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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MICAH D. HEPLER
Appellant No. 2241 MDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order November 20, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-49-CR-0000392-2006
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JUNE 22, 2016
Micah D. Hepler appeals pro se from the trial court’s order denying his
Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition. We affirm.
On February 2, 2007, Hepler entered a guilty plea to aggravated
assault and resisting arrest.2 On April 30, 2007, he was sentenced to 5-10
years’ imprisonment on the assault charge, with a concurrent term of 7-24
months on the resisting arrest charge. The court imposed a deadly weapons
enhancement to Hepler’s sentence, see 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301, and he was
sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. §
9712. No direct appeal was filed.
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1
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
2
18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104.
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On August 18, 2015, Hepler filed the instant pro se PCRA petition. On
August 25, 2015, the trial court appointed PCRA counsel to represent Hepler.
See Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(a) (defendant has absolute right to counsel on first
PCRA petition). On September 25, 2015, appointed counsel filed a petition
to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.
Super. 1988).3 The court sent Hepler Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to
dismiss his petition as untimely on October 15, 2015. On November 13,
2015, Hepler filed a pro se motion to stay the court’s disposition of his PCRA
petition based on a “new case that is to be heard on similar issues.” Pro Se
Motion to Stay and Hold in Abeyance, 11/13/15, at 1. On November 20,
2015, the court granted counsel’s petition to withdraw, dismissed Hepler’s
petition without a hearing, and denied Hepler’s motion for stay.
This appeal follows, in which Hepler raises the following issues for our
consideration:
(1) Did the PCRA court abuse its discretion when it upheld
unconstitutionally imposed sentences upon appellant that
have been deemed unconstitutional by the high state and
federal courts despite the new rulings being substantive
rule changes requiring retroactive applications, this also
leaving all prior counsel ineffective for failing to object or
further a claim on appellant’s behalf?
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3
In his petition, counsel states that he carefully considered the matter, does
not believe that there is merit to Hepler’s petition and that, in fact, the
petition is frivolous. He also states that he has sent Hepler a “no merit”
letter and attached a Turner/Finley no merit letter to the petition. See
Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel, 9/25/15.
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(2) Did the PCRA court abuse its discretion when it denied
appellant’s PCRA hearing motion to stay and hold in
abeyance pending a ruling in the state supreme court
concerning the retroactivity of Alleyne v. United
States[,133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013)]?
The standard of review of an order denying a PCRA petition is whether
that determination is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal
error. The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no
support for the findings in the certified record. Commonwealth v.
Johnston, 42 A.3d 1120, 1126 (Pa. Super. 2012).
Before we address the merits of Hepler’s claims on appeal, we must
determine whether his petition was timely filed. Generally, a petition for
PCRA relief, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within
one year of the date the judgment is final. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3);
see also Commonwealth v. Alcorn, 703 A.2d 1054 (Pa. Super. 1997).
There are, however, exceptions to the time requirement, set forth at 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). Where the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves,
that an exception to the time for filing the petition is met, the petition will be
considered timely. Id. These exceptions include interference by
government officials in the presentation of the claim, after-discovered facts
or evidence, and an after-recognized constitutional right. 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1)(ii)-(iii). A PCRA petition invoking one of these exceptions must
“be filed within 60 days of the date the claims could have been presented.”
Id. at (b)(2). The timeliness requirements of the PCRA are jurisdictional in
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nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court cannot hear untimely petitions.
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157 (Pa. 2003).
Instantly, Hepler filed his PCRA petition on August 18, 2015. Hepler’s
judgment of sentence became final, for purposes of the PCRA, on May 30,
2007, after the time expired for him to file a direct appeal. Therefore, in
order to be timely under the PCRA, Hepler would have had to have filed his
petition by May 30, 2008. Accordingly, Hepler’s petition is facially untimely.
However, we must determine whether Hepler has pled and proven an
exception to the PCRA time bar.
Instantly, Hepler does not allege any section 9545(b)(1) exception.
Rather, his illegal sentence claim is predicated upon the holding of the
United States Supreme Court’s decision, Alleyne, supra. In Alleyne, the
Supreme Court held that “facts that increase mandatory minimum sentences
must be submitted to the jury” and must be found beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 2163. A challenge to a sentence premised upon Alleyne
implicates the legality of the sentence. Commonwealth v. Newman, 99
A.3d 86, 90 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc). While legality of sentence is
always subject to review within the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the
PCRA's time limits or one of the exceptions thereto. See 42 Pa.C.S. §
9543(a)(2)(vii).
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Despite the fact that section 9712 has been declared unconstitutional,4
Hepler is not entitled to relief in his untimely PCRA petition. In
Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988 (Pa. Super. 2014), the defendant
also filed an untimely PCRA petition raising the claim that his mandatory
minimum sentence was illegal. To overcome the untimeliness of his petition,
the defendant unsuccessfully argued that Alleyne announced a new
constitutional right under the PCRA that applies retroactively. Additionally,
the Court found meritless the defendant’s allegation that his illegal sentence
claim was not waivable on appeal where “in order for th[e] Court to review a
legality of sentence claim, there must be a basis for [its] jurisdiction.” Id. at
995. Finally, the Miller Court held that Alleyne is not to be applied
retroactively to cases in which the judgment of sentence had become final.
Id.
Similar to the defendant in Miller, Hepler raises a legality of sentence
claim predicated on the holding of Alleyne and an unconstitutional
mandatory minimum statute. Because Hepler’s petition is facially untimely,
because he does not allege and prove an exception to the timeliness
requirements of the PCRA, and because Alleyne does not apply retroactively
to cases on collateral review, Miller, supra, he is not entitled to relief.
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4
See Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801 (Pa. Super. 2013).
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Therefore, the trial court properly concluded that Hepler’s untimely PCRA
petition should be dismissed. Johnston, supra.
Having found no merit to Hepler’s underlying claim that his sentence is
illegal under Alleyne, we cannot deem counsel ineffective.
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 47 A.3d 63, 76 (Pa. 2012) (to prevail on
ineffectiveness claim, petitioner must plead and prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, among other elements, that underlying legal claim has
arguable merit).
Finally, Hepler claims that the court abused its discretion by denying
him a hearing on his petition and by not granting his motion to stay the
disposition of his petition until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decides a
case in which it recently granted allowance of appeal.
Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 908, a judge shall order a hearing on a PCRA
petition “when the petition . . . raises any material issues of fact.” However,
where, as here, the court is “satisfied from [a review of the petition and any
answer by the Commonwealth or other matters of record] that there are no
genuine issues concerning any material fact and that the defendant is not
entitled to post-conviction collateral relief,” the court may dismiss the
petition without a hearing after giving the defendant proper notice of its
intention to dismiss. Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(1). Accordingly, Hepler was not
entitled to a hearing.
Finally, we find no merit to Hepler’s claim that the PCRA court should
have stayed his case pending the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in
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Commonwealth v. Barnes, 122 A.3d 1034 (Pa. 2015), in which he claims
the Supreme Court is going to determine “if retroactivity concerning Alleyne
should be applied in regards to Pennsylvania cases and if a claim concerning
sentences in Pennsylvania is nonwaivable.” Appellant’s Brief, at 9. We note
that the Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in Barnes, limited to
the following issues:
(1) Whether a challenge to a sentence pursuant to Alleyne v.
United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), implicates the legality of
the sentence and is therefore non-waivable.
(2) Whether contemporaneous convictions of possession with
intent to deliver, pursuant to 35 Pa.C.S. § 780-113, and
possession of a firearm prohibited, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. §
6105, allow application of the mandatory minimum sentence
found at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1 in light of our decision in
Commonwealth v. Hopkins, ___ A.3d ___, 2015 Pa.LEXIS
1282 (decided June 15, 2015).
Barnes, supra. Because neither of these issues is relevant to Hepler’s
collateral appeal, nor would they afford him any relief on his petition, his
claim is meritless.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/22/2016
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