15-3502
Snyder v. Colvin
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 30th day of June, two thousand sixteen.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 REENA RAGGI,
8 DENNY CHIN,
9 Circuit Judges.
10
11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
12 CHASITY SNYDER,
13 Plaintiff-Appellant,
14
15 -v.- 15-3502
16
17 CAROLYN COLVIN,
18 Commissioner of Social Security,
19 Defendant-Appellee.
20 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
21
22 FOR APPELLANT: MARK SCHNEIDER, Plattsburgh, New
23 York.
24
25 FOR APPELLEES: FERGUS KAISER, Special Assistant
26 U.S. Attorney (with Stephen P.
27 Conte, Regional Chief Counsel –
28 Region II Office of the General
1
1 Counsel Social Security
2 Administration, on the brief),
3 for Richard S. Hartunian, United
4 States Attorney for the Northern
5 District of New York.
6
7 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
8 Court for the Northern District of New York (Suddaby, C.J.).
9
10 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
11 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
12 AFFIRMED.
13
14 Plaintiff Chasity Snyder appeals from the district
15 court’s affirmance of a decision of the Commissioner of
16 Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for
17 Social Security disability benefits. We review the
18 administrative record de novo, and will uphold the
19 Commissioner’s decision if it is supported by substantial
20 evidence and the correct legal standards were applied. See
21 Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012)
22 (“Substantial evidence . . . . means such relevant evidence
23 as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
24 conclusion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Zabala v.
25 Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 2010). We assume the
26 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
27 procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
28
29 1. The plaintiff argues that the district court
30 applied an incorrect standard of review, but does not
31 support the argument with record evidence or citation to any
32 portion of the district court ruling. The standard of
33 review is “very deferential.” Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,
34 Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012). “Issues not
35 sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and
36 normally will not be addressed on appeal.” City of Syracuse
37 v. Onondaga Cty., 464 F.3d 297, 308 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal
38 quotation marks omitted).
39
40 2. The ALJ acknowledged that the plaintiff’s cervical
41 condition, obesity, and depression were impairments, but
42 found that they did not rise to the level of a disability.
43 The plaintiff argues that she was disabled by the
44 “combination” of her spinal disorders, mental impairments,
45 obesity, and other “exertional and non-exertional
46 limitations.” However, the ALJ considered her impairments
47 in combination, as well as separately. See Rivers v.
2
1 Astrue, 280 F. App’x 20, 23 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary order)
2 (rejecting allegations that the ALJ failed to consider
3 impairments in combination where record showed that each
4 ailment and its cumulative effects was considered).
5
6 3. Snyder argues that the ALJ gave too much weight to
7 the medical opinion of the consulting psychologist. The
8 opinion of a treating physician is not binding if it is
9 contradicted by substantial evidence, and a consulting
10 physician report may constitute such evidence. See Mongeur
11 v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir. 1983). Here, the
12 consulting psychologist opinion was consistent with other
13 medical evidence and was supported by substantial evidence;
14 the ALJ therefore did not err in affording his opinion great
15 weight.
16
17 4. Snyder argues that the ALJ erred by not crediting
18 her testimony. The Commissioner is not obligated to credit
19 a claimant’s testimony about her limitations and symptoms,
20 but has discretion to evaluate the claimant’s credibility in
21 light of the evidence in the record. See Genier v. Astrue,
22 606 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2010). The ALJ determined that,
23 while Snyder’s medically determinable impairments could
24 reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms,
25 Snyder’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence,
26 and limiting effects of these symptoms were not entirely
27 credible. The ALJ specifically analyzed Snyder’s claims of
28 neck pain, arm numbness, obesity, and depression; as to each
29 condition, the ALJ cited specific medical evidence in the
30 record and concluded that the alleged limitations were
31 without support. Accordingly, the ALJ sufficiently
32 explained the credibility determination and committed no
33 error.
34
35 5. Snyder argues that the ALJ erroneously relied upon
36 the lack of “formal mental health treatment” to deny her
37 appeal. The ALJ considered and discussed Snyder’s “history
38 of treatment for depression,” which included prescription
39 antidepressants from her primary care physician. The ALJ’s
40 credibility assessment observed that the plaintiff never
41 sought “formal mental health treatment” (such as counseling
42 or psychiatric care). Although an ALJ may find a plaintiff
43 less credible if she failed to seek medical treatment, an
44 ALJ is obligated to consider any explanation a plaintiff may
45 have for such failure, see SSR 16-3p, 81 Fed. Reg. 14,166,
46 14,170-71 (Mar. 16, 2016), and here the ALJ did not consider
3
1 any reasons why the plaintiff did not seek “formal mental
2 health treatment.”
3
4 Despite this error, the credibility determination was
5 supported by other substantial record evidence as discussed
6 above. Furthermore, the lack of formal mental health
7 treatment was just one of multiple factors considered in
8 assessing the plaintiff’s credibility, including that
9 Snyder’s allegations were unsupported by objective medical
10 evidence, and so any error was harmless.
11
12 6. Snyder argues that the Commissioner did not satisfy
13 her burden to show at Step 5 that she could not perform work
14 in the national economy. When the hypothetical posed to the
15 vocational expert is based on a residual functional capacity
16 finding that is supported by substantial evidence, the
17 hypothetical is proper and the ALJ is entitled to rely on
18 the vocational expert’s testimony. See Dumas v. Schweiker,
19 712 F.2d 1545, 1554 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Salmini v.
20 Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 371 F. App’x 109, 114 (2d Cir. 2010)
21 (summary order). Here, the ALJ’s hypothetical to the
22 vocational expert closely paralleled the ALJ’s residual
23 functional capacity finding, which was supported by
24 substantial evidence. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s
25 challenge fails.
26
27 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in the
28 plaintiff’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment
29 of the district court.
30
31 FOR THE COURT:
32 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
33
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