NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 23, 2016*
Decided June 24, 2016
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
No. 16‐1078
PAUL ANDRESS, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellant, Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
v. No. 15‐CV‐423‐JPS
DAUBERT LAW FIRM, LLC, and J.P. Stadtmueller,
MICHAEL A. STUELAND, Judge.
Defendants‐Appellees.
O R D E R
Paul Andress brought this suit against lawyer Michael Stueland and
Daubert Law Firm claiming that the defendants violated several provisions of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a–1692l, during state‐court litigation
to collect a defaulted car loan. The district court dismissed some of the claims under the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine for lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction, see D.C. Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and the rest
* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral
argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.
See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
No. 16‐1078 Page 2
for noncompliance with the pleading standards in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.
We agree with the court’s application of the Rooker–Feldman doctrine and also conclude
that Andress has waived any challenge to the dismissal of his other claims.
Andress borrowed $33,120 from a bank to buy a pickup truck in 2011. Two years
later the bank, asserting that Andress had fallen behind in his payments, sued him in
Wisconsin state court to collect the debt. Andress did not defend the lawsuit, and in
April 2014 the state court entered a default judgment in the amount of $32,019. Andress
did not appeal that judgment or the denial of his later request to reopen the case. The
bank, represented by Stueland, an attorney at Daubert Law Firm, then sought to enforce
the judgment by securing two garnishment orders against Andress.
Andress responded with this suit in federal court asserting that the defendants
had violated the FDCPA by (1) failing to serve him properly in the state‐court action,
(2) initiating collection activities in state court despite knowing that evidence of a debt
to the bank was lacking, (3) concealing the “true identity of the real party in interest” by
not disclosing that the bank had been made whole through “default insurance” and
reassignment of the loan, (4) calling him at his home and calling his employer despite
his contrary instructions, and (5) yelling, screaming, and trying to intimidate him
during telephone discussions about the defaulted loan.
The district court concluded that, because of the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, it
lacked subject‐matter jurisdiction over the first three claims. Those claims, the court
reasoned, essentially challenged the Wisconsin court’s judgment and garnishment
orders. And the two remaining claims concerning unauthorized or abusive telephone
calls, the court added, were too vague to satisfy the minimum pleading requirements of
Rule 8. The court further noted that Stueland had not been properly served. The court
gave Andress 30 days to amend his complaint to include greater detail and also to
perfect service of process on Stueland, but Andress declined. Instead he moved for
reconsideration, which was denied. The district court later dismissed the action after its
deadline for amending the complaint had passed without further action by Andress.
On appeal Andress argues that his first three claims should not have been
dismissed under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine because, he says, the injuries he asserts are
independent of the state‐court judgment. The Rooker–Feldman doctrine deprives the
lower federal courts of subject‐matter jurisdiction to review judgments entered by state
courts in civil litigation. See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006); Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291–92 (2005). Thus, only the Supreme Court may
hear “cases brought by state‐court losers complaining of injuries caused by state‐court
No. 16‐1078 Page 3
judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. at 464 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284).
To the extent that Andress’s first three claims even allege violations of the FDCPA, the
district court correctly concluded that Rooker–Feldman divests it of jurisdiction to hear
them. None of the alleged violations—that service in the state‐court proceeding was
defective, that the defendants must have known that they would have lost the collection
action (had Andress not defaulted), and that in the state court the defendants concealed
the identity of the real party in interest—could have resulted in injury independent of
the judgment or the subsequent garnishment orders. See Harold v. Steel, 773 F.3d 884,
885 (7th Cir. 2014) (“No injury occurred until the state judge ruled against him.”); Kelley
v. Med‐1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that Rooker–Feldman
applies when injuries alleged—attorney fees—could not be analyzed without
determining whether state court erred in granting fees). The district court thus correctly
concluded that it did not have subject‐matter jurisdiction over his claims.
The last two counts in Andress’s complaint were dismissed as deficient under
Rule 8 and for defective service on Stueland. Although Andress asks that this court
allow him to reassert those claims in the district court, he has not challenged the district
court’s reasons for dismissing them. Defendants argue that Andress has thus waived
any argument that the district court erred in dismissing the claims, and Andress did not
file a reply brief contesting that position. We agree with defendants that Andress has
waived any contention that the dismissal of these two claims was improper.
AFFIRMED.