United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT September 8, 2003
_____________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-10181
Summary Calendar
_____________________
Arthur Williams,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
versus
Aviall Services Inc.,
Defendant/Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
District Court No. 3:01-CV-2151-D
_________________________________________________________________
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, EMILIO M. GARZA and PRADO, Circuit Judges.1
PRADO, Circuit Judge.
Arthur Williams sued his former employer, Aviall Services,
Inc., alleging that Aviall fired him because of his race. After
conducting discovery, Aviall filed a motion for summary judgment
on October 7, 2002. Williams responded to this motion on November
5, 2002. On November 20, 2002, Aviall sought leave to file a
supplemental appendix to its reply. Williams filed no opposition
1
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, this Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R.
47.5.4.
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to this motion, which was granted as unopposed. Williams then
asked the court for leave to file a surreply. The Magistrate
Judge denied Williams’ request. Subsequently, the Magistrate
Judge recommended granting Aviall’s motion for summary judgment,
and the District Court accepted this recommendation. On appeal,
Williams argues that the Magistrate Judge erred by denying him
permission to file a surreply. Williams also appeals from the
summary judgment decision, arguing that he conclusively proved
that documents Aviall used as evidence had been falsified and
that Aviall had discriminated against him. Finding no error, we
will affirm.
Motion for Leave to File Surreply
As the Magistrate Judge pointed out in his order denying
Williams’ request to file a surreply, the proposed surreply
included no new arguments or evidence. Williams’ response to
Aviall’s motion for summary judgement had already presented
everything contained in his surreply. Therefore, the Magistrate
Judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Williams’ motion
for leave to file a surreply. Williams’ arguments and evidence
were before the district court when it ruled on Aviall’s motion
for summary judgment.
Summary Judgment
Although nowhere does Williams specifically state that he
appeals the summary judgment decision, he argues that if he had
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been permitted to file his surreply, he would have won his case.
In particular, he argues that his proposed surreply would have
proved that Aviall’s evidence was falsified. In light of
Williams’ pro se status, the Court will interpret these arguments
as raising the issue of whether the district court properly
granted summary judgment.
This Court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo, using
the same standards as the district court. Hanks v. Transcon. Gas
Pipe Line Corp., 953 F.2d 996, 997 (5th Cir. 1992). To be
entitled to summary judgment, the movant must show the absence of
any genuine issue of material fact. Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d
453, 457 (5th Cir. 1994). In response, the nonmovant must
present evidence showing that a fact issue exists. Id.
Conclusory allegations will not suffice. Hanks, 953 F.2d at 997.
Because Williams presents no direct evidence of
discrimination, his claims are analyzed using the McDonnell
Douglas framework. Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., L.L.P., 332 F.3d
874, 881 (5th Cir. 2003). Under this framework, after a
plaintiff produces a prima facie case, the burden of production
switches to the employer to offer a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the employment action. Id. Once the
employer has offered this reason, the burden shifts again to the
plaintiff to present evidence that the employer’s reason is
pretext for discrimination. Id. On appeal, Aviall concedes that
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Williams established a fact question on his prima facie case of
discrimination.
Aviall produced evidence that it terminated Williams because
he got into an altercation with his supervisor. This evidence
included deposition testimony, affidavits of Williams’
supervisors, a signed employee handbook, and records of
disciplinary actions Aviall previously took against Williams.
Williams argues that the signature on the employee handbook was
not his own and that, because the wrong person signed as his
manager, the disciplinary records were forged. Even assuming
that Williams could produce evidence that he did not sign the
handbook and that the incorrect supervisor signed the forms,2
this evidence would not raise a fact question concerning pretext.
Williams has presented no evidence that calls Aviall’s stated
reason for his termination into doubt.
In his response to the summary judgment motion, Williams
pointed to two pieces of evidence: the Texas Workforce Commission
determination that he had not been terminated for misconduct
associated with work and evidence that he had received pay
increases during his employment at Aviall. Neither piece of
evidence presents a fact question about pretext. Under Texas
law, the Texas Workforce Commission’s findings and conclusions
may not be used as evidence in lawsuits, except for suits brought
2
The record contains no evidence of this.
4
to enforce unemployment benefits. TEX. LAB. CODE § 213.007.
Additionally, evidence that Williams received pay raises in the
past does not cast any doubt on the validity of Aviall’s stated
reason for terminating Williams. The district court did not err
in concluding that Williams did not meet his summary judgment
burden.
AFFIRMED.
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