Chen v. Antel Communications, LLC

15-3475 Chen v. Antel Communications, LLC et al. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 4 on the 24th day of June, two thousand sixteen. 5 6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, 7 GUIDO CALABRESI, 8 REENA RAGGI, 9 Circuit Judges. 10 11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 12 JIA CHEN, AKA KEVIN CHEN, 13 Plaintiff-Appellant, 14 15 -v.- 15-3475 16 17 ANTEL COMMUNICATIONS, LLC & LOUIS 18 ANTONIOU, 19 Defendants-Appellees. 20 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 21 22 FOR APPELLANT: William M. Brown, Hang and 23 Associates, PLLC, Flushing, New 24 York. 25 26 FOR APPELLEES: Andrew W. Schwartz, Sills Cummis 27 & Gross, P.C., Newark, New 28 Jersey. 1 1 Appeal from an order of the United States District 2 Court for the Eastern District of New York (Feuerstein, J.). 3 4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 5 AND DECREED that the order of the district court is 6 AFFIRMED. 7 8 Jia Chen appeals from a September 30, 2015 order of the 9 United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 10 York (Feuerstein, J.), granting defendants-appellees’ motion 11 to dismiss in part and denying it in part. We assume the 12 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the 13 procedural history, and the issues presented for review. 14 15 “[A] denial of a motion to dismiss is ordinarily 16 considered non-final, and therefore not immediately 17 appealable.” Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 659 (2d 18 Cir. 1995); see also Britt v. Garcia, 457 F.3d 264, 270 (2d 19 Cir. 2006) (“Because the district court ha[d] not yet 20 entered a final judgment, this appeal is interlocutory.”). 21 Chen has articulated no reason why he should be permitted to 22 take an interlocutory appeal in this case. Nonetheless, “‘a 23 premature notice of appeal from a nonfinal order may ripen 24 into a valid notice of appeal if a final judgment has been 25 entered by the time the appeal is heard and the appellee 26 suffers no prejudice.’” IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. 27 Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1054-55 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Welch 28 v. Cadre Capital, 923 F.2d 989, 992 n.1 (2d Cir. 1991)). 29 Both conditions are satisfied here, so we proceed to the 30 merits of Chen’s claims. 31 32 Chen principally argues on appeal that the district 33 court erred in considering the Employment Agreement when 34 evaluating defendants-appellees’ motion to dismiss. 35 “[M]aterials outside the record may become the basis for a 36 dismissal” if: (1) the document is “‘integral’ to the 37 complaint”; (2) “no dispute exists regarding the 38 authenticity or accuracy of the document”; and (3) “there 39 exist no material disputed issues of fact regarding the 40 relevance of the document.” Faulkner v. Beer, 463 F.3d 130, 41 134 (2d Cir. 2006). The Employment Agreement meets all 42 three requirements given that, by its terms, it superseded 43 the Appointment Contract. Chen cannot evade that conclusion 44 merely because he carefully omitted mention of the 45 Employment Agreement in his complaint. “Carefully avoiding 46 all mention of [pertinent documents] does not make them any 47 less integral to [the] complaint.” Yak v. Bank Brussels 2 1 Lambert, 252 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the 2 district court properly exercised its discretion in taking 3 “the document into consideration in deciding the 4 [defendants’] motion to dismiss, without converting the 5 proceeding to one for summary judgment.” Int’l Audiotext 6 Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d 7 Cir. 1995). 8 9 Chen also argues he should have been given leave to 10 replead notwithstanding that he made no such application to 11 the district court. “[W]e do not deem it an abuse of the 12 district court’s discretion to order a case closed when 13 leave to amend has not been sought.” Shields v. Citytrust 14 Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1132 (2d Cir. 1994). 15 16 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in 17 Chen’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the order of the 18 district court. 19 20 FOR THE COURT: 21 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK 22 3