United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 26, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 02-60645
Summary Calendar
PRAMIT BOONNIN SANCHEZ
Petitioner
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, US ATTORNEY GENERAL
Respondent
--------------------
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A-29-999-175
--------------------
Before KING, Chief Judge, and WIENER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Pramit Boonnin Sanchez, a native and citizen of Thailand,
challenges a final order of deportation issued by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) on July 10, 2002. Sanchez argues
that: (1) the BIA violated her right to due process by summarily
affirming the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) pursuant
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-60645
-2-
to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7)**; (2) the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (“INS”) is barred from bringing deportation proceedings
against her because it failed to comply with the statute of
limitations set forth in § 246(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act; and (3) the IJ’s determination that her marriage
was fraudulent is not supported by substantial evidence.
Sanchez’s due process argument is foreclosed by this court’s
decision in Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 832-33 (5th Cir.
2003). In Soadjede, this court rejected a due process challenge
to the “streamlining” regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7), holding
that the summary affirmance procedures do not violate due process
and do not deprive the court of a basis for judicial review.
324 F.3d at 832-33.
Sanchez did not raise her statute of limitations argument
before the BIA, either on direct appeal or in a motion to reopen.
Thus, she has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with
respect to this claim. See Wang v. Ashcroft, 260 F.3d 448, 452
(5th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, this court may not consider the
issue.
Sanchez has not provided this court with compelling evidence
warranting reversal of the IJ’s determination that her marriage
was fraudulent. See Moin v. Ashcroft, ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir.
**
The regulation previously cited as 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (2002)
can now be found at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2003). Because the
parties referred to the 2002 regulation, and because the new
regulation is either identical or substantially similar to the
older version, we will refer to the 2002 regulation.
No. 02-60645
-3-
June 20, 2003, No. 02-60449) 2003 WL 21435473 at *1.
Accordingly, her petition for review of the BIA’s decision is
DENIED.