15‐1469
Maldonado v. Evans
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY
CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40
Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 1st day of July, two thousand
sixteen.
PRESENT: CHESTER J. STRAUB,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
ANGEL MALDONADO,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v. 15‐1469
ANDREA W. EVANS, Chairwoman, New
York State Division of Parole, BRIAN
FISCHER, Commissioner, New York State
Department of Correctional Services,
DIANA SHERRY, Facility Parole Officer,
SUSANNA MATTINGLY, Parole Officer,
Defendants‐Appellees. 1
_____________________________________
FOR APPELLANT: ANGEL MALDONADO, pro se, Malone, NY.
FOR APPELLEES: KATE H. NEPVEU, Assistant Solicitor General
(Andrew Ayers, Senior Assistant Solicitor General,
Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, on the brief)
for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State
of New York, Albany, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the
Western District of New York (Arcara, J.; Schroeder, M.J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is
AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff‐Appellant Angel Maldonado, proceeding pro se, appeals from a
judgment in favor of Defendants‐Appellees2 in his suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
asserting that Defendants‐Appellees Diana Sherry and Susanna Mattingly
1 The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the official caption to conform with the
caption above.
2 Although Maldonado also named as defendants Commissioner Brian Fischer and
Division of Parole Chairwoman Andrea Evans in the District Court, he has not
challenged the district court’s grant of summary judgment in their favor on appeal. We
therefore deem his argument against them abandoned. See LoSacco v. City of
Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding, in civil appeal filed by pro
se appellant, that issue not raised in an appellate brief are abandoned).
delayed his re‐release to parole without affording him due process. We assume
the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the
case, and the issues on appeal.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Garcia v.
Hartford Police Dep’t, 706 F.3d 120, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). Summary
judgment must be granted if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“Where cross‐motions for summary judgment are filed, a court must evaluate
each party’s motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all
reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration.”
Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 100 v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of Parks &
Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 543 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the District Court properly adopted the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation to grant summary judgment in favor of Appellees. We affirm
for substantially the reasons stated by the Magistrate Judge in his thorough
September 26, 2014 report and recommendation.
We have considered Maldonado’s remaining arguments and find them to
be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk