
Before: JORDAN, BARRY and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: June 22, 2016)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Stephen A. Johnson appeals pro se from an order of the District Court dismissing
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the
reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Johnson is incarcerated at USP-Lewisburg within the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. His habeas claims arise out of his transfer from USP-Atwater, in the
Eastern District of California. First, Johnson claimed that his transfer violated his right to
due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, Johnson claimed that the
use of hand restraints at USP-Lewisburg amounted to cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment. Third, Johnson claimed that his confinement to his cell
while USP-Lewisburg was on “lockdown” denied him access to the courts under the First
Amendment. Johnson prayed for a declaration that these constitutional rights were
violated and an injunction requiring his transfer to another federal facility. The District
Court dismissed the petition without prejudice as raising non-cognizable claims, and
Johnson appealed.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our
review of the District Court’s dismissal of Johnson’s § 2241 petition is plenary. See
Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Section
2241 gives federal district courts the power to grant a writ of habeas corpus to prisoners
within their jurisdiction who are “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). To present a viable claim under
§ 2241, a prisoner must challenge the “execution” of his sentences. Coady v. Vaughn,
251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001). Although we have characterized the precise meaning
of execution as “hazy,” we have said that such claims properly address the way a
sentence is “put into effect” or “carr[ied] out[.]” Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432
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F.3d 235, 242-43 (3d Cir. 2005); Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2012)
(explaining that, in order for a prisoner to challenge the execution of his sentence under
§ 2241, he must allege that the “[Federal Bureau of Prisons’] conduct was somehow
inconsistent with a command or recommendation in the sentencing judgment”).
In this case, Johnson did not present a proper § 2241 claim. Johnson’s allegations
concern the fact of his transfer between two high-security prisons and the conditions of
his confinement, not the manner in which the government is carrying out his sentencing
judgment. See id.; Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen the
challenge is to a condition of confinement such that a finding in plaintiff’s favor would
not alter his sentence or undo his conviction, an action under § 1983 [and not habeas
corpus] is appropriate.”). Although Johnson asserts that there are differences between the
conditions at USP-Lewisburg and USP-Atwater, his transfer did not “cross[] the line
beyond a challenge to . . . a garden variety prison transfer.” See Woodall, 432 F.3d at
243 (holding that “[c]arrying out a sentence through detention in a [a community
correction center] is very different from carrying out a sentence in an ordinary penal
institution.”); accord Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F.3d 497, 499-500 (7th Cir. 1999).
Consequently, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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