J-S50035-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JORDAN R. STANLEY
Appellant No. 1875 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 1, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0002355-2015
BEFORE: MUNDY, J., STABILE, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED JUNE 29, 2016
Appellant, Jordan R. Stanley, appeals from the October 1, 2015
judgment of sentence of 72 hours’ incarceration, imposed by the trial court
after it convicted Appellant of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI),
and the summary offense of operating a vehicle in the wrong direction on a
roadway designated for one-way traffic.1 After careful consideration, we
affirm.
The relevant factual background is as follows.
On the morning of March 6, 2015, Appellant was
driving home from a sports bar in the Allison Hill
area of Harrisburg, where he had consumed alcohol
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1) and 3308(b), respectively.
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over the course of two hours. At approximately 1:40
a.m., Officer Gregory Hill of the Harrisburg Bureau of
Police observed Appellant’s vehicle make a left-hand
turn from northbound Cameron Street onto
westbound Maclay Street. Upon making the turn,
Appellant “cut his turn too short” and ended up
travelling westbound in the eastbound travel lane.
Officer Hill paralleled Appellant from the correct
(westbound) lane of Maclay Street until the lanes
were no longer divided by a median strip, whereupon
Officer Hill activated his emergency lights and
directed Appellant to pull into a side parking lot of
the Pennsylvania Farm Show Complex. Once
stopped, Appellant exited his vehicle. Officer Hill
exited his patrol car and ordered Appellant to return
to his vehicle, which he refused to do despite
repeated instructions from Officer Hill. Officer Hill
handcuffed Appellant out of concern that he might
flee the traffic stop. Officer Hill noted that Appellant
smelled of alcohol, that his eyes were bloodshot and
glassy, and that he was unsteady on his feet and
using his car for support. Based on his observations
of Appellant’s physical demeanor and his turn into
the wrong lane of traffic, Officer Hill placed him
under arrest for suspicion of DUI. A police transport
van delivered Appellant to county booking. Once
there, Officer Hill read [Appellant] the DL-26
chemical test consent form, explaining to him the
possible penalties for refusing to submit to a blood
test. [Appellant signed the form and declined to
take the blood test.]
Trial Court Opinion, 1/22/16, at 1-3 (citations to notes of testimony and
footnote omitted).
Appellant was charged with the aforementioned offenses. On October
1, 2015, the trial court convened Appellant’s bench trial. After the trial court
heard evidence and rendered its guilty verdicts, Appellant indicated that he
wanted “to do sentencing now.” N.T., 10/1/15, at 36. The trial court
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sentenced Appellant to 72 hours’ incarceration in Dauphin County Prison,
and ordered Appellant to complete 50 hours of community service, and pay
costs and fines. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion on October 2,
2015, in which he claimed that his conviction was against the weight of the
evidence. The trial court denied the motion on October 8, 2015. On
October 20, 2015, Appellant filed this timely appeal.2
On appeal, Appellant raises two issues for our review.
[1.] Whether the trial court erred in denying
Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion where the
verdict was against the weight of the
evidence so as to shock one’s sense of
justice where the Commonwealth never
showed that [Appellant] was incapable of
driving his vehicle safely?
[2.] Whether the Commonwealth failed to
present sufficient evidence to sustain
Appellant’s convictions where the
Commonwealth did not prove that Appellant
was incapable of driving his vehicle safely.
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
We begin by noting that the crime of DUI is defined, in pertinent part,
as follows.
§ 3802. Driving under influence of alcohol or
controlled substance
(a) General impairment.--
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2
Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.
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(1) An individual may not drive, operate or be in
actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle
after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such
that the individual is rendered incapable of safely
driving, operating or being in actual physical control
of the movement of the vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence. An allegation that a “verdict was against the weight
of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.”
Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 A.2d 873, 879 (Pa. 2008), cert. denied,
Diggs v. Pennsylvania, 129 S.Ct. 1580 (2009). Where the trial court has
ruled on a weight claim, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the
underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. Rather, “[our] review is limited to whether the trial court palpably
abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.” Commonwealth v.
Tharp, 830 A.2d 519, 528 (Pa. 2003), cert. denied, Tharp v.
Pennsylvania, 541 U.S. 1045 (2004). “The weight of the evidence is
exclusively for the finder of fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of
the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. An appellate
court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact.”
Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003) (citations
omitted), cert. denied, Champney v. Pennsylvania, 542 U.S. 939 (2004).
Before addressing the merits of Appellant’s weight claim, we first
determine whether he has properly preserved the issue for appellate review.
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Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 607 provides that a claim that the
verdict was against the weight of the evidence “shall be raised with the trial
judge in a motion for a new trial: (1) orally, on the record, at any time
before sentencing; (2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or
(3) in a post-sentence motion.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). “The purpose of this
rule is to make it clear that a challenge to the weight of the evidence must
be raised with the trial judge or it will be waived.” Commonwealth v.
McCall, 911 A.2d 992, 997 (Pa. Super. 2006). Upon review, we conclude
that Appellant properly preserved his weight of the evidence claim by raising
it in his October 2, 2015 post-sentence motion. We thus turn to the merits
of Appellant’s claim.
Appellant maintains that the trial court’s verdict “was based on pure
conjecture,” and “at no point did Officer Hill see Appellant sway or swerve
his car or do anything that would draw attention to Appellant’s vehicle.”
Appellant’s Brief at 13-15. Appellant concedes that he was “traveling in the
wrong lane,” but maintains, without further explanation or detail, that “dash
cam video,” which was not preserved or presented at the hearing, “would be
able to show what actually occurred the night of the incident.” Id.
It is well established that this Court will not reverse a trial court’s
credibility determination absent the court’s abuse of discretion. In a bench
trial, as in a jury trial, “the trier of fact, while passing upon the credibility of
witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all,
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part or none of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Zingarelli, 839 A.2d
1064, 1069 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 856 A.2d 834 (Pa. 2004).
Additionally, “the evidence at trial need not preclude every possibility of
innocence, and the fact-finder is free to resolve any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a
matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Emler, 903 A.2d 1273, 1276 (Pa.
Super. 2006).
Instantly, the trial court found the testimony of Officer Hill, as related
above, to be credible. Conversely, the trial court did not credit Appellant’s
version of events.3 The trial court stated that “in its role as fact finder, the
credible testimony of Officer Hill permitted a conclusion that Appellant drove
his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol at a time when he was
incapable of safe driving.” Trial Court Opinion, 1/22/16, at 6-7. Upon
review of the certified record, we agree. We are precluded from reweighing
the evidence and substituting our judgment for that of the fact finder.
Champney, supra at 408. Accordingly, we cannot conclude the verdict “is
so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.”
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3
Appellant testified that he “made the wrong turn,” and admitted to Officer
Hill that he “did have two beers”; however, Appellant also testified that he
was not “incapable” of safe driving, and specifically denied being “drunk” or
“tipsy.” N.T., 10/1/15, at 27-29.
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Commonwealth v. Cruz, 919 A.2d 279, 282 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation
omitted), appeal denied, 928 A.2d 1289 (Pa. 2007).
We next address Appellant’s claim that there was insufficient evidence
to sustain his conviction for DUI. Appellant contends the “testimony
adduced at trial fails to establish that Appellant was incapable of driving
safely,” and asserts his “driving failed to show any indication of impaired
driving or inability to operate his vehicle safely.” Appellant’s Brief at 16. We
disagree.
Our standard of review in assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence is well-settled. “The standard we apply in reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 939 A.2d 912, 913 (Pa.
Super. 2007) (citation omitted). “Any doubts concerning an appellant’s guilt
[are] to be resolved by the trier of fact unless the evidence was so weak and
inconclusive that no probability of fact could be drawn therefrom.”
Commonwealth v. West, 937 A.2d 516, 523 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal
denied, 947 A.2d 737 (Pa. 2008). Moreover, “[t]he Commonwealth may
sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.”
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Commonwealth v. Perez, 931 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations
omitted).
Upon review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as verdict winner, we agree with the trial court there was
sufficient evidence to establish that Appellant operated his vehicle after
consuming enough alcohol to render him incapable of safe driving. Our
review of the record supports the trial court’s reasoning, which it explained
as follows.
In the instant case, Officer Hill observed
Appellant make a left-hand turn from Northbound
Cameron Street onto the eastbound lane of Maclay
Street at 1:40 a.m., thus placing Appellant’s vehicle
on the wrong side of the road and moving in the
direction of possible oncoming traffic. As this was in
violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3308(b), Officer Hill was
well within his authority to effect a stop of
Appellant’s vehicle. Once pulled over, Appellant
exited his vehicle and ignored multiple requests to
return to his vehicle. While detaining [Appellant],
Officer Hill detected the odor of alcohol and observed
Appellant rocking back and forth and bracing himself
against his vehicle. Combined with Appellant’s
refusal to participate in a field sobriety test, th[e trial
c]ourt finds that the Commonwealth presented
ample evidence that Appellant was operating his
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and,
while operating the vehicle, he was incapable of
doing so in a safe manner.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/22/16, at 5-6.
Based on the foregoing, we find no merit to Appellant’s sufficiency
claim. Therefore, we affirm the October 1, 2015 judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/29/2016
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Com. v. Stanley, J.
Combined Opinion