In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 14‐2753
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
ALEXIS MIRANDA‐SOTOLONGO,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 13‐10107‐001 — Joe Billy McDade, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED APRIL 20, 2015 — DECIDED JUNE 28, 2016
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, and
DARRAH, District Judge.
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant Alexis Miranda‐Soto‐
longo challenges both his conviction and his sentence for be‐
ing a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). First, he argues that the district court erred in
The Honorable John W. Darrah, of the Northern District of Illinois,
sitting by designation.
2 No. 14‐2753
denying his motion to suppress the guns used to convict him,
contending that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to con‐
duct the traffic stop that led to the discovery of the guns. We
affirm the denial of the motion to suppress. The officer based
the stop on the fact that the number on the defendant’s car’s
temporary registration tag did not appear in the relevant law
enforcement database. That discrepancy gave the officer a
reasonable suspicion that the car was either stolen or other‐
wise not properly registered.
Second, the defendant argues that several special condi‐
tions of supervised release are too vague and not justified.
Although he did not raise these challenges in the district court
and the conditions had often been imposed without contro‐
versy, recent decisions from this court require us to remand
this case for reconsideration of those conditions of supervised
release.
I. Fourth Amendment Challenge to the Traffic Stop
Miranda‐Sotolongo’s encounter with the police began on
Labor Day, Monday, September 2, 2013, when Officer Jared
Johnson spotted him driving a white Cadillac on an interstate
highway in Bloomington, Illinois. Miranda‐Sotolongo had not
been speeding, swerving, or committing any moving viola‐
tion. What caught Officer Johnson’s attention was an Indiana
temporary vehicle registration tag that looked odd. He testi‐
fied that this tag was unlike any Indiana registration tag he
had seen before and that in his experience temporary Indiana
tags were normally “in the back of a window, not a piece of
paper where the license plate normally goes.”
Officer Johnson decided to check the registration number
in the relevant database. When first his own check and then a
No. 14‐2753 3
dispatcher’s separate check of the database found no record
of the registration, Johnson made a traffic stop to investigate
whether the tag might be a forgery designed to hide a stolen
or otherwise unregistered vehicle. When Officer Johnson
asked Miranda‐Sotolongo for his license, he admitted that he
was driving on a suspended license. The officer arrested him.
During a later inventory search, the police discovered the two
guns that led to defendant’s conviction.
Miranda‐Sotolongo argues on appeal that the initial stop
violated the Fourth Amendment and that the district court
erred by denying his motion to suppress the guns as evidence.
We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error
and review de novo whether the stop was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Uribe, 709 F.3d 646,
649 (7th Cir. 2013). A traffic stop is reasonable when the officer
has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, see id.
at 649–50, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968), which
can extend to violations of traffic laws, as Uribe makes clear.
See also Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. —, 135 S. Ct. 1609,
1614 (2015) (routine traffic stop is more analogous to Terry
stop than to formal arrest); Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S.
___, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014) (reasonable suspicion that driver
is breaking traffic law can justify traffic stop).
Reasonable suspicion requires more than a hunch. The of‐
ficer must be able to identify some “particularized and objec‐
tive basis” for thinking that the person to be stopped is or may
be about to engage in unlawful activity. United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). The Fourth Amendment requires an
officer making a stop to point to “specific and articulable
facts” that suggest unlawful conduct. See Uribe, 709 F.3d at
650, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
4 No. 14‐2753
The factual basis for the stop identified by the officer
here—and the one relied upon by the government and the dis‐
trict court—is that Miranda‐Sotolongo’s vehicle registration
did not appear in the law enforcement database. The district
court reasoned that because the officer was unable to verify
that the car was registered, he had a reasonable suspicion that
the temporary tag was a forgery designed to mask an unreg‐
istered or stolen car.
Before we address that basis for the officer’s suspicion, we
first consider Miranda‐Sotolongo’s argument that the govern‐
ment was not entitled to rely at all on the database infor‐
mation to justify the stop. He argues that the actual reason he
was pulled over was only the officerʹs mistaken belief that
placing a temporary paper registration tag in the normal li‐
cense‐plate holder violated Indiana law. At the suppression
hearing, the officer testified that, in his experience, temporary
Indiana registration tags were normally “in the back of a win‐
dow, not a piece of paper where the license plate normally
goes.” This suspicion that there was something strange about
this particular tag led the officer to check the database to ver‐
ify it.
Although one can often see Indiana temporary registra‐
tion tags in rear windows, it is clear that Indiana law actually
required Miranda‐Sotolongo to place the temporary paper reg‐
istration tag exactly where he did—where a normal license
plate goes and not in the rear window. See Meredith v. State,
906 N.E.2d 867, 872–73 (Ind. 2009). Miranda‐Sotolongo is cor‐
rect in theory, then, that if the only basis for the stop had been
the officer’s suspicion that the display of the registration tag
somehow violated Indiana law, we could uphold the stop
only if the officer’s mistaken understanding of the law about
No. 14‐2753 5
how to display a temporary tag was a reasonable one. See
Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. —, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014)
(“The Fourth Amendment tolerates only reasonable mistakes,
and those mistakes—whether of fact or of law—must be ob‐
jectively reasonable.”).
We need not decide whether the Illinois officer’s mistaken
view of Indiana traffic law was reasonable. Although the lo‐
cation of the tag was what first caught Officer Johnson’s eye,
the record makes clear that he did not stop Miranda‐Soto‐
longo’s vehicle until after two computer checks failed to verify
that the vehicle was temporarily registered as the tag indi‐
cated. The reason for the stop was not to investigate the place‐
ment or form of the tag but to verify that the tag was not dis‐
guising a stolen or unregistered vehicle. The fact that Indiana
has chosen to use pieces of paper that appear easy to forge as
temporary tags might have contributed to the officer’s suspi‐
cions. But Officer Johnson also had information that this par‐
ticular temporary tag did not appear in the database it should
have been in. Finding reasonable suspicion here would not
allow the police to stop just any vehicle with a temporary In‐
diana registration tag.
To avoid this logic, Miranda‐Sotolongo also argues that
the police were not entitled to consider the information from
the law enforcement database in the first place. He argues that
the information was discovered by a search that was itself un‐
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In his view, be‐
cause the only reason for the computer check was either a ran‐
dom “spot check” or the officer’s mistaken belief that the tem‐
porary tag did not comply with Indiana law, there was no in‐
dividualized suspicion of wrongdoing or other justification
for the officer’s decision to check his registration.
6 No. 14‐2753
A police officer’s check of a vehicle registration in a data‐
base is not a Fourth Amendment search, as every other circuit
that has considered this issue has held. See, e.g., United States
v. Diaz‐Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146, 1150–52 (9th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557, 561–63 (6th Cir. 2006); Olabisio‐
motosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 1999); cf.
United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972, 974 (10th Cir. 1989)
(“Because they are in plain view, no privacy interest exists in
license plates.”), citing United States v. Matthews, 615 F.2d 1279,
1285 (10th Cir. 1980). The registration check involves only
checking publicly displayed registration information against
official public records. We see no difference between such
checks and comparing, for example, a photograph of a person
against mug shots or latent fingerprints against FBI finger‐
print records.
In this case, observing and recording the registration num‐
ber was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Nor was it a search to use the registration tag
number (in which defendant had no reasonable expectation
of privacy) to retrieve the registration information present in
the law enforcement database. See Diaz‐Castaneda, 494 F.3d at
1152; Ellison, 462 F.3d at 562–63; but see Ellison, 462 F.3d at
566–71 (Moore, J., dissenting) (arguing that police use of da‐
tabases to investigate vehicles and drivers threatens privacy
interests to extent that should be subject to Fourth Amend‐
ment scrutiny). Because the police conducted a check of a da‐
tabase containing only non‐private information and did so us‐
ing only registration information that could be seen by any
member of the public, the police did not conduct a Fourth
Amendment search. Regardless of whether the police had an
articulable suspicion that Miranda‐Sotolongo was engaged in
No. 14‐2753 7
unlawful conduct, they would be able to rely on the infor‐
mation obtained from that search as a basis for the stop.1
Miranda‐Sotolongo argues further that even if the police
did not violate his rights by finding the absence of registration
information in the database, that absence could not support a
reasonable suspicion that he was violating Illinois law. Illinois
requires vehicles driven on its roads to be registered, whether
in Illinois itself or in the home state of an out‐of‐state driver.
625 ILCS 5/3‐401(a); 625 ILCS 5/3‐402(B)(2)(a). For that reason,
we and other courts have previously upheld stops based on
the absence of car registration information in the computer
database. See, e.g., United States v. Mounts, 35 F.3d 1208, 1213
& n.4 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Cortez‐Galaviz, 495 F.3d
1203, 1205–06 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Stephens, 350
F.3d 778, 780 (8th Cir. 2003); cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
663 (1979) (noting that traffic stop is justified when there is
reasonable suspicion “that an automobile is not registered”).
Miranda‐Sotolongo points out some innocent explana‐
tions for the vehicle’s registration not appearing in the law en‐
forcement database. For example, there could be a delay be‐
tween a person’s registration of a newly purchased car and
the updating of the state records. Such a delay might have ex‐
plained the discrepancy here. Miranda‐Sotolongo was
stopped on the Monday of a holiday weekend. In fact, Officer
1 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), held that police could not stop
motorists to conduct “spot checks” of registration information, including
database checks of cars driving by, unless the officer had a specific reason
to suspect the motorist was engaged in criminal activity. The reasoning of
Prouse does not extend from stopping a motorist to “spot checks” of public
records based on the registration tags that must be displayed on a vehicle
for all the world to see. See id. at 661.
8 No. 14‐2753
Johnson, in explaining why he made the stop, recognized the
possibility that the car was recently purchased (as Miranda‐
Sotolongo told him it had been) and made clear that he
stopped the car to resolve the ambiguity about whether it was
newly purchased or stolen or unregistered.
Police officers encounter situations of uncertain legality all
the time. Uncertainty does not always justify a Terry stop or a
traffic stop, which can intrude substantially on a person’s pri‐
vacy and dignity. We have explained that a “suspicion so
broad that [it] would permit the police to stop a substantial
portion of the lawfully driving public” is not reasonable.
United States v. Flores, 798 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2015) (possi‐
bility that license plate frame covered unknown information
on license plate did not justify traffic stop); accord, United
States v. Paniagua‐Garcia, 813 F.3d 1013, 1014–15 (7th Cir. 2016)
(citing Flores, possibility that driver was using cell phone for
unlawful texting rather than lawful phone call or other lawful
purpose did not justify traffic stop).
Reasonable suspicion, however, does not require the of‐
ficer to rule out all innocent explanations of what he sees. The
need to resolve ambiguous factual situations—ambiguous be‐
cause the observed conduct could be either lawful or unlaw‐
ful—is a core reason the Constitution permits investigative
stops like the one at issue here. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S.
119, 125 (2000) (“Even in Terry, the conduct justifying the stop
was ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explana‐
tion. The officer observed two individuals pacing back and
forth in front of a store, peering into the window and period‐
ically conferring. All of this conduct was by itself lawful, but
it also suggested that the individuals were casing the store for
No. 14‐2753 9
a planned robbery. Terry recognized that the officers could de‐
tain the individuals to resolve the ambiguity.”) (citations
omitted). As the Court noted in Terry, and as the district court
suggested in its suppression ruling here, it “would have been
poor police work” for an experienced officer to give up an in‐
vestigation of suspicious behavior solely because that behav‐
ior might also have an innocent explanation. See Terry, 392
U.S. at 23.
For that reason, a stop conducted in the face of ambiguity
is permissible so long as it remains sufficiently probable that
the observed conduct suggests unlawful activity. See Cortez,
449 U.S. at 418 (“The process does not deal with hard certain‐
ties, but with probabilities.”). The “relevant inquiry is not
whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but the de‐
gree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncrim‐
inal acts.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989), quot‐
ing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243–44 n.13 (1983).
By this reasoning, Officer Johnson would not have been
justified in stopping the car here merely because it had a tem‐
porary registration tag that might have been phony. But after
he and the dispatcher had both checked the relevant database
and found no record of the car’s registration in Indiana, he
had a reasonable suspicion that justified this stop. An officer
need not be absolutely certain; without specifying mathemat‐
ical probabilities, the degree of suspicion needed to justify a
traffic stop is “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by
a preponderance of the evidence,” and “obviously less” than
that needed for probable cause. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.
Officer Johnson had learned that the registration infor‐
mation on Miranda‐Sotolongo’s car did not appear in the da‐
tabase specifically designed for the purpose of verifying that
10 No. 14‐2753
information. He had also observed that the registration tag
could easily have been a home‐made forgery. In his view,
these facts, taken together, meant there was a distinct possi‐
bility that the car was either unregistered or stolen. We agree.
Although it turned out that the car was neither, Officer John‐
son had the reasonable suspicion needed to justify his initial
detention of the defendant in the traffic stop.
That does not mean we would necessarily uphold such a
stop on a different record. For example, as other courts have
reasoned, if there were evidence that the database was unre‐
liable because a large percentage of lawfully registered cars
with temporary registration tags did not appear in the data‐
base, the inability to verify the registration information stand‐
ing alone might not support a reasonable suspicion. See
Mounts, 35 F.3d at 1213 n.4 (absence of database information
might not be sufficiently probative of unlawful activity if de‐
fendant “established that a large percentage of registered au‐
tomobiles in Georgia did not appear on Georgia’s computer
system”); Cortez‐Galaviz, 495 F.3d at 1209 (demonstrating that
a law enforcement “database is unreliable might well form a
persuasive basis for a suppression motion”); United States v.
Esquivel‐Rios, 725 F.3d 1231, 1235–38 (10th Cir. 2013) (remand‐
ing for further proceedings on reliability of database in light
of dispatcher’s comment that “Colorado [temporary] tags
usually don’t return” in searches of database).
That is, it would be much harder for an officer to reasona‐
bly suspect wrongdoing if the sole basis for that suspicion
were an unreliable database. Miranda‐Sotolongo asserts a
plausible theoretical basis for why the database might be un‐
reliable when it comes to temporary tags—the delay between
registering a car and adding that new data to the database.
No. 14‐2753 11
His failure to offer evidence supporting that theory means,
however, that we cannot reverse on the speculative theory
that this database was too unreliable to justify the stop. See
Mounts, 35 F.3d at 1213 n.4; see also Esquivel‐Rios, 725 F.3d at
1235 (distinguishing between evidence suggesting unreliabil‐
ity and mere assertions of unreliability); Cortez‐Galaviz, 495
F.3d at 1209 (evidence that database was not reliable “might
well form a persuasive basis for a suppression motion,” but
argument required evidence rather than speculative possibil‐
ity).
Miranda‐Sotolongo argues in effect that the silence in the
record should be held against the government rather than
against him, citing United States v. Uribe, 709 F.3d 646 (7th Cir.
2013). There, the government attempted to justify a stop based
on reasonable suspicion that the defendant had been driving
a stolen car. The sole basis for that suspicion was that the reg‐
istration database indicated a different color for the car. We
doubted that an officer could reasonably infer that the color
discrepancy was enough by itself to suggest car theft, and the
government offered no evidence that it did. We concluded
that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop.
Id. at 652.
The reasoning of Uribe does not extend to the facts here.
First, the inferential step needed to bridge the gap between
the observed facts and unlawful conduct seems much shorter
here than it was in Uribe. A color discrepancy between the real
car and the database provides a much weaker basis for infer‐
ring the car is likely stolen or not properly registered than
does a car’s complete absence from the database. Vehicle own‐
ers do not need the state’s permission to repaint their cars.
Second, unlike in Uribe, the government here offered evidence
12 No. 14‐2753
that the inference of unlawful conduct was supported by Of‐
ficer Johnson’s experience. While the government might have
strengthened its case for reasonable suspicion by providing
some quantitative evidence about the correlation between
finding no registration information in the law enforcement
database and the car being either stolen or unregistered, see
Uribe, 709 F.3d at 652, we do not believe evidence of that sort
was required to uphold this stop. See Mounts, 35 F.3d at 1213;
Cortez‐Galaviz, 495 F.3d at 1206.
The database here was not perfect, but few are. Neverthe‐
less, the law’s usual presumption of correctness of such rec‐
ords justified reasonable suspicion, at least in the absence of
evidence that Officer Johnson could not reasonably rely on
the absence of a registration record to support an investigative
stop. See Esquivel‐Rios, 725 F.3d at 1235 (remanding denial of
motion to suppress where defendant offered evidence that
dispatcher told officer that database “usually” did not include
current information about temporary tags from state in ques‐
tion). To justify suppression, Miranda‐Sotolongo would have
needed to offer evidence to undermine that presumption of
correctness. He did not. The district court did not err by deny‐
ing the motion to suppress.
II. Supervised Release Conditions
Miranda‐Sotolongo also challenges several special condi‐
tions of the supervised release term of his sentence, arguing
that they are too vague and that the district court did not jus‐
tify sufficiently its decision to impose them. Miranda‐Soto‐
longo had advance notice of these conditions (from the
presentence report) and did not object to these conditions in
the district court. On the other hand, parties need not take
“exceptions” to decisions a court has already made in order
No. 14‐2753 13
to challenge them on appeal. See generally United States v.
Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 843–44 (7th Cir. 2015) (discussing tension
in our decisions about standard of review for conditions of
supervised release for which defendant had advance notice
and did not object or take “exception”).
While the district court here followed practices long ac‐
cepted in this circuit, our more recent cases require that we
vacate the four conditions and remand for reconsideration of
them by the district court. One condition requires defendant
to “refrain from excessive use of alcohol,” which we have
treated as too vague. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 755 F.3d
515, 524 (7th Cir. 2014), following United States v. Siegel, 753
F.3d 705, 715 (7th Cir. 2014). A second condition prohibits pur‐
chase, possession, use, distribution, or administration of
“mood‐altering substances,” which we have also treated as
too vague. E.g., Siegel, 753 F.3d at 713, 715 (7th Cir. 2014). A
third condition requires the defendant to undergo a program
of substance abuse treatment involving no more than six tests
per month to assess the use of alcohol and other illicit drugs.
Per special condition 1, however, the appellant is permitted to
consume alcohol, just not to excess. In Siegel, we described a
similar condition as an “oddity” and suggested that it be clar‐
ified on remand. 753 F.3d at 716. The last special condition of
supervised release requires Miranda‐Sotolongo to “obtain his
GED” within the first year of his supervised release term. We
have recently vacated that condition while saying we would
uphold a condition requiring a defendant to “seek” a GED.
See United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 381 (7th Cir. 2015).
We are confident that the district court on remand will
consider whether to impose similar but more narrowly tai‐
14 No. 14‐2753
lored conditions and, if so, will explain its decisions to the ex‐
tent required by our more recent decisions that are by now
familiar to all district judges in the circuit. See United States v.
Farmer, 755 F.3d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that judges
are required to “give a reason, consistent with the sentencing
factors in section 3553(a), for every discretionary part of the
sentence that the judge is imposing, including any non‐man‐
datory conditions of supervised release”). Cf. United States v.
Lewis, — F.3d —, 2016 WL 3004435 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding
that defendant waived objections to sufficiency of district
court’s explanation of reasons for supervised release condi‐
tions by declining invitation to raise issue). The problems here
are narrow enough that we see no need to order a full re‐sen‐
tencing.
Accordingly, the district court’s denial of the motion to
suppress is AFFIRMED, and the challenged conditions of su‐
pervised release are VACATED, and the case is REMANDED
for reconsideration of those conditions of supervised release.