Lewis v. Bank of America NA

                                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                   Fifth Circuit
                                                                F I L E D
                                                                October 6, 2003
                 United States Court of Appeals
                      for the Fifth Circuit                  Charles R. Fulbruge III
            _____________________________________                    Clerk


                         No. 02-10605
            _____________________________________


                          BILLY LEWIS,

                                     Plaintiff - Appellee/Cross-Appellant


                             VERSUS

              BANK OF AMERICA NA, Etc.; ET AL,

                                     Defendants,

BANK OF AMERICA NA, formerly known as Nationsbank of Texas NA;
 MARK THOMASON; WALTER F. SMITH, JR.; SALLY WALTERS,

                                     Defendants - Appellants/Cross-
                                     Appellees.

     __________________________________________________

            Appeals from the United States District Court
                 For the Northern District of Texas
     __________________________________________________

                   ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

    Opinion September 2, 2003, U.S. 5th Cir. 2003, _____F.3d____.
Before DAVIS, CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL* and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM:

      Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Billy Lewis (“Lewis”) complains that, inter alia,

we misstated Texas law when we said that the “failure to disclose information is not

actionable ‘misrepresentation’ under Texas law, absent a fiduciary relationship.”

Lewis cites Union Pacific Resources Group, Inc. v. Rhone, 247 F.3d 574 (5th Cir.

2001), which states that

      A duty to speak arises by operation of law when (1) a confidential or
      fiduciary duty relationship exists between the parties; or (2) one party
      learns later that his previous statement was false and misleading; or (3)
      one party knows that the other party is relying on a concealed fact and
      does not have an equal opportunity to discover the truth; or (4) one
      party voluntarily discloses some but less than all material facts, so that
      he must disclose the whole truth, i.e., all material facts, lest his partial
      disclosure convey a false impression.

Id. at 586 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing World Help v. Leisure Lifestyles, Inc., 977 S.W.2d

662, 670 (Tex. App.-Forth Worth 1998, pet. denied)). We agree that the above

quote from Rhone correctly states current Texas law.

      Lewis argues that the Bank’s loan officer Mark Thomason (“Thomason”) had

a duty to disclose the taxability of the new account under the fourth prong of Rhone


      *
       Circuit Judge of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
                                           2
as stated above. Assuming without deciding that Thomason knew the tax

consequences of this transaction and had an obligation to advise Lewis accordingly,

Lewis still has not satisfied the requirement that he was justified in relying on

Thomason for tax advice.

      The petition for panel rehearing is denied. Judge Garza would grant

rehearing for reasons stated in his Dissent.

      No member of this panel nor judge in regular active service on the court

having requested that the court be polled on Rehearing En Banc, (Fed. R. App. P.

And 5th Cir. R. 35) the Petitions for Rehearing En Banc are also DENIED.




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