United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 26, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 02-21316
Summary Calendar
MAURICE TAYLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JERRY GROOM, Chaplain Director,
AKBAR SHABAZZ, Islamic Chaplain,
DONALD KASPAR, Regional Chaplain,
JANIE COCKRELL, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-00-CV-2809
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Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Maurice Taylor brings this appeal to challenge the district
court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim of his equal-
rights challenge to the grooming policy of the Texas prison in
which he was incarcerated when he first filed this suit. He
argues that he has raised a valid equal-protection claim, that
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-21316
-2-
the district court erred in substituting Janie Cockrell for the
defendants originally named in his complaint, and that the
district court should have enforced this court’s prior order that
Cockrell bear part of the costs associated with his initial
appeal. He also moves this court for the appointment of counsel;
to issue a show cause order that directs Cockrell to pay the
appellate costs she owes him; and to reconsider our prior
dismissal of Cockrell’s appeal, which was dismissed upon her
motion. Cockrell moves this court to vacate that part of the
district court’s judgment relating to Taylor’s claim under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).
Several of Taylor’s former fellow inmates move this court for
leave to intervene in the suit, to certify it as a class action,
and to join as plaintiffs.
Taylor has not briefed that portion of the district court’s
judgment holding that his claim for monetary damages was barred
by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Accordingly, this issue is
waived. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir.
1993).
Taylor does, however, argue that the district court erred in
dismissing his claim for injunctive relief because he has raised
a valid claim that the grooming policy had a disparate impact
upon Muslims. This argument is unavailing. Taylor’s recent
release from prison moots his claims for injunctive relief. See
Rocky v. King, 900 F.2d 864, 867 (5th Cir. 1990). Accordingly,
No. 02-21316
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Taylor’s appeal from the district court’s dismissal of his equal-
protection claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted is DISMISSED AS MOOT. Taylor’s motion for a
show cause order is DENIED because the defendant asserts that she
is taking reasonable steps to comply with this court’s order
concerning appellate costs.
“If a claim becomes moot after the entry of a district
court’s judgment and prior to the completion of appellate review,
we generally vacate the judgment and remand for dismissal.”
Murphy v. Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist., 334 F.3d 470, 471 (5th
Cir. 2003). That is the scenario presented by the instant case
in relation to Taylor’s RLUIPA claim. Accordingly, we GRANT
Cockrell’s motion, VACATE the district court’s Memorandum Order
and Injunction relating to Taylor’s RLUIPA claim, and REMAND this
case to the district court for the sole purpose of dismissal of
Taylor’s RLUIPA claim. Because Taylor’s appeal is moot, all
other outstanding motions are DENIED.