J-S37041-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JOHN D. LIPPHARDT
Appellant No. 1921 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 6, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-20-CR-0001162-2014
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and LAZARUS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JUNE 30, 2016
John D. Lipphardt appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in
the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County after a jury convicted him of
failure to register his residence with the Pennsylvania State Police1 pursuant
to provisions2 of the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act
(SORNA).3 Upon review, we affirm.
Lipphardt was previously convicted of a crime that required him to
register with the Pennsylvania State Police in compliance with SORNA. On or
about August 26, 2014, Lipphardt moved from a residence in Mercer County
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1
18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(1).
2
42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(g).
3
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41.
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to a residence in Crawford County. Lipphardt did not report to the
Pennsylvania State Police in person to register his new address within the
statutory period of three business days required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(g).
Indeed, Lipphardt did not register his new address at any point prior to his
arrest on October 21, 2014.
Prior to trial, Lipphardt filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude
evidence of his continued failure to report after three business days, arguing
that “any evidence of [his] non-reporting beyond the stated three-day time
period is irrelevant.” Motion in Limine, 9/14/15, at ¶ 9. The trial court
denied the motion in limine, and a jury trial was conducted on September 14
and 15, 2015. Lipphardt was found guilty of failing to report the change in
his residence and was sentenced on November 6, 2015, to five to ten years’
incarceration, to be served concurrently with any other sentences he was
serving.
Lipphardt filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
On appeal, Lipphardt raises the following issue for our review:
Whether the trial court erred in denying [Lipphardt’s] motion in
limine requesting that any evidence of [his] failure to register
with the Pennsylvania State Police beyond the legally stated
three-day time period should be excluded at trial?
Brief of Appellant, at 7.
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We review a trial court’s denial of a motion in limine for an abuse of
discretion. Commonwealth v. Owens, 929 A.2d 1187, 1190 (Pa. Super.
2007). Further,
[o]ur standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial
of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the
suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record
and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record
as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and
may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous.
Where, as here, the appeal of the determination of the
suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an
appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the
conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary
review.
Commonwealth v. Hoppert, 39 A.3d 358, 361-62 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citation omitted).
Instantly, the Commonwealth was required to present evidence
showing that Lipphardt knowingly failed to update his address in person
within three business days of moving. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(1); 42
Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(g). Lipphardt admits that he did not register his new
address within three business days. However, Lipphardt argues that his
failure to register should be excused because he did not have transportation
and, thus, “he did not voluntarily fail to register his new address with the
Pennsylvania State Police or an approved registration site within three
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business days.” Brief of Appellant, at 10 (emphasis added). In making this
argument, Lipphardt asserts that any evidence of events outside the three-
day window is irrelevant. We disagree.
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 402 provides that relevant evidence is
generally admissible. Pa.R.E. 402. Moreover, evidence is relevant if “it has
any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.” Pa.R.E. 401(a). During the hearing on the motion in limine,
the Commonwealth indicated that although it appeared that Lipphardt had
relocated on August 26, 2014, the exact date was unclear. See N.T. Motion
in Limine, 9/14/15, at 17-18. Thus, the trial court appropriately determined
that evidence of non-compliance beyond the three business days
immediately following August 26 was relevant.
We also note that Lipphardt provides no legal support indicating that a
lack of transportation provides a defense for the failure to register a new
address. When Lipphardt chose to set forth this “defense,” he made his
continued non-compliance even more relevant because it bolsters the theory
that Lipphardt knowingly failed to register and simply fabricated an excuse
months later for his failure to do so.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court did not err in
denying Lipphardt’s motion in limine.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/30/2016
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